I Dream of Mogadishu

I have not seen Mogadishu since 1987.


In fact, I have not lived in my hometown since 1978. But I visited it briefly—not more than two weeks each time—about four times between 1978 and 1987.

The Somali civil war finally reached Mogadishu in January 1991 when President Siad Barre and his supporters were driven out of the city. What happened next in the capital is beyond comprehension. Thousands of people were killed by Barre’s fleeing soldiers, others because they belonged to the wrong clan, and many were caught in the cross-fire of renegade fighters. Thousands were uprooted, and the city was destroyed by marauding armed militias. Government buildings were looted and damaged. Many of the residents suffered continuous bombardment from warring factions and ended up being killed or wounded while others fled to the countryside or flocked to neighboring countries, especially Kenya. Today, at least 600,000 Somali refugees still live in Dhadab camp, on the Kenyan side of the border.

The destruction that occurred in Mogadishu was unfathomable. Keith Richburg, a Washington Post reporter, wrote a vivid portrayal of the city in the early 1990s in his interesting book, Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa (1997):

“When I first saw Mogadishu in 1992, the capital looked like a transplanted set from

“Mad Max” movies, about a surreal post-nuclear world where scavengers survive by

slapping together debris and bits of scrap metal. Mogadishu hadn’t gone through a

nuclear inferno−but it seemed about as close as you could come in an urban setting.”

According to Richburg, sections of Mogadishu were so dangerous that a “Green Line” divided the warring factions, a term aptly borrowed from Beirut during Lebanon’s civil war. One particularly dangerous and treacherous section was called “Bosnia.” The American government’s brief humanitarian intervention in Somalia was preceded by an opinion article in the Washington Post penned by its flamboyant ambassador in Nairobi, Smith Hempstone, who warned about sending troops there. The piece was fittingly titled, “If you liked Beirut, you will love Mogadishu.” In essence, Mogadishu became a derelict and dilapidated city.

The armed militias took the entire city hostage in their bellicose pursuit of hegemony. They became unhinged in a shocking display of brutality and terror toward residents. People in the city were unable to extricate themselves from the situation. As a result, they led a regimented existence created by a culture of fear. Mogadishu residents experienced high unemployment because all the major institutions and businesses were destroyed. It was a situation just like that encountered by the late Arab-American reporter of the New York Times, Anthony Shadid. In his memoir, A House of Stone (2012), Shadid referred to his ancestral home of Lebanon during its civil war as “tribes bereft of citizenship.”

One thing that has gone viral on the internet, and even in some books, is the notion of juxtaposing old images of serene Mogadishu and the newer pictures: a contrast of growth vs. destruction, civilization vs. decay, peace vs. war, and normalcy vs. anarchy.

Mogadishu is the same city that the famous Moroccan traveler, Ibn Batuta, visited in 1331 and found to be steeped in history and tradition. Mogadishu was prosperous, diverse, and well connected to the world markets. Men, the Arab traveler said, were hefty eaters to the extent that they appeared corpulent with protruding stomachs. To the keen traveler, the city seemed prosperous and lively. In the 1990s, oddly, there were rumors in Mogadishu that incoming travelers were weighed at the old military airport in Balli Doogle for ransom purposes. Rumor had it that if you had extra pounds you were likely to pay more money to protect yourself from kidnapping. That is when appearance became deadly.

I was in California when streams of Somali refugees arrived there in1991 and afterward. Before their arrival, the Somali community was small and cohesive. We visited each other, occasionally ate together, and helped the needy. The arrival of droves of Somalis fresh from Somalia, a country that had abysmally failed, was jarring. Refugees from various clans who hated each other were placed in San Diego. However, although resentment and suspicion permeated their relationships, they were not in a position to engage in violence.

I used to see two friends who drank tea together every day in a fast food restaurant. They belonged to the same clan but were from two different sub-clans. One day, I noticed the two were no longer socializing. When I inquired about the reason for their estrangement, one of them told me that they had a falling out because of recent flare-ups of fighting in the port city of Kismayo. It was apparent then that the Somali civil war had reached San Diego sans violence.

My mother stayed in Mogadishu for the first few months of the civil war. She was attacked with gunfire once when a group of marauding gangs robbed her in her house. My cousin, Shukri, was fourteen and she suffered a minor injury when a splinter hit her arm. When the fighting got intense, my mother fled to Afgooye to my brother-in-law’s villa. A militia headed by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, a warlord, occupied Afgooye and forced my mother out of the villa. She and my cousin returned to her home. My mother did not want to leave her house until my sister persuaded her to leave. She flew to neighboring Djibouti where I met her and arranged an entry visa to the U.S for her and my cousin. She arrived in San Diego in May 1991.

