Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Shiikhaal


“What I have done in the past is history, what I am going to do in the future is a mystery.” Mike Tyson.
                                                            ***
The great Somali poet Abdullahi Suldan Timacadde said, “Clannism provides no shelter; it only causes destruction.” That is only partially true. What is left unsaid is that members of one clan can go out of their way to help each other, and their common bond can bring some good things to the table.

Like a nice free meal in a top-rated eatery.
Did you hear that?

OK, let me first indulge in an exercise of name-dropping.
You know Attorney Abdurahman Hosh Jibril, former Somali Minister of Constitution, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation? He is a longtime friend, but this Hosh guy told me in 2010, after reading my Mogadishu Memoir, that he always thought I was Shiikhaal. Hosh was not the only one who believed that; many of my friends thought so even though I never claimed to be Shiikhaal.

How did it happen that so many people thought I was Shiikhaal when they never heard me say so?
That is simple—not through Facebook or Twitter but through the old fashioned way: word of mouth.

I miss those good old days though because I innocently and unwittingly received certain tangible benefits. I was received well in certain Shiikhaal corners and was even well-fed under the impression I was one of them. Unfortunately, the truth has an unceremonious way of exposing itself.
Get that imposter. He is Digil. He was born in Afgooye. Get him.

Now that many of my friends know who I am, I get no free meals.
Once, a young wife of Warlord Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid extolled my virtues and gave my colleague (Habar Gidir-Cayr) and me a powerful motivational speech. My colleague and I were running a nonprofit foundation that received government grants to serve Somali refugees.  “Keep on the good job, boys,” she told us. My colleague, who did not correct her, kept on doing what he was doing. He was probably basking in her praise and forgot about me and my Shiikhaal-ness. For me, my jaw dropped. I did not, oddly, correct her. Of course, someone must have told the young woman that I was Shiikhaal.

At any rate, let me go back to my days as a ‘Shiikhaal.’
The first time I realized I was suspected as a Shiikhaal was in 1979 while in Cairo.  I was working for Somali Airlines. A young Shiikhaal man whom I barely knew invited me to lunch. He took me to a fancy restaurant in downtown Cairo that tourists frequented. The meal was elaborate and delicious, and it lasted about an hour and half. Dessert and tea followed.

Then, my host started talking seriously as though he were preparing to make an official announcement.
“OK, Hassan, so what is your sub-clan?”

“Sub-clan of what?”
 “You are a Shiikhaal, aren’t you?”

“Shiikhaal?”
I rolled my eyes in bewilderment searching for words, but unfortunately none was forthcoming. I had no escape! It was not the time to weave and wind around the truth. I immediately figured the source of the problem. It was my turn to become serious and address the issue head-on.

I told the young man that I had good news and bad news.
“Go ahead.”

“The good news is; I really enjoyed and loved the food. It is, in my humble opinion, one of the best meals I ever had,” I said.
The young man nodded in approval.

“But the bad news is—are you ready for this? I am not Shiikhaal.”
“What?

“No, I am not.”
Then, the young man raised a resonant, logical question.

“OK, but aren’t you the brother-in-law of so and so [he mentioned the name of a government official in the Barre regime]?  
“Yes, I am,” I replied.

“So, what is the problem? “, he asked.
“What problem?” I retorted.

Then, I had to clarify the matter.
“Again, I have good news and bad news.”

“Now, what is it?”

“Well, yes, I am indeed the in-law of that official all right, but the bad news, to you my friend, is I am the brother of the “Bahda Yar” (“the younger wife”).

The first wife is incidentally Shiikhaal. The couple has since divorced.
Initially, I thought the man took the ‘bad’ news in stride, but I was wrong. He appeared perplexed, and then he mumbled something inaudibly. I thought he was secretly wailing a string of expletives in my direction. Perhaps, what he really wanted to say was, “You miserable creature, you wasted all the money I had spent on this sumptuous lunch, and you are not even freaking Shiikhaal. Just go.”

To alleviate the financial toll I had inflicted on this good-natured man, I offered to give him money to defray the cost of the meal, but he politely declined.
Somehow, I realized the futility of placing too much emphasis on clan affiliation. Look at this tortured soul. Minutes earlier, he had been happy, gregarious, and engaging and now he was huffing and puffing.

I hate clannism and its pernicious ways!
This kind of story could have had a bad ending in which the two people concerned would go to their separate ways when they found they were from different clans. But, the story had a happy ending. Oddly, after that incident, the young man and I became good friends.  Both of us, in a way, felt guilty in using the concept of clan as a convenience to produce an elusive favorable outcome. To him, it was an alluring prospect having a fellow “Shiikhaal” in the branch of Somali Airlines in Egypt. I could help him transmit news and packages from his family in Somalia without going through aviation red tape. At the restaurant, I was unaware of his good intentions and, shall I say, his grand design. But still I willing benefited from his largesse.

Now that I have been fully exposed, can I still get another cup of tea, please? My throat is parched.
On one trip to Mogadishu, the young man asked me to meet his father and retrieve for him all his educational documents. I did. Both the father and the young man were grateful for this small favor.

Afterward, the young man and I realized that our newfound friendship was more important and stronger than our supposedly ‘mutual’ clan membership. It was a small emotional victory that we savored, but a victory nonetheless.
Then, one day, the young man added a twist to our friendship when he introduced me in front of his kith and kin as his brother.

Now, that was touching.
I guess Poet Timacadde rested his case.

 

 

 

Saturday, May 18, 2013

An Al-Shabab Leader Says Hammami is Alive


Shaikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of the leaders of Al-Shabab, confirmed that the American jihadist, Omar Hammami, is still alive.
In an interview with Somali Channel TV on May 16, Aweys stated that Hammami was wounded and on the run. He lashed out at an unnamed senior Al-Shabab leader for going after the American fighter whom Aweys said had done nothing wrong “but expressed his [critical] views.”

Last March, 2012, Hammami appeared on the internet claiming that Al-Shabab militants were trying to kill him because he disagreed with the group regarding the application of sharia, strategy, and the course of jihad in Somalia.
The Al-Shabab leaders were not pleased with Hammami’s public rants. After several months of tolerating what they called his “childish petulance,” the group lashed out at him and accused him of seeking fame at the expense of his fellow jihadists.

Aweys criticized the unnamed leader of Al-Shabab for following the tactics and teachings of Machiavelli instead of the Prophet Mohamed. He said, “Mistakes have been made in the movement by certain individual leaders who do not want to consult with others.”
Aweys’ statement is the first by a high-ranking Al-Shabab figure since April 25 when an Al-Shabab assassin tried to kill Hammami. Aweys also confirmed that some Al-Shabab leaders have complained to Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the Al-Qaeda supreme leader, about the wrong course of jihad in Somalia.

