Somali Phoenix: A Book Review

         

Jama Mohamed Ghalib “Jama Yare” is a Somali politician and writer. He held important posts in Somalia’s civilian government in the 1960s, and later in Siad Barre’s regime. He was the head of the national police under Barre and served, among other important posts, as interior, labor, local government and transport minister. After 1991, he served as a special adviser to General Mohamed Farah Aideed and later became an active participant in various Somali peace conferences held in Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt and Djibouti. Jama published his first book, The Cost of Dictatorship, in 1995. The book under review, Somali Phoenix, is his latest.

This book is a continuation of unfinished business that the author did not address in his first book. It begins with the significance of the Arta Conference which was held in Djibouti in 2000. That important gathering, just 10 years after the beginning of the Somali civil war, was historic—it was the first time a Somali peace conference run by Somalis produced the first transitional government in the country. A Somali government came to existence that was internationally recognized, with a national charter and a clearly defined structure of power: executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. Unfortunately, Arta’s success was not capitalized upon because powerful and sinister forces made sure that it did not succeed. First and foremost, Ethiopia—Somalia’s longtime neighbor and rival— was inimical to the Somali-owned peace conference from the very beginning. Addis Ababa, sensing a rare opportunity to precipitate Somalia’s decline into anarchy, set out to derail the accomplishments of the Arta conference and the transitional national government that it bore. While Ethiopia was the major obstacle, according to Ghalib, other international entities such as the United Nations and the United States, turned a blind eye on Addis Ababa’s negative meddling in Somali affairs. This Ethiopian intervention manifested in several forms, from actual military invasion and periodic incursions in the country to blatant interference —mostly by proxy— in all Somali peace conferences. In one instance during the early 1990s, Somalia’s factions, which were 16, were invited to a gathering in Addis Ababa. Soon, that number had multiplied into 25 separate groups. Some of the Somali personalities who had been invited were mere figures without actual groups. Ethiopia, according to Ghalib, has always had an expansionist policy toward Somalia, a policy that is several hundred years old and is also deeply rooted in fear of Islam.

Ghalib devotes more than 98 pages (one-third) of the book to the destabilizing role of Ethiopia in the past and present of Somalia. What follows is an interesting discussion of other countries’ policies toward Somalia. For instance, Ghalib has a positive view of countries and entities like Kenya, Djibouti, Italy, Egypt, OAU, and the Arab League. The book also covers some general features of Somali culture, Somaliland, and certain key personalities in Somalia.

The discussion on Somaliland and how its secessionist government was founded is perhaps one of the most interesting parts of the book. Ghalib, an avowed nationalist and unionist, minces no words and provides detailed historical and legal refutations of claims made by Somaliland politicians as to why they opted for secession from Somalia.

Perhaps, the discussion of some Somali political leaders, as seen by Ghalib, will create uproar. Ghalib talks about personalities such as Dr. Ismail Jumale Ossoble, Hashi Weheliye Maalin, Ali Mahdi, Aideed, Abdulkadir Zoppo, Abdullahi Yusuf, Mohamed Abshir, Abdirahman Tuur, and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. The author’s view of Aideed is generally positive. Ghalib, for instance, spends less than a paragraph discussing the clan cleansing that took place in southern Somalia. Ghalib’s four-sentence recap of that tragedy in Mogadishu in which thousands of innocent civilians were killed, uprooted, and targeted simply because of their clan affiliation, is as follows:

“Aideed led an uprising against a formidable and strongly established order. The victory over the latter, unfortunately, degenerated into a tragic civil war and inter-clan strafes to which Aideed’s militia was also a party. People therefore died on all sides throughout these conflicts, whether combatants or innocents. Many personalities including Aideed could not therefore escape responsibility for the upheavals per se, but he was never personally accused, let alone proved, of any particular willful murder of non-combatant civilians.”