I can only speculate that my mother went through two stages after her escape from Mogadishu: stress and indifference. In the beginning, she was edgy, worried, and apprehensive about what the future held for her in America. She initially thought that the civil war back home would subside and that she would be able to return to her beloved city of Mogadishu and her villa. My mother always wanted to have her own house when my sister and I were growing up, but she couldn’t afford it. Only after the two years when my sister and I left the country−in 1977 and 1978, respectively−was my mother able to purchase a house. She was so proud of her house that she became distraught when she left Mogadishu. Her neighbors agreed to look after the villa in her absence. However, my mother never returned to Mogadishu and passed away in San Diego eighteen years after her arrival.

Several years after her arrival in California, my mother started showing indifference to Mogadishu. She no longer talked about the city or her house. She had spent 40 years in the region of Benadir, of which Mogadishu is the capital, and only 20 years in Qardho, her birthplace. When I offered several times to take her to Somalia for a two-month vacation, she declined. Her usual answer was astonishing: “What am I going to do there?” She had accepted the reality that the civil war in Mogadishu was not winding down but instead intensifying. To her, Mogadishu slid slowly into an abyss.

I have never lost hope for Mogadishu. Somehow, I knew that the city would recover from its destruction and decay. One thing I had faith in was the people of Mogadishu−the ones who fled, the ones who stayed, and others who joined them afterward. Those who fled kept up with news of the city. I saw people from Hargeisa who would tell me about their good memories of Mogadishu. They missed it as much as the people who called the capital home. The city had captivated them intensely. There is something magical about Mogadishu. The city has the capacity to shape its residents regardless of their background. It molds them as time goes by and exposes their softer sides. Mogadishu provides ample scope for acceptance, compassion, and forgiveness. It is an ancient city that has always been rich in its tapestry of people.

Although the capital has a long way to go in terms of recovering from its devastation, there are glimmers of hope that people are coming together. Some of those who fled are back−not only reclaiming their properties, but also feeling confident in their safety. People who would have been hunted two decades ago are building businesses in the city and are now an integral part of the new Somalia. These people have shattered the psychological barrier that crippled them and made them prisoners to their fear and biases. They thought they would be killed and ostracized. Instead, they have found their brethren welcoming them with open arms. Of course, there have been cases in which returnees were murdered by criminal elements. However, this does not represent the majority of Mogadishu residents who no longer believe that the capital must be devoid of its original residents.

I believe there is hope in the reconstruction of Mogadishu−not just in building houses, but also in building trust and confidence. Mogadishu residents are doing just that, even if incrementally. Rome, after all, was not built in a day, and so it is with Mogadishu. The city’s past mood of utter despondency has been replaced with feelings of hope for rejuvenation. Yes, residents were subjected to a great deal of trauma, but people had time to wallow in that trauma. Now they are war-weary and, above all, they have become, as rational choice theory proponents would say, committed to wanting more rather than settling for less than good. They want to maximize their personal advantage by doing what is healthy for the long term.

The Canadian comic Jim Carey, in Dumb and Dumber, makes an interesting revelatory statement. After chasing a beautiful married woman cross -country, he finally asks her about the chances of the two ever living together happily. “Not good,” is her stark answer. But Carey’s character is not the type who takes no for an answer. Above all, he wants a percentage estimate of their likely union and pleads with her to give him a number. “You mean not good like one out of a hundred?” he asks. The woman clarifies, “I would say more like one out of a million.” Carey is quiet for a minute and finally bursts out, “So you are telling me there is a chance!” He may be statistically challenged but he is definitely looking at the positive.

I am too old to feign naiveté and too smart to be pessimistic. The grim axiom defining Mogadishu is that a bright future is emerging. It is slowly recovering. I may be unable to erase the past, but at least I am not bitter. I am optimistic that my beloved city is not yet fully formed; it has something else to reveal.

Yes, there are still plenty of chances.

*This article is excerpted from the author’s new book, Mogadishu Memoir, which will be published soon.

Is Shirdon an Asset or a Bust?

An unusual confluence of events transpired in Mogadishu last week. Last Monday, President Mohamoud visited Baidoa and asked a crowd there whom they wanted to be prime minister. “Farmajo fadaane,” (We want Farmajo) was the answer. A source told me a few days later, on Thursday night, the Abgaal imam and the ugas of Hawadle dined with President Mohamoud. The two chieftains told the president that they had come for two things: “Faataxo iyo Farmajo” (Fatiha and Farmajo). Fatiha is the first and the most important chapter of the Quran, and Farmajo was a former prime minister. The request before the president was simple and straightforward: appoint Farmajo as prime minister, and we will recite the Quranic verses and pray for you. The president was respectful of his guests but remained non-committal. On Saturday, Mohamoud named Abdi Farah Shirdon as his prime minister. Shirdon, if approved, will be the sixth prime minister since 2004 and the fourth since 2009.