In 2001, Aweys was added to the United States government’s list of terrorists.  He was the former leader of the Union of Islamic Courts which controlled Mogadishu in 2006. In 2009, he formed Hizbul Islam to fight against the African Union forces (AMISOM) and Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government. A year later, Aweys and his group formally joined Al-Shabab.

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

The Al-Shabab Implosion: Featuring Foreign Jihadists

Several years ago, Somalia’s Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabab, was the first jihadi group to use Twitter to transmit its messages. These days, it is on that same social networking medium that the group’s dirty laundry is being aired.

In a span of three weeks in April, Ibrahim Al-Afghani, one of the top leaders of Al-Shabab and a veteran of the jihad in Afghanistan, wrote a scathing open letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of Al-Qaeda, in which he assailed Ahmed Abdi Godane (also known as Mokhtar Abu Zubeir) — the emir of Al-Shabab—for his imperious style of leadership. The letter unwittingly set off a dizzying chain of events. On April 25, there was an assassination attempt on the American jihadist Omar Hammami. Four days later, an influential foreign jihadist of Al-Shabab wrote an open letter upbraiding the emir of Al-Shabab for committing a long list of egregious acts against foreign fighters in Somalia. That same day, a special court of Al-Shabab presided over by Mukhtar Robow, Ibrahim Al-Afghani, and Hassan Dahir Aweys issued a fatwa, a religious edict, ruling that the killing of Omar Hammami and his colleagues is impermissible.

Omar Hammami, born and raised in Alabama, went to Somalia in 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts was in control of Mogadishu. After the courts were expelled by Ethiopian troops, he joined Al-Shabab and became one of its leaders. Until a year ago, he was a member of the group’s Shura Council, the highest decision-making body. For several years, Hammami was running on all cylinders: He was the face of Al-Shabab on the internet calling for foreign jihadists to come to Somalia and join the fight, issuing Twitter messages, aiming threats and bluster against the U.S. and Somali governments, composing and singing jihadi rap songs and publicly appearing with local jihadist leaders. In one of his videos, he pleaded, “If you can encourage more of your children, and more of your neighbors, and anyone around you to send people….to this jihad, it would be a great asset for us.” It was apparent that Hammami, the hip-hop jihadist, was naturally inclined to seek the spotlight and constantly angling to get even more attention. According to Hammami’s Twitter messages, he had a falling out with Godane and the duo’s once friendly relationship went from frosty to hostile. Godane and Hammami are two militants who have the same worldview when it comes to global jihad. However, where they differ most, according to Hammami, are the application of sharia, strategy and the treatment of foreign jihadists in Somalia. Hammami has also been critical of the lavish lifestyle some Al-Shabab leaders lead with the taxes that the group imposes on people under its control.

Last year, Hammami went into hiding and started making appearances on the internet appealing for help. He said Al-Shabab leaders were trying to kill him because he had complained about the group’s singular focus on local jihad rather than global jihad. He declared that the threat of his extermination was real and imminent. He has since been emitting a series of fiery denunciations of Al-Shabab and its mercurial leader, Godane. In a way, Hammami has become fixated with the emir of Al-Shabab and is dedicated to smearing him at every opportunity. He accused Godane of all kinds of crimes, from ruling the terrorist outfit with an iron hand to being behind the killing of Fazul Abdullah Mohamed. Fazul, Bin Laden’s representative in East Africa and the man responsible for the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, was killed when he made a wrong turn to a check point manned by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Mogadishu. According to Hammami, Godane was the one who “misdirected” Fazul to that fateful checkpoint.

Initially, Al-Shabab leaders issued no response as they read and watched Hammami’s rants with a mixture of irritation and embarrassment. It is not an everyday event that an American jihadist, who had ascended to the corridors of power in an African group, publicly rebukes his hosts. However, after nine months of silence, Al-Shabab reprimanded Hammami and accused him of obstinacy and the shameless pursuit of fame. Furthermore, the terrorist group apologized to the Muslim community in general and all the jihadists in the world in particular for having “to witness such childish petulance in one of the theaters of jihad….frivolous ramblings and whimsical desires of those who wish to enhance their image at the price of jihad and the mujahidin, spreading discord and disunity in the process.”

Then, on January 4, 2013, Al Shabab asked Hammami to turn himself in no later than January 19. For many, it would have been a walk-away point, but Hammami did not immediately heed the group’s request and continued his criticism of Godane and Al-Shabab. He had developed a special relationship with some American and Canadian counterterrorism experts who were eager to hear from him, and in some cases even interview him. As a man on whose head the U.S. placed a $5 million bounty, Hammami at times revealed crucial information about the leadership dynamics of Al-Shabab, his background, and even that he was in the Bay and Bakool region. These bloggers became his lifeline to transmit his views, and some even showed no qualms about rooting for the safety of the wanted jihadist.

Hammami felt that his life was in danger. His instincts were not far off. On Thursday, April 25, he, an Egyptian and a British jihadist were sipping tea in a cafĂ© in a small village in the Bay and Bakool region when an Al Shabab assassin shot Hammami in the neck. Hammami tweeted saying, “just been shot in [the] neck by Shabab assassin. [But the injury is] not critical yet.” He went on to acknowledge that Al-Shabab fighters were coming from “multiple directions” and that his friends were few and they were waiting for back up forces. Hammami accused Godane of being behind the attempted assassination, declaring that, “Abu Zubeir (Godane) has gone mad,” because “he is starting a civil war.” It was an interesting choice of words —“civil war”— in a jihadi group. Without missing a beat, he continued: “Their goal is to kill us regardless of reason.” Then, he acted as a tough guy determined not to wilt under attack when he posted images of his wounds.

The Al-Shabab fighters, Hammami wrote, raided the houses of his supporters and apparently uncovered condoms, alcohol and documents. He accused the militant group of planting these materials. To add more insult to this injury, Hammami accused Al-Shabab fighters of moral turpitude. “They have started harassing our wives,” he lamented.