Ghalib’s narrative of the late former prime minister of Somalia, Egal, is the most intriguing. The discussion is exhaustive and multi-faceted. It covers Egal’s family history, his failure to finish college in England, his political career which was replete with brilliance and backstabbing, public service and corruption, relations with the CIA—real or imagined—and years of imprisonment in Barre’s jails, serving as lackey to Barre after his release and betraying his people in the north, and finally changing colors and expediently becoming a secessionist leader and president of Somaliland. What piques the interest of the reader is what Egal did to Ghalib while the former was in power in Somaliland. Egal sent assassins to Ghalib’s house in Hargeisa, who in turn showered the author and his family with a fusillade of bullets. Fortunately, no one was hurt.  Ghalib has reproduced in his book a hand-written letter allegedly written by Egal ordering the political assassination.  

Ghalib’s book is a valuable addition to Somali studies. He is an excellent writer and is well-versed in Somali history, politics and culture. His assessment of political events, though at times clouded by his inherent biases, is powerful. I liked Ghalib’s first book, The Cost of Dictatorship, and feel the same with his new book. Ghalib is a Somali icon whose integrity and love of Somalia cannot be disputed. He stands tall in a world where many Somali politicians have sold their country to the highest bidder. Some consider Ghalib as a politician who, despite having served under Barre for 14 years as head of the police and interior minister, has not taken any responsibility for the crimes of that repressive regime. This is a subject Ghalib has yet to address because he has skillfully eschewed it in his prolific writings about Somalia. 

Because this book is self-published, Ghalib, unlike his first book, lacked the services of a professional editor. Hence, the book is poorly edited. It is inundated with numerous references—some good and some unimportant—that should have been neatly organized in footnotes. Despite that shortcoming, I would highly recommend this book to serious readers who are interested in Somali history and politics and who want to know why Somalia is in the state that it is in today.

A Winter of Discontent for Somalia's Beleaguered President

Mark Twain one said, “Get your facts first, and then you can distort them as you please.” When news of his demise spread like wildfire, Twain astutely remarked, “The reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.”

Last week, Somali President Hassan S. Mohamoud had his Mark Twain moment. When Turkey sent a special plane to take Mohamoud to Istanbul, the Somali Government spokesman told the mass media the president was having a medical check-up. Several Somali websites reported that the president was suffering from a stress-related condition and he had been placed in intensive care; others even floated the bizarre idea that he had actually died. 

 

After several days of silence, President Mohamoud gave a five-minute interview to Radio Mogadishu. He was furious he had been reported dead or was in intensive care. He contradicted his spokesman and stated he had come to Turkey to visit his wife and children. And yes, he’d had a medical check-up and the results were great.  The president said he was healthy and did not need to take an aspirin.

A simple question about his health that required a simple answer morphed into a tirade against his rivals that lasted several minutes. “These rumors and innuendos are the work of the enemies of the Somali people,” he warned. “In fact, these gossip-mongers are supporters of Al-Shabaab.” To emphasize his fitness, the president asserted, “I am 100% healthy,” six times in five minutes. The repetition of the word “healthy” was accompanied by a dire threat to his enemies. “I ordered the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security to investigate the people behind these false reports,” he added.

For the president, this has been a winter of discontent.

First, the West has abandoned his government. Last year, his government was heralded as the best option for ending Somalia’s two decades of chaos and anarchy. Western donors met in Brussels and pledged $2.5 billion to help the country rebuild itself from the ashes of ruin. British Prime Minister David Cameron convened an international conference in London to help Mohamoud and his government. Mohamoud also got a warm welcome in Washington, Rome, Tokyo, and other capitals.

Last July, the Somali government suffered a setback when the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea accused it of systemic corruption. The report concluded that 80% of aid given to the regime was missing, and the Somali Central Bank had become a “slush fund,” for the country’s officials. The bank’s governor was forced out and replaced by Yusur Abrar, a former Citigroup vice president. Then, the shocker came when Abrar herself resigned from her post after only seven weeks in office. She accused top government officials of graft and of pressuring her to open an account in Dubai so that funds from the Gulf States could be funneled through it instead of being deposited in the central bank. It was embarrassing for the government that Abrar had submitted her resignation in the UAE where she felt safer after assassination threats against her in Mogadishu. Her resignation was so damaging to Mohamoud’s reputation that Western donors withheld all aid to Somalia. Mogadishu has yet to receive a penny from the $2.5 billion pledged by these Western donors.