Shirdon, 54, is not the most qualified person the president had interviewed for the job. When George Bush Senior selected Dan Quayle as his running mate, he received a scathing criticism from many, including some powerful Republicans. What shocked Americans was Bush’s response, when he described Quayle as the most qualified person for the job. Quayle was anything but qualified to be vice president. A comedian aptly summarized it when he said, “Why is everybody against Dan Quayle? He has done nothing!” As my colleague Mukhtar Omer has eloquently articulated, the month-long waiting for the naming of a mediocre prime minister was, at best, disappointing. Shirdon graduated from the Somali National University in 1983 with a degree in economics. Apart from a two-year stint in the ministries of finance and agriculture as an economist, Shirdon has no experience in government. He was a businessman for many years, although the nature of his business is not clear. The official biography about him that Villa Somalia has issued to the media is a half-page and pathetic. For one thing, it is bereft of any details about what Shirdon did, not to mention that it is full of basic grammatical errors.

On April 28, 2012, Shirdon founded the Rajo (Hope) Forum. The only interview he has ever given was with Somali Channel TV after the formation of his group. He outlined his philosophy and his proposed solution for Somalia’s problems. His talk was a blend of nationalism and political realism. Shirdon said Somalia had become a battleground for foreign troops (AMISOM) and Al-Qaeda forces. “Somalia is for Somalis,” he stated. Shirdon wants the number of foreign troops reduced −the same forces that are currently protecting both him and the president−but offers no concrete plan in securing Mogadishu. He gave lukewarm support to the Roadmap, and instead emphasized the need for a more comprehensive plan by the Somalis themselves. Shirdon favors a plan that will restore confidence and hope in the people and guarantee security in the country. How that is going to happen is never addressed. At the very least, he was somewhat truthful when he said that Rajo Forum is based in Nairobi, Mogadishu, and the central regions of Somalia.

Shirdon’s appointment has received little popular support for several reasons:

a) Shirdon is an old friend of the president and a newcomer. He was never elected to any office nor did he hold a political position. His government experience is as thin as his resume. Shirdon was primarily selected not to overshadow the new president and not to rock the boat. There are no indications that the new president is weak, but he is a newcomer who is overwhelmed by the demands of the office. He has been propelled into an arena with which he is not familiar. For many years, Mohamoud was at home in community activism where he rarely took any decisive action. Now, he spends an inordinate amount of time listening to competing groups and has difficulty saying no when he should. One attribute that is a killer in Somalia’s political stage is being ‘nice’ and giving each group the impression that the president is with them. It will take some time for President Mohamoud to assert himself. Shirdon is unlikely to challenge the supremacy of President Mohamoud.

B) Shirdon is perceived by many Darod as a token representative of their tribe. A Marehan interim prime minister, married to a Hawiye politician, and who hails from Galgudud−a region which is predominantly Hawiye− will face serious challenges from Puntland. By appointing a Marehan prime minister, President Mohamoud has made a political statement to Puntland: Drop Dead. Puntland is a big Somali region with a large number of people from various clans. The Majertein, a sub-clan of Darod, is the predominant clan there. To many Puntlanders, this is the second time in two years that a Hawiye president has appointed a Marehan prime minister, which is a slap in the face for the Majertein. Farmajo, also from Galgadud, was hostile to Puntland and ended up alienating that region. President Mohamoud, like his predecessor Shaikh Sharif, is doing the same thing. The Farmajo fiasco was short-lived, of course, and President Ahmed appointed Abdiweli Gaas Ali. If history is the guide, that is when Puntland started participating in Somali politics and became an important pillar in the implementation of the Roadmap. Puntland will be disengaged, once again, from Mogadishu and that means issues like federalism, political reconciliation, piracy, and sharing the wealth and the resources of the Somali people are out of the window. Puntland is not going to secede, but it will not be part of Somali politics for a while.

c) The recent success in Kismayo by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) led to the expulsion of the radical Al-Shabab group from that important port city. President Mohamoud wants to appoint a new administration there which is totally against what he has recently been preaching that locals should select their own leaders instead of having them appointed by Mogadishu. When Mohamoud went to Baidoa and Beledwyne last week, he emphasized the need for the residents of these two important cities shaping their respective leadership. I know President Mohamoud was adamant about knowing what the potential candidates for the premiership thought of Kismayo and Somaliland. I wonder what Shirdon, who will be viewed with suspicion by some of the competing clans in Kismayo, said to the president. I guess we may never know all of the intricacies of the selection process.

d) The neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, are closely watching Shirdon. It is no secret that Shirdon was opposed to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 and the policies of President Abdullahi Yusuf. Shirdon’s views about Kenya are murky. For one thing, he is opposed to more foreign troops in Somalia. Kenya has troops in the Lower Juba and has alliance with the Ogaden in that region. The Kenyan Somali politicians, especially the influential Ogaden figures, play a crucial role in how Nairobi approaches the Lower Juba region. The manner in which the Ogaden politicians in Kenya perceive Shirdon will be interesting. The days when Mogadishu could ignore Nairobi are gone. There are more Somali refugees and immigrants today in Kenya than any other country. Somali leaders, in essence, have to take that into account.

e) Shirdon had the key backing of important figures of President Mohamoud’s New Blood Islamic group. For instance, Farah Abdulkhadir (a presidential advisor), Kamal Hassan (Chief of Staff), and Abdi Abtidon (former Minister of State for Defense), to mention a few, were in favor of Shirdon. Does that mean Shirdon, who is not an Islamist, is captive to the New Blood?

f) Finally, the people in northern Somalia were hoping to see one of their own at the helm as prime minister. A number of Somalis from many walks of life thought Dr. Ahmed Ismail Samatar would be appointed as the new prime minister in defiance of the conventional wisdom that a Hawiye president should appoint a Darod PM, and vice versa. That did not happen and President Mohamoud made the point that the premiership is a position of the south, by the south, and for the south.