On April 30, a foreign jihadist who did not reveal his name but is a member of Al Shabab’s Shura Council and who once chaired a special court that mediated between Al-Shabab leaders (Godane, Robow, Al-Afghani, and Shangole) wrote a carefully crafted open letter to Godane which made its way to jihadi websites. The letter, according to its author, was posted online because he had tried to meet with Godane to personally address the chronic problems the radical group is facing. Unfortunately, he said, he was rebuffed. Then, he went to a mosque where Al-Shabab leaders were present and gave an impromptu speech preaching to the leaders but was silenced and even banned from the mosque. “You [Godane] did not leave me any other choice except to keep silent while seeing the miserable situation of the mujahidin and Muslims. That is not acceptable in sharia,” he wrote. The writer stated that he wanted all jihadists in the world to know about the crises of jihad in Somalia. The writer personally addressed grievances to Godane as follows:

1. You have inculcated an environment that any foreign jihadist who leaves Somalia without permission is deemed an infidel.

2. You have failed to meet foreign jihadists for several years and you never inquire about their conditions.

3. You have arrested some foreign fighters without any charge and not allowed their families to visit them or know their whereabouts. You have prevented some fighters from waging jihad, the very reason they had traveled to Somalia. In essence, “You have banished some to the lands of infidels while you are hunting down the others.”

4. You have done nothing when Al-Shabab security officials raped the wives of some foreign jihadists while the latter were on the front lines.

5. Some foreign jihadists died in your secret detention centers and you failed to punish those behind these crimes.

The case of foreign jihadists in Somalia like Hammami is veering from tragedy to farce. The prevalent narrative is filled with accusations of power grabs, conspiracy, assassination attempts, jealousy, betrayal, dashed hopes, sexual innuendo, and—last and most damning—rape. The foreign jihadists, moreover, are fighting on two fronts. The first is against the Somali government and AMISOM forces. The second is against their fellow jihadists spearheaded by Godane. Hammami, who once provided the template for Al-Shabab’s recruitment to bloom in the West, is now a case study in effective counterterrorism. He has become a good example of a misguided and dangerous young man who left home in Alabama to become a jihadist in a faraway land only to be hunted down by the very people who were once his comrades in arms. It is a lesson of the bloody fate that awaits would-be foreign jihadists if they come to Somalia. The message is clear to these young jihadists in the West seeking martyrdom: You are more likely to be killed by your fellow jihadists than a hovering American drone in the skies of Africa. Hammami, whose fairy tale of martyrdom has come crashing down, is aware that he did not sign up for the mess he is currently in.

Rumblings of trouble have been brewing in Al-Shabab for some time. Paradoxically, the jihadi situation in Somalia does not draw a dichotomy between foreign fighters and local jihadists. Interestingly, the latter group has become a pawn to the power struggle among Al-Shabab leadership. For instance, Hammami has the backing of two local jihadist leaders (Robow and Hassan Dahir Aweys) and global jihadists like Ibrahim Al-Afghani. The biggest source of conflict among Al-Shabab leaders seems to stem from Godane, whose leadership style is a noxious cocktail of incompetence, manipulation, and repression. Among hard-core criminal jihadist leaders, Godane has been described as an inflexible leader with an extra proclivity for violence. What compounds Al-Shabab’s staggering problems is its loss of sources of revenue due to its loss of territory, the military progress of AMISOM and Somali government troops, the constant bickering over the smallest things, and the lack of vast territory in which to maneuver. In essence, Al-Shabab fighters are geographically surrounded in all directions. Nevertheless, many observers’ premise was wrong regarding Al-Shabab’s imminent demise. Despite the chronic discord among its leaders, not a single high-ranking figure of the terrorist group has defected from its ranks. Like an animal cornered, these leaders are all intractably interwoven. They have risen as a group and will go down as a group.

On April 5, 2009, Hammami issued a video in which he articulated his reasons for going to Somalia: “The only reason we are staying here, away from our families, away from the cities, away from candy bars [and] all these other things is because we are waiting to meet with the enemy.” While jihadism is a career that creates enemies, it is now creating in Somalia the wrong enemy: the one within. As the classic Walt Kelly Pogo cartoon read, “We have found the enemy and he is us.”




Thursday, April 18, 2013

The Letters: How Al Qaeda Failed in Mali and Somalia

Recently, two separate letters written in Arabic by Al Qaeda leaders in Mali and Somalia have surfaced. The writings paint a grim picture of the jihadist experience in both countries. The first was found in Mali, and the second is an open letter from a Somali jihadist leader to Al Qaeda supreme leader, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

The first was discovered when reporters from the Associated Press stumbled across a collection of documents that included a letter written by Abdelmailk Droukdel, the emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after that radical group was defeated in Timbuktu, Mali, by French forces. Droukdel (also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) was appointed by the late Usama Bin Laden to oversee Al Qaeda’s operations in North Africa.
The second letter is presumed to have been written by Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad (Al-Afghani), who until two years ago was the deputy emir of Somalia’s Al Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabab. The letter has appeared on several websites sympathetic to Al-Shabab and carries Al-Afghani’s nom de guerre, “Shaikh Abu Bakr Al-Zaylici.” It is an indictment of the emir of Al-Shabab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his brutal, secretive, “un-Islamic” and ruinous style of leadership which has had tragic repercussions on the course of jihad in Somalia.

Droukdel’s letter is a frank assessment of Al Qaeda’s brief and brutal capture of the northern part of Mali and the draconian rule that the jihadist group imposed on the people. The militants applied what they called sharia (Islamic law) by stoning adulterers, amputating the hands of thieves, whipping petty criminals, curtailing women’s activities, banning entertainment, berating and intimidating people, and destroying tombs and certain archeological sites.
In his letter, Droukdel admonished his fighters, saying that sharia was, for all practical purposes, applied too fast and in haste:  “Our previous experience showed that applying sharia this way, without taking the environment into consideration, will lead to people rejecting the religion, and engender hatred toward the mujahedeen, and will consequently lead to the failure of our experiment.” He went on to lash out at his cohorts for preventing women from going out, whipping women for not covering up, preventing children from playing, and searching people’s houses. “Your [local Al Qaeda] officials,” Droukdel commanded his followers, “need to control themselves.”

Droukdel was aware of other failed Al Qaeda experiences in Somalia and Algeria and the lessons learned from those attempts of unilaterally imposing sharia. He implored his fighters to act cautiously and gently, more like a parent guiding a child too weak to stand on its own, and to be always mindful of the need for patience. “We should be sure to win allies,” he recommended, “be flexible in dealing with the realities, and compromise on some rights to achieve greater interest.”
Droukdel presciently predicted the foreign military intervention that stymied the jihadi tide in Mali in mid-2012 long before it actually occurred in January 2013. He warned his fighters that they lived on the margins of society and hence needed to form alliances with local jihadi and nationalist groups. His prescription, however, was to engage in an elaborate scheme of deception to conceal the grand design of Al Qaeda and its global jihad. Without mincing words, Droukdel asked his fighters to lower their profile. “Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a ‘domestic’ movement that has its own causes and concerns,” he stated. “There is no reason for you to show that we have an expansionary jihadi, Al Qaeda, or any other sort of project.”