Second, Turkey, the only government that had been transparently providing cash aid ($4.5 million a month) directly to the Somali Government cut its aid in late December, 2013.  When a Turkish official was asked if aid would be resumed, he said, “We have no such plans at this stage. It is not our agenda.” Fortunately for Mohamoud, his government is still getting millions of dollars from Qatar and other Gulf States, monies whose size and frequency have never been revealed. 

Third, Al-Shabaab has intensified its bombings in Mogadishu, especially of the presidential compound. These terror acts are unprecedented in their ferocity and frequency. The lack of safety in the capital is a manifestation of the regime’s inability to reign in the terror group. Recently, James Clapper, the American Director of National Intelligence, accused Mohamoud of being weak and for heading a regime marred by chronic political infighting. To add insult to injury, a confidential report by the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea, that was leaked to Reuters this month, accused the Somali government of diversion of arms to Al-Shabaab. “A key adviser to the president, from his Abgaal sub-clan, has been involved in planning weapons deliveries to Al-Shabaab leader Yusuf Isse Kabatukade who is also Abgaal,” the report stated. These were weapons the government purchased as part of the partial lifting of the UN arms embargo last year. This is not the first time Mohamoud has been accused of having ties with Al-Shabaab. Last August, in an interview with a Somali channel, former prime minister and current parliamentarian Ali Khalif Galeyr accused Mohamoud of being in cahoots with Al-Shabaab. According to Galeyr, PM David Cameron of Britain had withdrawn an invitation to Mohamoud to attend the G-8 summit when the ties between Somali officials and Al-Shabaab leaders were uncovered. 

The reports of Mohamoud’s ill health are indeed exaggerated. However, what is not in doubt is his growing isolation from the international community, especially Western donors and Turkey, a country that has been a stalwart supporter of Mogadishu. Mohamoud might claim to be as fit as a fiddle, but his government today is ailing with endemic problems of corruption, lack of financial resources, serious security matters, and poor leadership.  

(Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, February 18, 2014).

Waran-Cadde's Wallaweyn Problem

I have a confession to make: I am a southerner and a card-carrying “Wallaweyn” man. Incidentally, Wallaweyn is a small town in southern Somalia. I was born in Afgooye (not far from Wallaweyn) and, since immediately after my birth and until age 18, I grew up in Mogadishu. Despite my strong credentials as Wallaweyn, I also have connections in the north, mostly through blood ties. In the 1960s, one of my sisters married a northerner (Ciise Muuse), a union that produced two children. A cousin also married another northerner (Sacad Muuse-Jibril Abokor), and that couple had several children. Most of my teachers in school were northerners. If you kindly think my English is good, all the credit is due to my northerner teachers. My grandparents hail from the north: my grandmother from Sool and my great grandparents from the Sanaag (Maakhir) region. This dizzying web of lineage for a Wallaweyn man like me is not unique; many Somalis are, after all, inter-related.

You may ask, Okay, what is the point? What are you trying to say?

Relax, I am doing what Somalilanders call “gogol-xaadh” (introduction) because this piece will infuriate some and delight others. It will annoy some because I will be called a “Somaliland hater” or a “Wallaweyn whiner.”  Others may approve of this piece because, as unionists, they will be delighted by the thrashing of Somaliland secessionists. Others might see it as a humorous attempt to toy with that dreadful and suffocating thing called “political correctness.” Are we clear now? No hard feelings.

 

The theme of this article can be summarized in one sentence: I like Somaliland politics. I never get bored with it because it is intriguing and lively. The north and the south share these common features: a) a dominant tribe is in power in both regions, b) there is a certain level of corruption in each, with the south being the greater den of thieves, and c) each regime marginalizes its opponents. However, the north enjoys relative peace and safety. Unlike the south, politicians in the north are not assassinated if they oppose the policies of the government. In Mogadishu, one member of the parliament was recently killed in a mysterious car bombing immediately after leaving the presidential compound. That happens only in Mogadishu.

 

A Pinocchio Interior Minister

Politicians lie, but some shamelessly offend our intelligence.

Recently, a brave and competent Somali journalist from the Somali Channel in the U.K interviewed the interior minister of Somaliland, Mohamed Ali “Waran-Cadde” (The White-speared). The interview was a classic example of how to dodge, lie, misinform, and mock. The minister said that Somaliland was a British protectorate and had a special relationship with Britain based on respect and cooperation.  While the British ruled Somaliland indirectly and were not as brutal as the Italians in the south, the territory was still administered by the Colonial Office in London. The protectorate, after all, was established to supply meat to the British garrison in Aden. Britain did not help the territory develop or build infrastructure.