Many are hoping that both President Mohamoud and Shirdon will be given the benefit of doubt. This is not the time to derail over the progress that Somalia has made for the last few weeks. That might be the best course as Shirdon and Mohamoud have both shown willingness to work together and rescue Somalia from its abyss. The lack of experience, unfortunately, has become a fait accompli, and there is not much that can be done now. Previous Somali leaders like Ali Geedi, Abdiweli, Farmajo, Shaikh Sharif, Abdullahi Yusuf, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, and Nur Cadde did not have experience in running the country. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan was the most experienced politician to lead Somalia since 1991, and his tenure was disastrous. While there is no substitute for experience, seasoned politicians can also be obstacles to real change because they have their myopic interests to protect.

I hope Shirdon, who is married to an activist, will give a boost to Somali women, who have been marginalized and even had their allotted slots in parliament robbed from them. Perhaps, for the first time in Somali history, there might be more women in the cabinet as opposed to a token representative who is always in charge of women’s affairs. This sexist cabinet portfolio will hopefully be abolished because Somali women do have stake in defense, education, reconstruction, transportation, foreign affairs, finance, and the security of the country. Let us all hope that tomorrow will be better than today and will give the president and the interim prime minister a chance to lead. They may shock the world and even inspire the skeptics.

The Man Who Dressed Obama in Kenya Speaks Up

Muhumad Hassan Mumin, better known as “Dhukow,” has fond memories of Barack Obama. He was, after all, the man who dressed the then-US Senator from Illinois in traditional Somali attire in 2006.

Things have never been the same for either of the two men. One became the president of the most powerful nation in the world and the other is still living in his hometown of Wajir, in northeast Kenya, still a respected Elder.

In an exclusive interview with Radio Wardheer on Monday, Dhukow, 83, said he never imagined that Obama would become the president of the United States.

Obama was a senator at the time who had interest in visiting in Dhukow’s part of the world, he said.

The picture of Obama in traditional Somali elder garb became sensational a year later when the senator from Illinois declared his intention to run for the office of the American presidency. Speculation was rife that Obama, who is Christian, was a secret Muslim.

Dhukow also got his 15 minutes of fame when the world saw him dressing Obama.

“People still call me Obama,” said Dhukow, laughing.

But Barack Obama and people in his campaign were not laughing when the image went viral on the internet. Matt Drudge, the influential blogger, first posted the picture but all indications were that the Hillary Clinton campaign, Obama’s main rival in the Democratic primaries, had something to do with airing it.

“I just want to make it very clear that we were not aware of it, the campaign didn’t sanction it and we don’t know anything about it,” declared Clinton campaign manager Howard Wolfson.

Two Clinton Iowa volunteers, however, resigned after they were responsible for forwarding a hoax e-mail falsely claiming that Obama was Muslim and bent on destroying America.

The leaders of the Obama campaign were livid and blamed the Clinton campaign for attempting to use “divisive “tactics to scare voters away from Obama. David Plouffe, Obama’s campaign manager then accused the Clinton camp of engaging in “the most shameful, offensive fear-mongering we have seen from either party in the election.”

Obama himself attacked the Clinton campaign in an interview with WOAI radio in San Antonio, Texas. “Everybody knows that whether it is I, Senator Clinton, or Bill Clinton−that when you travel to other countries they ask you to try on traditional garb that you have been given as a gift,” said Obama.

Dhukow denied that he ever talked to the visiting Obama about religion.

“We did not have a private meeting,” asserted Dhukow.

It was Obama who had requested to meet with the Elders and local government officials, said Dhukow.

“He was our guest,” said Dhukow of Obama “and, according to our Somali tradition, we gave him a gift.”

Dhukow remembers that Obama was happy and laughing when he was dressing him. Obama even joked about the Somali sarong. The senator said that he had heard of a man wearing pants and a sarong on the top and the sarong fell off. “The man thought he was naked and people laughed at him,” Obama told the Elders.

Dhukow has seen all kinds of leaders coming to Wajir and being dressed in Somali garb. Daniel Arap Moi, former president of Kenya, and Kibaki, Kenya’s current president, also were dressed up. In addition, Dhukow was present when the daughter of the British queen and an Algerian leader visited Wajir and were in dressed traditional clothes.

Obama visited Wajir’s animal market and asked Dhukow and others about camels. He also asked questions about the American foreign aid to Wajir Hospital and how the funds were managed.