A Somali leader of Al Shabab, Ibrahim Al-Afghani, in his open letter to Al Qaeda leader Al-Zawahiri, was more concerned with leadership issues in Somalia than the precise application of sharia. He wrote against the backdrop that Al Shabab had retreated and become the hunted. Al-Afghani, a man upon whose head the U.S. has placed a $5 million bounty, more or less engaged in the blame game. The logical question then is: What happened to Al Shabab which, not long ago, controlled large swaths of land in southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, the capital? For Al-Afghani, the deterioration of Al Shabab as a power to contend with was attributed to the personal conduct and dictatorial leadership of his longtime friend and colleague, Godane, the emir of Al Shabab. 
Speaking on behalf of what he called “the silent majority” of Al Shabab members, Al-Afghani accused Godane of expecting blind obedience, failing to consult with other leaders of the radical group, and placing personal desires above the requisites of sharia; neglecting Islamic teachings of fairness, kindness and gentleness; issuing arbitrary decisions; sowing conflict among the leaders by lavishing his supporters with largesse, and depriving his critics of the basics of survival and starving them; mistreating foreign jihadists; marginalizing Al Shabab scholars; inciting young jihadists against scholars and leaders by issuing threats of liquidation;  preventing certain scholars from publishing, teaching, or even giving sermons; not lending a hand in the jihadi campaigns in Ethiopia and Kenya; and operating secret jails not subject to the jurisdiction of the Al Shabab leadership. These detention centers are reserved, Al-Afghani contended, for jihadists who are not formally accused of any transgression or convicted of any crime.

Al-Afghani lamented the fact that Al Shabab had lost the sympathies and support of the local population because of the militant leadership’s haughtiness and draconian methods. He singled out the unjustified operations that the group regularly conducts which lead to the loss of limbs and lives. He warned that Somalia’s jihadi experience and its “fruits” were in danger of being lost just as in Algeria in the 1990s. Al-Afghani issued a plea to the Al Qaeda International leaders to intervene and take corrective action against the emir of the Somali branch. He reminded Al-Zawahiri that the Somali emir failed to heed his instructions to apply shura (consultation) to the local leaders. The Somali emir, Al-Afghani said, deliberately sabotaged the decisions of a special court specifically set up to address the conflict and discord among the Al Shabab leaders. Instead of going forward, Al-Afghani declared, Al Shabab was going backward. Furthermore, he mentioned the poor treatment of a foreign jihadist from neighboring Kenya, Shaikh Abboud Rogo, who returned to his hometown of Mombasa only to be killed there.
It is not clear whether Al-Afghani has a personal vendetta against Godane. Unconfirmed reports that the Al-Shabab leaders had once decided to replace Godane with Al-Afghani have circulated. However, that decision was conveniently torpedoed by none other than Godane. Moreover, Al-Afghani’s grievances represent the views of the Al Shabab leaders who favor the globalization of jihad by the Somali branch. Over the last few years, debate has simmered among Al Shabab leaders about the best way to ensure that the group survives Somalia’s ever shifting and volatile political landscape. One group favors building alliances with local groups and perhaps making temporary political accommodations that will guarantee the group’s relevance and lift its isolation. This wing sees the gradual expulsion of foreign jihadists as an absolute must in order to take these necessary and existential steps.

The second group sees Al Shabab as an integral part of an Al Qaeda that is more committed to global jihad and less to the country’s local issues and concerns. No one group ironically has been able to fully exert its will on the entire movement. Bin Laden’s instruction to Al Shabab, when the latter applied to join Al Qaeda, was one of caution. According to documents found in the terrorist’s compound in Pakistan when Bin Laden was killed by American forces, he advised the emir of Al Shabab to conceal the Somali group’s ties to Al Qaeda so as not to draw unfavorable attention from the West. Bin Laden’s successor, Al-Zawahiri, however, has taken just the opposite position and does not object to the African group’s flaunting its international affiliations. The fact that Al-Afghani is taking an active stand in advocating the cause and the plight of foreign jihadists in Somalia, a segment that has been increasingly marginalized, is an indication that he sees Somalia as a staging ground for global jihad. Al-Afghani’s views also mirror those of the American jihadist in Somalia, Omar Hammami, who has gone public by issuing videos that accuse his Al Shabab colleagues of attempting to personally liquidate him and emphasize what he terms the “local focus” instead of supporting a global jihad. Al Shabab’s Twitter response to the Alabama-born fighter was terse. It reprimanded Hammami for engaging in a “narcissistic pursuit of fame.”
These two letters are precise manifestations of the view that the jihadi experience in Mali and Somalia has been a failure because of poor and harsh policies implemented by the Al Qaeda militants that just alienated local populations. The militants have adhered to a convoluted understanding of basic Islamic teachings of moderation and natural evolution, possessing unrealistic expectations and exhibiting poor planning and leadership with but a limited vision. The fact is that Al Qaeda remains a pariah in a modern world that is well aware of its dangerous ideology and destructive operations.

Mali and Somalia share a commonality as they are certified failed states and, hence, there remains a power vacuum. They are also distressingly poor countries. Al Qaeda can conveniently find fertile ground in countries like Somalia, Mali, Yemen, and Afghanistan. It is not surprising then that Al Qaeda radicals in Mali and Somalia have shot themselves in the foot as they failed to capitalize on their brief control of many parts of these two countries. Here is the salient fact about the jihadi groups: It is a lot easier to grab power than to establish a viable government.

 

Sunday, April 7, 2013

One Woman's Tale and the Myths of Happiness


“Every moment wasted looking back keeps one from moving forward.” —Hillary Clinton.
                                                             ***
In a San Francisco airport lounge, I was reading Professor Sonja Lyubomirsky’s new book, The Myths of Happiness: What Should Make You Happy but Doesn’t What Shouldn’t Make You Happy but Does (January 13, 2013), when a woman who seemed to be in her forties approached me. She was from one of the countries in the Horn of Africa.

“Oh, you are reading about that thing,” she muttered. I told her I was interested in the field of positive psychology.

Strangers, it is said, will at times share with you more about the story of their lives than a friend or relative. The repercussion for the narrator is minimal because the chance of the two parties ever meeting again is extremely rare.