 

Waran-Cadde was asked about the rumors of his government hiring white mercenaries to protect potential oil fields. He curtly denied them and made it clear that his government will hire neither white mercenaries nor black ones. Then, in reference to the African Union forces in the south, Waran-Cadde called them “sanweyne” (big nose). This denigration of fellow African Union forces that are helping the country get rid of terrorists reveals ignorance and arrogance.

 

Waran-Cadde, in a boldface lie, denied that his government had any shortcomings. He said that the government did not deny the head of the UCID opposition party permission to hold a public demonstration in the town of Gabiley. In fact, the government insisted on the event taking place in the office of UCID rather than outside. Furthermore, Waran-Cadde discounted that a major clan in Somaliland dominates—by design— key positions, including  the presidency, interior, foreign affairs, and finance ministries, chairmanship of opposition parties, and the airport and port administrations.

Recently, Waran- Cadde’s security forces arrested three Somali federal government officials at Hargeisa airport. These officials had attended the Turkish-sponsored bilateral talks between Somaliland and Somalia that were held in Istanbul. “Here in Somaliland, [we] enacted anti-federal government legislation and they knew our response; henceforth, we would bring those people to justice,” declared Waran-Cadde. “They traveled by plane from Mogadishu to Hargeisa and they weren’t transit passengers,” he added. It was only last November when Waran-Cadde, in a press conference, named the Somali government enemy number one of Somaliland.

 

Waran-Cadde has also denied that Somaliland receives foreign aid. This is a strange statement from a government official since his entire security forces get their salaries from the UNDP. Somaliland has also received $3 million from UK Aid in the last year. This assistance, which was earmarked for the pacification of the Sool and Buuhoodle regions, was misspent as is most of the aid given to any part of Somalia. Faisal Ali Waraabe, chairman of UCID, has called the ruling clique in Somaliland a bunch of looters and demagogues who muzzle the independent media like Universal TV and fleece national resources. He compared the current regime in Somaliland to the Siad Barre government. “Somaliland is for sale,” he lamented.

 

Waran-Cadde is a flamboyant politician who has changed political parties as often as one changes clothes. He has, in his home, what defies logic: seven wild lions. Several years ago, one of them got loose in Hargeisa and killed a girl. He has failed to justify why he keeps dangerous wild animals in the city or whether keeping such animals in an urban setting is legal.

 

A War of Words

Recently, a spat erupted between Fadumo Siciid of the UCID party and Amina Mohamoud Diriye, a deputy minister. Ms. Siciid held a press conference in which she lashed out at Ms. Diriye. Ms. Siciid was barred from entering Gabiley by the current administration. This war of words might seem trivial to many, but in reality it is an indication of relative freedom of speech in Somaliland. The role of northerner women in politics is more vibrant than that of their sisters in the south.

  

The current Somaliland administration has a history of marginalizing the opposition parties and deliberately creating discord in their ranks. Funds allocated for the opposition are given to them at one time and denied at another. Opposition figures are also deprived of access to the national mass media. Waran-Cadde, of course, reassured the Somali Channel viewers that he would look into the matter.

Let us hope for that.

Somalia's New Cabinet: Business as Usual

The new cabinet appointed by Prime Minister Abdiweli Shaikh Ahmed on January 17 has been raising  uproar. The naming of a cabinet has been perhaps the most grueling process in recent Somali history. The president was heavily involved in the selection of the appointees and his prints are all over. Some of the hopefuls were promised positions—others were even invited to Mogadishu—only to be rejected in the eleventh hour. The new cabinet was announced in the wee hours at 2 AM. The dramatic responses have already begun and protestations are being heard from all corners: the cabinet is too big; two of the appointees resigned the same day of the announcement; women are upset for being marginalized; some clans are up in arms; groups like Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama have vowed to boycott the federal government; Dammul Jadiid is monopolizing power; and too many inexperienced persons are in the cabinet. The features of this new cabinet are as follows:

Size: This cabinet is big. It has 25 ministers, 25 deputy ministers, and five state ministers. The previous cabinet was unusually lean with only ten ministers, however, this one is unnecessarily large, and is a clear manifestation of a bloated government. In reality, all of these appointed ministers are merely officials by name. Many have no basic infrastructure such as offices, nor do they possess the necessary manpower that should go with their big titles.  