When asked if he had contacted Obama after he became president, Dhukow said no.

I thought that he would remember me and Wajir,” lamented Dhukow. There is a sense of disappointment in his voice. Nevertheless, the Elder wants Obama to win this November.

“People had told me that Obama would buy me a house or even university scholarships for my children,” Dhukow said with sadness in his voice.

So far, nothing has been forthcoming.

Who is Advising the New Somali President?

Over the last two weeks, Somalia has experienced seismic political changes. A sitting president, Shaikh Sharif Ahmed, found himself left in the dust by a newcomer, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, who defeated him in a landslide. The Al-Shabab group has started a massive campaign of suicide bombings in Mogadishu that have led to the death of many people, including a parliamentarian. The new president has given several interviews, but he has yet−until the writing of this article−to appoint a prime minister. While it is difficult to gauge his intentions, Mohamoud has so far made proclamations that are reassuring to a country that was torn apart by radicalism, civil war, and dysfunction. But he has also said things that make some people scratch their head.

In an interview with the VOA, Mohamoud made remarks that appeared to show his naiveté. He pleaded with “his friends” not to be upset with him if he did not appoint them as prime minister. The logical question is: Mr. President, how many people are we talking about? There are at least two verified cases in which Mohamoud and two other politicians –both highly educated –made an agreement with Mohamoud only for the new president to forsake them. These two individuals were promised the plum job of prime minister and are ruing because they feel double-crossed. The new president, in fairness, has yet to address this matter. But one thing is clear, Mohamoud is a politician committed to getting what he wants, even if it means engaging in equivocation.

There is the issue of the Al-Shabab and how to deal with the group. Mohamoud provided the usual rhetoric of Somali politicians when he stated that the young radical Al-Shabab fighters “are our children” and that they have been misled. Children who have been misled! The days of such double-talk are over because, first, Al-Shabab militants are not children but adults committed to killing their enemies. Second, no one would give legitimacy to a group that is losing battles and territories, and on its way to extinction. While the days of Al-Shabab, as we now know it, are numbered, the threat of radicalism is still present. Another group with similar ideology, but a different name, is likely to emerge after the Al-Shabab with unbridled vigor to resist reform. The outgoing interior minister has even gone so far as to offer factory jobs to Al-Shabab fighters; if they abandon the militant group. One might wonder; how one deals with terrorists who may have killed and maimed; without first conducting an investigation and then serving justice.

Somaliland is another matter that the new president highlighted−as Somalis say “wuu ku simbiriiraxday” (he has slipped) −when he naively made two contradictory statements. On one hand, he wished that things would be the way they were in 1960 when Somaliland joined its brethren in the south and formed one state under one flag. However, the president also said that “no one will be forced into Somali unity.” That statement was confusing to the people in Somaliland, a self-declared state, who were busy sending congratulatory messages to the new president. It is obvious that the new president and his coterie of advisors in Villa Somalia have not yet formed a well-thought -out and clear policy regarding key issues such as Somaliland and neighboring countries. It would have been better if Mohamoud had waited until he appointed a prime minister to issue confusing statements. A seasoned politician would focus on the major priority of the new regime which is −as the president himself said, “Security, Security, and Security.” Somaliland is an issue that should not consume the government when the south itself is in shambles. The new president, of course, gets the benefit of the doubt and these mishaps can be forgiven because, after all, he is a rookie.

This brings us to the question of who is advising the new president. There are, so far, three close advisors that we know of: Farah Abdulkhadir, Abdikarim H. Guled, and Dr. Mohamed Ali Dodishe.

Farah Abdulkhadir is the man mentioned as the major presidential advisor. Abdulkhadir is a member of the parliament and one of the people who encouraged Mohamoud to run for the presidency. The two are believed to be good friends and share the same approach in dealing with Somalia’s pernicious problems. Abdulkhadir was, until recently, a manager of the Kuwait-based Islamic organization named AMA (Africa Muslims Agency), and has a degree in Islamic studies. He is, of course, an Islamist and a bright individual. Contrary to rumors that he is the power behind the president, Abdulkhadir is an advisor with whom the president feels comfortable. All indications are that Mohamoud is his own man and, hence, does not carry water for anyone.

Dr. Mohamed Ali Dodishe is another close advisor of the new president and a longtime friend. Dodishe was once the head of the Al-Shahid Centre for Research and Media Studies, an Islamic nonprofit group. He is not as well-known as his father: Ahmed Shaikh Ali Ahmed Burale, a onetime faction leader from Jubbaland and a former leader of the Somalia National Front (SNF). Burale was once the head of the Somalia Appellate Court and a legal advisor to President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. He had written books in Somali and even translated the classic literary book, Kalila Wa Dimna, by Abdalla Ibn Moqfa’a, which is a collection of fables of people and animals. For those who know Dr. Dodishe, he is an intellectual who articulates his thoughts frankly, but he is also cautious to a fault.