The woman, whom I will call “Jasmine,” came to the U.S. in the late 1980s. After two years in Chicago, she met an American man two years her senior. He was relentless and methodical in his pursuit of her. Phone calls and flowers became her daily fare and started flowing like a stream of water. She was equally smitten and married the man at age 23. The two came from two different backgrounds: different races and different socio-economic backgrounds. His family was quite well-off and bought their only son and his new bride a house which was a shrine of ostentation: It had six bedrooms, three bathrooms, and a big swimming pool. Jasmine was a young woman of modest means and had lived a relatively sparse life. But the two were full of life, full of energy, and full of love. He was tall, handsome, and brilliant with a lot of charm and charisma. Their first year was memorable. They were best friends and each other’s confidants. They spent a great deal of time together and talked about everything, from the mundane (what colors each liked) to the serious (how many children they wanted). Their relationship was harmonious and romantic sparks flew right and left. After the first year, the couple had a daughter. A year later, another daughter was born. The children brought joy to her, she said, with a broad and beaming smile stamped on her face.
Two years later, the couple’s once romantic and cozy relationship had turned adversarial. The relationship became riddled with nasty arguments.  “We couldn’t stand each other,” she retorted. “For the first two years, my husband was number one in my own constellation,” she said, “but then, my children became my top priority.” Jasmine became busy with the children and their care, and her husband became resentful because he was not getting enough attention.

Then, one day, events took an alarming and dangerous turn. Jasmine was putting gas in her car when suddenly her husband parked behind her in the gas station. She was incredulous seeing her husband. She thought that he was following her. An hour before their encounter, her husband had grilled her about where she was going and why she was leaving. He had a possessive streak that annoyed her. He was, for all practical purposes, a control freak. What happened next was not in the playbook. Jasmine told me that she hurled a big cup of Coke she was drinking at her husband. Then, she approached him and started punching him and yelling, “Are you following me?” Her husband acted like a gentleman in front of the people at the gas station. He could have won an Academy Award for his superb performance. Jasmine was the one who was out of control. The police were called and came. Jasmine was arrested for assault and battery.
Normally, it is the husband who is charged with domestic violence in the U.S. and Jasmine’s case was an anomaly.   Her husband got an unusual opportunity to eviscerate her. He accused his wife of neglecting their children, child abuse, and even beating him up occasionally. His testimony, Jasmine argued, did not contain a grain of truth. Jasmine was found guilty of a misdemeanor for domestic violence and sentenced to three years’ probation. 

After the court case, Jasmine and her husband separated. She was, after all, under a restraining order not to come close to her husband. The couple, meanwhile, had joint custody of the children.
After Jasmine fulfilled her court requirements and three years had elapsed, she and her husband began to reassess their relationship. It was a highly combustible situation. She was twenty-eight years old, separated, and in an alien land with no relatives to support her. She felt lonely and fearful she might lose her children. After three years of separation, she went back to her husband. Her family back in Africa and her friends in Chicago were mystified. To them, it was like watching a scary movie:  a combination of horror and amazement. They started their opposition with a full-court press.  “Do everyone a favor,” her friends admonished her, “and end this child-like fantasy.” Why she returned to her husband, though a puzzling question, was not beyond all conjecture. Jasmine admitted that, while she professed so much abhorrence toward her husband, she still had feelings for him. Lowering her voice to nearly a whisper, she said, “I missed him and became nostalgic for the good times we had.”  The depth of betrayal and humiliation he had caused her became a thing of the past. However, a relationship built on tenuous pillars, like a house of cards, is destined to tumble.
Two years after the couple came back together; the marriage slowly became a life of grinding hardship. The good times faded and bad news came in batches. She thought she was caught in a volatile mix of manipulation, lies, and deception and felt she was in the belly of the beast. Jasmine herself confessed that she was verbally abusive and distant. She started avoiding her husband. In a way, the two were roommates more than a couple, more like fellow boarders than partners. “I made him unwanted, and he became more hostile,” she said. A husband deprived of loving would become frustrated.
 Then, there was the horrifying discovery. Her husband, it appeared, was leading a secret life under her nose. He was cheating on her and she caught him chatting with women online. Obviously, he was into internet dating, but she was amazed at how he had gone to increasingly elaborate lengths to hide his dark secret. His laptop, furthermore, was a den of pornography.  “How could a family man and an icon in the community engage in such morally repugnant practices,” she wondered. But the biggest lie—the granddaddy of all lies—was his concealing an infidelity. One day, her husband made an astounding confession: He had fathered a child. Jasmine was livid. She knew her marriage was hanging in the balance and had to listen and heed her own inner voices. She filed for divorce.

Her survival instinct kicked in.  Jasmine, accompanied by her children, got up, dusted herself off, and embarked on a life of singlehood. The news of her filing for divorce spread like wildfire. Before the divorce even became final, men were calling her and trying their luck. Americans, Asians, Arabs, her fellow countrymen and “even Somalis,” she said, laughing. The wheels were in motion for a change. Contrary to what her former husband had told her (that no man would marry her with two young children) Jasmine was hotly pursued, and she enjoyed the attention. Less than six months after her divorce became final, she fell in love with a man from her native country. Unlike her former husband, he was not uptight but funny, expressive, and he enjoyed listening to her. He also had a fashionable disdain for materialism. The new man did not spurn her children and, in fact, doted on them. This was, though, a risky enterprise for the couple; at least one of them was on the rebound. It was, of course, Jasmine. However, she categorically denied that she was. In fact, she would tell anyone who listened to her that she had grown to despise her ex and couldn’t wait to start a new life with someone about whom she cared.
Jasmine and her new man decided to get married. She said that she could not be happy without a partner in her life. What happened in the four months after the wedding is anyone’s guess. Boredom, she affirmed, seeped into the couple’s relationship. Jasmine had thought that she would ride into the sunset and live happily ever after. Her enthusiasm and wishful thinking were obviously misplaced. The couple’s serene world started spinning out of control. If history were any guide, Jasmine’s new marriage had some shades of her first marriage. Her husband witnessed a completely sinister side of her. He constantly complained of being marginalized, she said. She was dismissive and indifferent. “Occasionally, I growled at him,” she admitted. “I am known for my quick-draw temper.” She avoided him as much as she could and treated him like a roommate.  “I was, in a sense, reliving my first marriage,” she said.  
A three-month separation ensued and then the inevitable happened.  After six months of marriage, her new husband filed for divorce. The word “divorce,” she said, pierced her like a blade. She was expecting a long, drawn-out conflict and reconciliation and not the dissolution of her marriage. Her family and friends, this time, were not surprised and, in fact, did not even whimper. They all knew that she was easy to love and admire but difficult to live with.