Resignations: The most embarrassing moment for the president and the prime minister was when two deputy minister appointees, including the Mayor of Mogadishu, resigned in protest of what they called the “lowly” positions they were given. Mogadishu mayor, Mohamoud Ahmed Nur “Tarzan” called for an immediate press conference in which he said he had not been consulted about the position. “I will not accept the position of a minister,” he declared, “let alone a deputy minister.”

Tarzan’s appointment as deputy minister was humiliating and purely Machiavellian on the part of President Hassan Sh. Mohamoud. The president could have replaced Tarzan quietly with another mayor, but he had neither the courage nor the decorum to ask Tarzan to resign. It is the president, after all, who appoints the mayor of Mogadishu. Perhaps, either Ali “Amerika” (the Somali ambassador to Kenya) or Abdirahman “Yariisow,” (the government spokesman), might replace Tarzan. That is, unless the president comes up with another option in the last minute.  The president wanted to humiliate Tarzan publicly and he got his wish. Now, it is unlikely that Tarzan will last in his current position.  Tarzan, a man of an outsized ego, finally got his match in the president. One wonders how the president and his prime minister managed to appoint individuals to these positions without first consuling with them. It is, at best, sheer unprofessionalism.

Women: President Mohamud’s earlier promises to give women equal representation in the government have hit a snag. The new cabinet has only two women out of 25 (5%). This is a downgrade from the last cabinet in terms of percentage (20%) which had two women in powerful posts out of ten. One of the newly appointed ministers has been given the traditional portfolio of women’s affairs, and the other has been promoted from deputy minister in the ministry of public works to full minister. There are two new female deputy ministers out of 25 and no female state ministers. Mohamoud has alienated many groups and clans, but his alienation of women, who represent half of the population, is tragic.

Dammul Jadiid: This secretive but powerful group is still occupying key positions. There are more than a dozen appointees in the cabinet that belong to Dammul Jadiid, including the new deputy prime minister and minister of religion. Traditionally, deputy prime ministers are chosen from key posts such as finance, foreign affairs or defense.  The new deputy prime minister has all of the qualifications that President Mohamoud likes: he is inexperienced, a member of Dammul Jadiid, and hails from the north. Dammul Jadiid’s naked power grab is now in epic proportions.

Farah Abdulkadir, the architect of President Mohamoud’s election, was appointed as Minister of Justice and Constitution. This is a clear indication that President Mohamoud is already laying the ground work for his re-election in 2016. Abdulkadir is the right man to help Mohamoud influence future amendments of the provisional constitution.

Abdikarim Hussein Guled, another stalwart of Dammul Jadiid, is also back as the minister of national security. This new position is usurpation from the interior ministry, which is traditionally responsible for the police and intelligence services. Guled now is the new chief of security and intelligence, and he has his own ministry.

Jamal Barrow, deputy foreign minister, and Mohamed Nur Gacal, state minister for foreign affairs, two Dammul Jadiid figures, were not so fortunate. Barrow is replaced by another colleague of his in the group. Gacal was slated to be a minister of education, yet his contentious relationship with Foreign Minister Fowzia Yusuf ended up hurting him. Mohamoud decided to leave these two out of the new cabinet. “My friend,” the president has told Gacal, according to a source, “I am sorry, but you will not be in the cabinet.”

Inexperience: Inexperience is a major feature of the new cabinet. Unfortunately, many of the appointees are inexperienced in government affairs. Many were brought there not because of their qualifications but instead for their clan credentials. This has been the hallmark of President Mohamoud’s administration: to avoid qualified and educated people who might overshadow him. Mohamoud’s selection of two prime ministers in the span of a year who are remarkable for their inexperience is a good example of what kind of cabinet the president desires.