Abdikarim Hussein Guled is one of the top leaders, and perhaps, the most respected figure of Dam al-Jadid (New Blood) and a key advisor of President Mohamoud. Guled became the the head of AMA after Farah Abdulkhadir had left. He is best known for being the chief of FPENS (Formal Private Education Network in Somalia). A source familiar with Guled has described him as “the brain and the person who understands the complexity of Mogadishu the most.”

While any president has the right to surround himself with friends and loyalists, it takes guts and a high level of self-confidence to seek out opposing viewpoints. Barack Obama shocked the world when he made his once avowed political rival in the Democratic Party primaries− Hillary Clinton− his secretary of state. The new president has to prove to the country that he has –aside from his friends of Dam al-Jadid − an array of advisors who can be frank with him and who form the microcosm of Somali society: women, non-Islamists, traditional elders, and the youth. He is, after all, the president of all Somalia and not just the leader of one group.

Who Will Be Somalia's Next PM?

The new Somali president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, did not have much time to rest after his victory; the next day, a group of masked men attempted to kill him in a failed suicide mission. Then, unconfirmed reports claimed that his private email was hacked. The biggest task ahead of the president now is to appoint a prime minister, a job which has attracted all kinds of seekers and dreamers.

Former Somali president, Siad Barre, used to say, “It is not who you are [clan wise] but what you know.” In an ideal situation in which knowledge and competence matter, someone like Dr. Ahmed I. Samatar, a former journalist (BBC) and a professor of political science for 30 years in the US, would be a shoo-in for either the office of the presidency or the premiership. Samatar and Mohamoud became close friends during the presidential campaign because they had the similar priorities in saving the country. According to sources close to both men, there was even a gentleman’s agreement between the two. However, no one knows for sure if Mohamoud had similar agreements with other candidates. Moreover, Samatar is not Darod, and, in a political environment where clans matter, his chances are slim. Those advising the new president have the understanding that the next prime minister should be Darod. The challenge is to determine which sub-clan. So far, the Majertein and the Marehan are neck and neck in the competition for the position. The Marehan might have a better chance because they have history on their side. Since the Abdiqassim regime, there have been five Darod prime ministers (three Majertein, a Dhulbahante, and a Marehan). The Majertein, obviously, have taken more than their share in filling that position, thus, It will not be a surprise if history is repeated. Dr. Ali Khalif Galeyr, a Dhulbahante, is also in contention for the position but his success is not likely.

Dr. Mohamed Sh. Ali “Doodishe,” is a name on the minds of many, according to sources very close to the president. A political scientist by training, Doodishe graduated on and taught in Sudan. He is Marehan and boasts a special characteristic: He is a member of the New Blood, an Islamic group that counts on the new president. While Doodishe fulfills the clan requirement, he is not likely to cause political headaches for the president for several reasons. First, he is an Islamist from the New Blood, a group the president ideologically identifies with, and the two might have the same outlook and plan for the government. Second, according to the new constitution, the president has the power to appoint the prime minister but cannot dismiss him or her. Every Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was hampered by the endemic power struggle between its president and prime minister. This problem may no longer be as acute as it was previously because the powers of each position are clearly now delineated. “Wouldn’t it be easier for you, M. President,” Mohamoud has been told by his advisors, “to have a prime minister from our group that we can handle instead of an outsider?” According to the people very privy to the president’s thinking, he hasn’t made up his mind, but he finds the idea of Dr. Doodishe as prime minister interesting.

Doodishe, while a friend and a colleague of the new president, brings baggage of his own. It will seem unwise for an Islamist president to appoint another Islamist as prime minister. This could be problematic, because too much concentration of power in the hands of the Islamists in the executive branch torpedoes efforts of reconciliation, discourages coalition-building, and promotes the abuse of power.

If Doodishe is not selected, the other Marehan contenders are Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, Abdiwahab Elmi Omar “Goonjeex,” and Saacid Farah Garaad (Shirdon). The latter once came close to being appointed as prime minister in the government of Shaikh Sharif only for Farmajo to get the nod in the eleventh hour. Farmajo was a prime minister for six months and gathered mixed responses from people. He has many supporters who believe that he is clean, competent, and a nationalist. The latter is an attribute that has lost traction recently in Somali politics. But then, there are others who view Farmajo as someone who lacks political acumen, and might be a liability if the new president wants to court Puntland. That illustrates an example of what I call “the Farole factor.”

Dr. Abdirahman Sh. Mohamed “Farole” is president of Puntland. Under the new federal system adopted by Somalia, Puntland is an entity that cannot be ignored. Farole has recently intimated that Puntland might entertain the idea of deciding its future (a euphemism for secession) if a certain political leader were elected as president. That ‘certain’-leader was the former president Shaikh Sharif who lost to the new president. Farole, however, was quick to welcome the selection of President Mohamoud. The new president, of course, would need to work with Farole and Puntland, but one might ask; at what price? Will Farole have a say in the selection of the new Darod prime minister? The president has the right to appoint whomever he wants, but clan politics is a matter that involves deliberate consideration. If the Farole factor is as important as some perceive, then the new president would want to maintain working relations with Puntland. Consequently, some potential candidates for the premiership; Farmajo, Galeyr and Abdiweli, might be out. Each of these politicians has had falling out with Puntland’s strong man; Farmajo for marginalizing Puntland when he was prime minister; Galeyr for being a leader of Khatumo State, and Abdiweli for not heeding to Farole during the adoption of the new constitution, the naming of both the Elders Group and members of the parliament from Puntland. It was apparent that Abdiweli, himself a Puntlander, did not want to pander to Farole.