 Instead of the two actively seeking to rescue their tattered union, they went on the offensive to discredit each other. “I guess we were emotionally immature, too sensitive, and not level-headed,” she said, smiling. “I disrespected him and talked to him in a way I would not address my friends,” she said. “Honestly, I regret that.” Then she added a zinger, “But someone had to be the adult in that marriage,” a not-too-subtle shot at her second husband.

“I a m now single,” she told this writer. “My two former husbands are ‘happily’ married, I assume.” Her children are adults and preparing to move out of her house and start their own families.

Jasmine asked rhetorically, “Am I that bad of a person not to be happy?”
This is the end of Jasmine’s absorbing account of her marriages.

                                                                  ***
Sonja Lyubomirsky’s book, The Myths of Happiness, interestingly answers some of the questions about happiness. The writer teaches psychology at the University of California, Riverside.  A new marriage, argues Lyubomirsky, brings a great deal of joy and intense happiness, but only for a short period. In a survey of 1761  European and American couples who have been married for longer than 15 years, respondents said that newlyweds enjoyed a period of heightened joy and happiness in the first two years but that joy started wearing off afterwards. Married couples, after that initial period, can recover that marital happiness 10 to 20 years later when the children leave home. The empty nest provides new opportunities for couples to rediscover each other and rekindle their love.

Why does the joy and intense happiness vaporize after a short period? Lyubomirsky introduces a concept that she calls “hedonic adaptation”; could it be the culprit? Hedonic adaptation means “human beings have the remarkable capacity to grow habituated or inured to most of life’s changes.” When things are familiar and constant, Lyubomirsky points out, humans, psychologically and physiologically, are notorious for taking positive experiences for granted. Every marriage is susceptible to hedonic adaptation. A new marriage that started with intense joy suddenly may turn into a life of routine existence and predictability. In fact, the author writes, that “we are prone to take for granted pretty much everything positive that happens to us.” The author writes that the thrill mostly goes away as quickly as it does when buying a new car or house because we begin to take the “new improved circumstance” for granted. Familiarity, Lyubomirsky says, may or may not breed contempt but research has proved that it breeds indifference. People’s expectations of the marriage might evolve, change, or expand. Indeed, Woody Allen once said that a relationship is like a shark; “If it does not move forward, it dies.”
When people fall in love, they experience an array of euphoric, amorous and passionate feelings. But over the years, the passionate love turns into compassionate love. Interestingly, what normally kills passionate love is predictability. On the other hand, the hallmarks of compassionate love are “deep affection, connection, and liking.” Lyubomirsky does not dismiss the viability of passionate love and argues that humans need both passionate love and compassionate love because the two complement each other: The first galvanizes us and lays the foundation for the new relationship, and the second is crucial for the nourishment of “a committed, stable partnership.”

 Lyubomirsky’s book shatters basic assumptions of happiness. Some of the myths of happiness are divided into two categories. The first is the notion that says, “I will be happy when— (fill in the blank).” I will be happy when I get married, or have children, or get the long-awaited promotion, or become wealthy. When we get what we want though and these things do not make us happy, we become frustrated and depressed. Then, the blame game kicks in. We question ourselves about whether something is wrong with us.
 
The second category of happiness myths is the following: “I can’t be happy when— (fill in the blank).” For instance, I can’t be happy when I am single, poor, or ill. Negative experiences, such as divorce, loss of employment, and death, freak us out and invite self-doubt and downturns. We contemplate that we will never be happy again.  Paradoxically, what we call “crisis” can be veiled opportunities for “renewal, growth, or meaningful change.” Many times, adversity “toughens us up” and people who have weathered negative experiences tend to be happier than the ones who have not. In essence, positive and negative events are intricately linked. As the English poet William Blake said in Auguries of Innocence, “Joe and woe are woven fine.” Lyubomirsky raises the question that if we were asked the best thing and the worst thing that happened to us last year, the answer might surprise us because “it is often one and the same.” We may have lost a loved one last year but, in that same year, we also may have met a soul mate. Or, we may have lost a job and then regrouped and found a more interesting field of employment. 
To Lyubomirsky, popular culture has been feeding us myths that happiness means marriage, wealth, and fame. In fact, the author argues that happiness is “neither a destination nor an acquisition.” People are happier when:

a)      They invest in their relationships and pay attention to each other.

b)      They redirect things that matter instead of what does not.

c)      They are not desirous compared to others.

d)      They are thrifty.

e)      They express gratitude regularly about their relationships, life and health.

f)       They bring variety and surprise to their marriage and do not settle on a routine and dull existence.

g)      They have reliable friends to talk to and lean on.

h)      Couples have an open line of communication,

i)       They have the right attitude in dealing with life’s challenges, and know what they can’t control.

j)       They focus on the positives.
On the issue of attention, another author, Gretchen Rubin, who wrote Happier at Home (2012), adds an interesting caveat about what makes a couple’s relationship thrive: warm greetings and farewells. If a spouse gives a heartfelt greeting when his or her significant other comes home instead of a perfunctory greeting and the same when the spouse is leaving home, the act shows engagement and attentiveness.

 Happiness, if only Jasmine knew, is something that “resides inside us, not outside.” It is never achieving a mythical goal. Certainly, as Lyubomirsky remarks, “nothing in life is as joy-producing or as misery-inducing as we think.” When all is said and done, nothing makes us happy all the time.

For example, researchers at the University of British Columbia found that people who spend money “pro-socially,” which means spending it on gifts for others and charitable donations, are happier.
Finally, the American actress Goldie Hawn once wrote a memoir, The Lotus Grows in the Mud (2005), about her years in Hollywood where fame and wealth are intertwined. She said that she believed she would be happy once she made it in the film industry. On the contrary, she discovered that it was not the case. But she had learned a valuable lesson. “I think I had to become successful to understand that success enhances who you are,” she wrote. “People who are nasty become nastier. People who are happy become happier. People who are mean hoard their money and live in fear for the rest of their lives that they will lose it. People who are generous use their gifts to help people and try to make the world a better place.”

 

  

Sunday, March 31, 2013

Clan Cleansing in Somalia: A Book Review


Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 336 pages.
                                                       ***
“We’re going to get it on because we don’t get along.” —Mohamed Ali, Rumble in the Jungle.

“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”—William Faulkner, Intruder in the Dust.
                                                         ***
When the current Somali president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, has recently visited Minnesota, he gave what seemed to be an inspiring and upbeat speech to that state’s Somali community. Then, he committed a faux pas when he admonished the audience to forget about the past, what happened in 1991 and afterward, and not to dwell on it. The reaction of those who heard the speech ranged from those who wanted to move forward and build on the positives to those who had hard time swallowing the fact that what happened in 1991 could be readily dismissed after so many lives were lost, properties confiscated, and thousands expelled from their homes. The president was depicted as an insensitive leader bent on concealing the truth rather than seeking a judicious way of redressing the wrong. Such is the legacy of 1991 and its deleterious effect on the minds of many Somalis, even after 22 years.