Abdiweli did well during his short stint as prime minister and might be re-appointed. The outgoing government headed by Shaikh Sharif and Abdiweli as its Prime Minister—in conjunction with AMISOM forces and the UN Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Mahiga-- deserve much credit for 1) the expulsion of al-Shabab from many parts of the south, including Mogadishu, 2) the writing and adoption of the new constitution, and 3) the ending of the transitional period of the government. Moreover, he brought Puntland on board. Abdiweli’s detractors, however, emphasize the allegations of graft against him, President Shaikh Sharif and former speaker of the parliament, Sharif Hassan, by the United Nations’ Monitoring Group for Eritrea and Somalia. Abdiweli’s critics do not consider him an agent of change, and some see his close relationship with Kenya, a neighboring country which has strong territorial, economic and political interests in Somalia, disturbing.

Other Darod contenders such as Hussein Khalif (Majertein), Dr. Abdirahman Hashi (Dhulbahante), Saeed Abdullahi Dani (Majertein), and Abdirizak Osman Juriile (Dishiishe), interestingly seem to have the alleged support of Farole. Engineer Mohamoud Jama Hamud (Warsangeli) is a northerner who is also a contender, and he believes that he is uniquely qualified to work on the unification of the Somali communities.

Finally, the new president came from nowhere to trounce a sitting president. He might surprise many by appointing a newcomer, just as he is.

Somalia's New President: A Victory for Islamic Groups

On Monday, Somalia selected a new president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, an Islamist. Mohamoud has been an Islamic activist for a long time. He is counted as one of the sympathizers of the New Blood, a group of Islamists who broke away from al-Islah, Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood, during the reign of the Islamic Courts Union. I use the word “counted,” because there is no record of Mohamoud as a member of any Islamic group. What is not in doubt is the fact that he is an Islamist of the Muslim Brotherhood persuasion. Rival candidate Abdurrahman Baadiyow, on the other hand, has been a member of al-Islah more than two decades.

One phenomenon that was apparent during Monday’s selection process was the prevalence of Islamists among the candidates best able to generate votes in the first round of the election. For instance, four of the six highest vote getters were Islamists: Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, Abdurrahman Baadiyow, and Abdulkhadir Ossoble. Each of these four candidates is believed to represent four different trends: Tajamuc or Ala-Sheikh (Shaikh Sharif), al-Islah (Baadiyow), Ossoble (al-Ictisaam) and Mohamoud (the New Blood). Professor Afyare Elmi of Qatar University was prescient when he predicted in 2010 that Islamists would rule Somalia one day. The Arab Spring has brought the Islamic movements to the forefront of political power.

One can confidently say that the four Islamists did a remarkable job garnering votes. Baadiyow was articulate and bold in his presidential campaign speech before the Somali parliament which he declared that the current Transitional Federal Government leaders were failures. He did not get the votes that he had hoped; the recent turmoil in al-Islah did not make things easier for him. The good news is that the Islamists are more likely to learn from this new political experience. Still, the Islamists in Somalia have not reached the level at which they can mobilize the masses for political purposes and win elections. They are in an early stage where personality dominates the political process rather than the institutions. The new president did not win because he is the founder/leader of a political party called Peace and Development Party (PDP). He won, in part, by forging alliances with various clans and capitalizing on the lawmakers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Somalia, like Tunisia and Egypt, will test Islamist leaders who are at the helm. Muslims in these countries have granted Islamists a chance because they see them as clean and not corrupt. Now, the ball is in the courts of the Islamists. Will they rule by building coalitions and leading by example? Will they be tolerant, unifiers, and fight for justice and equality before the law?

Many Somalis are optimistic that Somalia is headed in the right direction. It was impossible, two years ago, to move around Mogadishu safely. Today, the country is enjoying relative peace, and the days of chaos, political cannibalism, and warlords are behind us. US Republican Senator Mitch McConnell said in 2010 that he wanted President Obama to fail. Many of us, on the contrary, are praying for Somalia’s new president to succeed.

Faqash

A young Somali northerner in Toronto, who was born and raised in Mogadishu, has become a fervent supporter of Somaliland and its causes. In other words, as it is said in left-wing parlance, he has become “more Marxist than Marx.” He hangs out with die-hard Somalilanders and attends their political and social events. However, the young man has never been to Somaliland and, in fact, has never traveled beyond the city of Jowhar, which is 100 km north of Mogadishu.

One day, an elderly man new to the group approached the ‘funny’-speaking young man and asked him:

“Who are you?”

“I am Isaaq,” responded the young man.

“Isaaq is a big tribe; what is your sub-clan?”

“Habar Yonis.”

“Habar Yonis is a large sub-clan.”

The young man was baffled and, in a sign of desperation, asked the men if they could, perhaps, name for him some of the sub-clans of Habar Yonis.” “ii soo yeeriya,” he said. The men consented.

“Isihaaq?”

“No.”

“Muuse Carre?”

“No.”

“Abdalla Ismail?”

“No.”

“Reer Caynaanshe?”

The young man jumped from his chair and screamed, “Barobiyo!” (The actual word ‘proprio’ is Italian and means ‘definitely.’)

The young man, after that true incident, was dubbed “Barobiyo.”

Being given an unwanted nickname can be frustrating.

The first time I heard the word “Faqash” was in May 1991 in Djibouti. I was there to collect my mother and cousin, who were arriving from Mogadishu. I stayed in Hotel De Djibouti, which was owned and operated by an Isaaq man named Saeed. Because many people were fleeing Somalia, the hotel was fully booked. I roomed with an elderly Isaaq man, Jama, who had been wounded in the leg. He had a good business in Mogadishu and owned big tractors. In the mayhem of the civil war, Jama was shot by an unidentified bandit. He grilled me about who I was and where I had come from, and I took no offense to his line of questioning. Once he realized that I was visiting from the US and that I originally hailed from Afgooye, he became more relaxed.

At noon, Djibouti, a hot and humid city, would come to a standstill. Most of the residents stayed home in the comfort of air conditioners. That was also the time of day when the consumption of khat, a mild stimulant plant, reached its zenith. Being a non-khat consumer, I used to leave the hotel room and hang with my friend, Mohamoud Haji Abdillahi Diriye, an Isaaq merchant from Hargeisa. Jama and his friends stayed in the hotel chewing khat and ruminating on all kinds of topics. No subject was sacred. By the time I came back to the room in the evening, Jama would tease me, “waaryaa Faqash, maxaa cusub?” (Hey you Faqash, what’s up?) I did not ask Jama and his friends what the word “Faqash” meant. Frankly, I thought it was a nickname or a purely nonsensical word. To me, the word sounded more or less like “fuunto,” a word southerners use to refer to a spoiled egg. The men laughed at the utterance of the word Faqash and I laughed at them for engaging in khat-induced silly chatter.

When I returned to California, some of my friends from the north asked me about my brief trip to Djibouti. I told them that I had actually stayed in a hotel owned by a Qaldaan, (northerner) and had another Qaldaan, as a roommate. Then I cursorily added, “But they kept calling me “Faqash.” My friends burst out laughing and, since that day, they have called me “Hassan Faqash.” They did, however, tell me the origin of the word “Faqash.” During the civil war in the north, the soldiers of the Somali government were called “Faqash.” The word means “the noise boots/shoes make or the way they rattle.” The fleeing soldiers, who had committed a litany of horrible acts in the north, hence, were dubbed “Faqash.”

Then, as years passed, the word started to take on a life of its own.

Some people refer to anyone who worked for the Siad Barre regime or supported his government as Faqash. Oddly, the Isaaq government officials who remained in Barre’s regime until his fall fit into that category too.

Some people have started using it exclusively to refer to the Darod.

Then in 2011, I had an encounter with an Isaaq teen that was born and raised in California. This young man is Sacad Muuse, but his mother is Harti. For the first time in his life, he ventured out of the US and visited Hargeisa. He was excited to be among his kith and kin and began mastering Somali, of course with a distinct northern accent.

When he came back to the US, the first question he asked me was “Adeer, qolamaa tahay?” (Uncle, what is your clan?”)

I have known this young man since his infancy, and he has known me merely as a Somali man and a friend of his parents. However, this time, he wanted to get to know me even better and I felt honored.

Then, he dropped a bombshell.

“Uncle, I will never marry an Isaaq woman.”

“Why not?”

“My aunts in Hargeisa were always badmouthing my mother.”

“How?”

“Well, they would say, ‘Islaantaa Faqashta ah” (that Faqash woman).

I told the young man about my story in Djibouti and appealed to him not to reach foregone conclusions.

He was somewhat pleased to hear my explanation of the word ‘Faqash’ because the term was not yet pejorative.

After the young man left, I kept questioning whether my assessment was actually right.

My Isaaq friends call me Faqash from time to time, even though I am not Darod nor have I ever worked for the government of Siad Barre, yet I am never offended by it.

Do some people use the word to discriminate against others or deride an entire tribe?

There is a great deal of sensitivity among some people regarding the word. The fact that the word is loosely used against all kinds of people today does not in itself make it pejorative.

Perhaps, the word is in the midst of a natural evolution.

Yesterday, it was Siad Barre’s soldiers!

Today, it is refereed to all southerners and whoever is being teased.

Tomorrow, it might be used against someone else.

However, the fact is, it is not specific to one group.