Professor Lidwien Kapteijns’ book, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, exactly cautions Somali politicians not to engage in empty rhetoric about concealing and brushing off the “ruinous legacy” of 1991. Kapteijns, who teaches history at Wellesley College in the United States, is no stranger to Somali studies. She has extensively written about Somalia and speaks fluent Somali. As long as the memories, wrongdoings, and injustice of that period are not fully acknowledged and publicly addressed, she argues, Somalia will remain in a state of conflict and unable to engage in meaningful reconciliation and nation-building.
Something drastic and major happened in 1991 in Mogadishu and other parts of the south that was tragic: an unprecedented violence. Whereas Somalis had history of killing each other—a clan against clan—what took place in 1991 after the collapse of Siad Barre’s brutal regime, writes Kapteijns, was “analytically, politically, and discursively something new, a transformative turning point and key shift that has remained largely unaddressed (and has been purposefully denied and concealed) both in the scholarship about the Somali civil war and in the political efforts at social and moral repair.” Various mechanisms were used to conceal, deny or downplay the 1991 tragedies. The Western media, for instance, failed to uncover the killings and raping of innocent people in Mogadishu, and when foreign reporters visited Mogadishu at the apex of the civil war, they were chaperoned by the operatives of the United Somali Congress (USC). Kapteijns adroitly cites a case of several Western reporters reporting from Mogadishu on one fateful day whose narratives almost resembled each other. It was obvious that these journalists were in the same convoy when they were reporting the carnage in Mogadishu. The problem was compounded by poor academic and political memoir writings that failed to grasp the gravity of the situation in Mogadishu. Moreover, moderate leaders of the USC engaged in covering up the killings. It was only a decade and half later when warlord Ali Mahdi publicly admitted the atrocities committed in 1991.

This was a campaign based on collective punishment of one clan, and, hence, it was “namely that of clan cleansing, in a new political context and with a new dominant discourse.” In fact, argues Kapteijns, it was a communal violence in a way because it involved ordinary people such as friends, acquaintances, and neighbors targeting others based on being members of the wrong clan. The violence was not done randomly but instead it was carried out in a well-thought-out manner that pitted, not a government force against an organized armed group but, a common people against common people. Kapteijns, though, makes it clear that it was not clans that did the killings in Somalia but rather people who used the name of clans to kill, maim and rape.

The 1991 violence was not created out of vacuum. It was Barre who started using political violence to punish entire clans. The government’s policy was “using clan sentiment to exacerbate competition, conflict and grudge among Somalis.” Two incidents stand out. First, it happened in 1978-1982 in the Mudug, northeast, and Nugaal regions.  Barre’s forces killed innocent people in those regions, poisoned wells, and starved thousands of people. There is also the incident that involved the killings of 82 high- ranking military officers in Jigjiga during the Ethiopian War, an act overseen by Barre’s minions; General Mohamed Ali Samantar and General Mohamed Nur Galaal. This happened after a failed military coup, aptly called “the Majertein coup,” which led to the execution of 17 officers. Oddly, 16 of the 17 killed were Majertein. The other non-Majertein conspirators, interestingly, had their sentences commuted to prison terms.  
Second, it was the well-written and widely-covered violence of 1988-1989 in the northwest and Togdheer regions when the regime bombed cities, killing and dislocating thousands of Isaac people.

When Barre was overthrown, the USC, according to Kapteijns, adopted a policy that “defined as mortal enemy of all Somalis encompassed by the genealogical construct of Daarood, which also included the president.” Many of those targeted by the USC and its allies (the SNM and the Rahanwein-based SDM), argues Kapteijns, had nothing to do with the Barre regime, but their crime was they shared the president the same clan. On the other side of the coin, the 1991 violence also had another dimension: some high-ranking officials in Barre’s regime were spared after the defeat of the dictator. Kapteijns mentions individuals such as Hussein Kulmiye Afrah (vice president), Abdiqassim Salad Hassan (interior minister), General Jilicow (head of security in the Benadir region) Mohamed Shaikh (finance minister), Abdullahi Adow (minister of presidency and former Somali Ambassador to the United States) who had largely benefited from their long association with Barre, found themselves unharmed and, in fact, were embraced by the leaders of the USC, whereas persons who belonged to Barre’s clan but never benefited from his regime got killed, robbed, or expelled because they were from the wrong clan.
Kapteijns chronicles the atrocities committed against minority groups such as, for instance, the Bravanese, that had suffered tremendously in the hands of both the USC and the Daarood-based SNF. A resident of Brava, a coastal town in the south, complained about how the rule in his hometown had changed hands on numerous occasions. “One group leaves then the next group comes,” he lamented. “They loot and take away your possessions. I can’t tell one from the other; they are like ants of the same color.”  

Lidwien Kapteijns’ book is an important addition to Somali studies. She uses popular poems, radio broadcasts, and extensive oral interviews to analyze the genesis, fomenting, and perpetuation of hate speech, and the employment of code words. The book is at its strongest when Kapteijns delves into the use of poetry and oral recordings to explain the violence that had engulfed Somalia in early 1990s. This is a-must-read book for every Somali who wants to know what happened in 1991. It is especially important for Somali leaders who want to bring a lasting change to Somalia because the process of uncovering the truth and dealing with it is only the beginning of the healing process.

 

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Shaikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah: An Obituary


Several years ago, the prominent Somali scholar Shaikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah gave a speech at a conference in Puntland. He derided what he called “Ghuluwi” (extremism) as a new phenomenon that was gripping that country. Teens between ages fourteen and seventeen, he lamented, were being brainwashed and had become killer-machines targeting religious scholars when the latter entered or left mosques.  
Last Friday, February 15, 2013, Shaikh Abdulkadir, who was in his seventies himself, was killed in broad daylight while he was praying in a mosque in Garowe. The killer was sadly a teenager. The young assassin was immediately apprehended by unarmed citizens who risked their lives to capture him.
Shaikh Abdulkadir went to Saudi Arabia in 1970 to study at the Islamic University in Madinah. He graduated in 1974 and was sent by Dar-ul-Iftaa, a Saudi religious organization, to Niger in West Africa as a religious teacher. He and his longtime friend, Shaikh Yusuf Adan, were unable to work there because they arrived after the academic year had started. The two were stuck in Niger unemployed until Siad Barre, who was the Chairman of the Organization of African Union (OAU) that year, came to Niger on an official visit. Barre encouraged the two to return to their country where they were badly needed and, in fact, took them in his plane to Mogadishu. Abdulkadir was appointed as a judge in the Hodon District. A year later, Barre would put Abdulkadir and Shaikh Yusuf in jail without any charges ever being brought against them. The two languished in prison until 1978.
Shaikh Abdulkadir went through four stages in his life after his return to Mogadishu: Ostracism, rehabilitation, cautionary tale and acceptance.
Ostracism
Shaikh Abdulkadir was one of only a few Somali scholars who graduated from Saudi universities prior to 1974. Somalia, at that time, was primarily a Sufi-oriented society. The nascient Islamic resurgence in Mogadishu was spearheaded by Shaikh Mohamed Moalim Hassan, a graduate of the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt, and an admirer of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Many of the young Islamists of that period were influenced by MB thinkers like Hassan El-Banna, Sayid Qutb, Mohamed Qutb, Fathi Yakan, Sa’eed Hawwaa and Pakistan’s own Abu A’laa Al-Mawdudi. Shaikh Abdulkadir, in essence, was an oddity and entered a hostile environment that was against Salafism, or as the Somalis derisively called the ideology “Wahhabism.” In many ways, Abdulkadir was treated like a pariah.
In 1975, I was a 15-year-old student when I first saw Abdulkadir. He was a rail thin man with impeccable manners. He was polite, courteous, and shy. He was given, like any Somali with a distinctive physical attribute, a nickname. His was Abdulkadir “Gacameey” (the one-handed). The nickname exposed his physical condition, and he hated it. Many years later, he implored his friends and acquaintances not to call him such a name.  

Student activists were told, in so many words, to steer clear of Abdulkadir because he carried an alien ideology that was ‘radical’. I remember one evening in 1975 when Abdulkadir was talking to two young activists and suddenly the student leader at the time, Abdulkadir Shaikh Mohamoud, came upon them and reprimanded the scholar. “What are you telling these youngsters?’ the student leader screamed. Then, in a clear indictment of the Saudi-trained scholar, the leader recited the Quranic verses; “And when it is said to them, “Do not cause corruption on the earth,” they say, “We are but reformers. Unquestionably, it is they who are the corruptors, but they perceive [it] not.”  Abdulkadir was stunned by the leader’s uncouth behavior but he simply ignored him. It was indeed ironic that this same student leader fled Somalia in 1976 and found home in Saudi Arabia where he spent for almost two decades and even graduated from one of that country’s finest universities.
There was also the case of a young man called Abdirahman who was influenced by Shaikh Abdulkadir. Initially, student leaders tried to reason with the young man but to no avail. Then, the leaders did something odd: Abdirahman was perceived as a mentally-ill person because it was unfathomable, in the eyes of student leaders that a “good person” would fall under the spell of Salafism. A group of twenty to thirty student activists went to the young man’s house in Pilaggio Arab to read Quranic verses to him, like someone who was possessed. When that attempt failed, the young man was ostracized like his mentor, Abdulkadir. Such was the ignorance prevalent at the time among young activists and the environment where there was zero tolerance for Salafism.  Today, the Salafi movement, in spite of its imperfects, has a strong presence in the country
Rehabilitation
In 1978, something dramatic happened. The student movement split into two groups. The first group, labeled “At-Takfir”, declared that Somalis, who are 100% Muslims, as “Kuffar” (infidels) because Islamic rule was not being implemented in the country. Members of this group stopped praying in mosques. The second group, however, had opposed to the first group and maintained that Somalis were Muslims but needed to be taught their religion. The strength of Salafism is its strong focus on issues about faith. Shaikh Abdulkadir, who was just released from prison in that tumultuous period, found a home in the second group and became active in eradicating the new alien and radical thought. In a short period, Shaikh Abdulkadir’s group adopted Salafism as its ideology. The group later became known as Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), and the largest Islamic movement in Somalia.  Abdulkadir suddenly became someone whose counsel and guidance was actively sought.  
Cautionary Tale
When the Barre government collapsed in 1991, Somalia was beset with a civil war. Many armed groups emerged including militias run by the AIAI. Shaikh Abdulkadir was against the idea of establishing these militias. He believed that Islamists had no business carrying arms because such a tactic frightened ordinary people, distracted them from worshipping God, destabilized the country, and actively invited more enemies to go against the Islamists. Unfortunately, he was not listened to then. He settled in his hometown, Garowe, and continued teaching people their religion. The AIAI briefly took control of Puntland and Shaikh Abdulkadir was not pleased with the actions of his colleagues. He told whoever would listen to him that the group’s action would soon backfire. The solution was for the Islamists, according to Abdulkadir, to work with the local people, tribal elders, and politicians without brandishing AK-47 and delivering violence. No one heeded to his admonition.
The people of Puntland, who initially welcomed the Islamists, became disenchanted with their new rulers and their style of governing. A militia led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf expelled the religious group from Puntland. Many innocent people died in those military clashes. Afterwards, the AIAI did the unthinkable when it decided to completely disarm. Some of its members though were not happy with the group laying down its arms and founded their own group, Al-Shabab. This is the same militant group now believed to be behind Abdulkadir’s assassination and, in December 5, 2011, that of his long-time friend and a colleague, Dr. Ahmed Haji Abdirahman.
Acceptance
For the last decade and half, Shaikh Abdulkadir has been a highly respected scholar in Somalia and a leader of Al-Ictisaam, a Salafi nonviolent movement.  He was a voice of moderation in a sea of radicalism. He believed in education rather than engaging in an armed struggle. He criticized the Islamic movement in the country for not having a strategic plan to save the country. He called for a well-thought out plan to deal with the ordinary people, tribal chieftains, and politicians instead of Islamists simply reacting to events. He wanted a peaceful transformation of Somalia where people’s lives, properties, and institutions were protected. The young misguided radicals, he would say, should be educated. “They only know the benefits of jihad and not ‘fiqhul- jihad’ (jurisprudence of jihad).”  The youths do not know when to fight, who authorizes jihad, and who can fight, he stated.  He condemned suicide bombers as a bunch of fools who do not care about the irrational loss they inflict on themselves and innocent people. “These ignorant young men do not know that when they blow up themselves in a bomb that they will end up in hellfire,” he would quip.

Shaikh Abdulkadir refused to have security protection even when numerous threats were issued against him by the Al-Shabab. “I am in my seventies and I have nothing left in me,” he used to say. “Whoever kills an old man like me is a loser.”
 Indeed, his assassins are the real losers. May God bless him.