Sharif Sakiin: After Dammul Jadiid, the second big beneficiary of the new cabinet is Sharif Hassan “Sakiin,” former speaker of the parliament. He has at least six of his allies appointed as ministers, state ministers and deputy ministers. President Mohamoud has struck an unholy alliance with the controversial former speaker and future leader of what is now proposed as the South West state. Sakiin has become a king-maker, and was instrumental in gaining votes for Mohamoud in the parliament during the ousting of PM Shirdon.

 

The new cabinet will be confirmed in due time, but it would be unrealistic to expect any miracles from these ministers. For the time being, it will be business as usual: the president will keep running the show from Villa Somalia, and the new ministers will obey his marching orders. They will retain their fancy titles and fat paychecks. In my estimation, though, they will be lucky if they last more than a year.

 

Extrajudicial Killings in Kenya: The Easier Route

On December 20, the head of Kenya’s National Police Service issued a report about the country’s 2013 crime rate. The good news was that crime rates had fallen 8 percent compared from the previous year. Inspector General David Kimaiyo attributed the decrease to what he called “public cooperation with the police and the increased police mobility.” He even introduced the notion of “community policing,” a popular model based on engagement and partnership between the police and the community. 

According to the report, economic crimes decreased by 21 percent, theft of livestock by 17 percent and offenses against persons by 7 percent.  The bad news, however, was an increase in some crimes, such as robbery (10 percent), homicide (6 percent), rape (22 percent) vehicle and other thefts (3 percent) and robbery with violence by 9 percent. There were also 509 incidents of mob injustice in 2013. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab killed 111 persons, 71 of whom died during the Westgate Mall bombing.

Oddly, the police report was remarkable in what it failed to mention: extrajudicial killings.  Kenyan human rights organizations have criticized the government for sponsoring such crimes. In November 2013, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and the George Soros-funded Open Society Initiative issued a report titled, “We Are Tired of Taking you to Court: Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit,” that concluded the Kenyan government was running a police death squad that targets suspects with links to terror groups.  Most of the extrajudicial killings take place, according to the report, in the heavily Muslim populated city of Mombasa which has become a hotbed for Al-Shabaab recruitment. In 2012, Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a cleric on the U.S and UN sanctions list for providing “financial, material, logistical or technical support for Al-Shabaab”  was killed in the streets of that city. In October 2013, Sheikh Ibrahim Omar was also shot dead in Mombasa after allegations of involvement with the Westgate Mall bombing. More than 20 others met the same fate in 2013 or simply disappeared. According to the report, a Kenyan police officer told a detainee, “We are tired of taking you to the court. Next time, we will finish you off in the field.”

The government resorts to these unlawful killings, according to human rights groups, when it is unable to build a strong case against terror suspects. These groups have asked both the United Kingdom and the U.S governments to suspend aid to the Ant-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) due to its direct involvement with these unlawful killings. The unit receives training and funding from Washington and London. This elite counter-terrorism unit has regularly arrested suspects but the number of terrorists convicted in courts remains dismal.

The Kenyan government denies that it is culpable for extrajudicial killings. The usual government response has been that the suspects died in a gun battle due to intra-rivalries (for good effect, the police display weapons to the mass media), that rogue political officers are the ones to blame, or, in the case of disappearances, the suspects simply fled to Somalia. A radical cleric in Mombasa has in fact lamented, “The government is murdering us.”

Extrajudicial Killings are not new in Kenya. In 2008, a government-funded group, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, issued a report, “The Cry of Blood,” that identified police as responsible for the killings and disappearance of more than 500 young men. The report classified these extrajudicial killings as crimes against humanity because they deprived the victims of all due process.

The general view among human rights groups is that the extrajudicial killings, instead of stemming the tide of religious radicalism, alienate many Muslims who could otherwise serve as partners in the war against terror. As Jonathan Horowitz of the Open Society and the co-author of the group’s report has argued “[The ATUP’s conduct] has “eroded the rule of law in Kenya and created distrust between the public and police, creating conditions which can provide fuel for terrorists.”

That is, after all, what Inspector General Kimaiyo has been advocating: community policing.

(Written by Hassan M. Abukar. Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, January 16, 2016).

Abdiweli Gaas and Villa Somalia: A Cautionary Note

Dr. Abdiweli Gaas surprised many with his victory as the new president of the regional government of Puntland. There was a general perception among many that the incumbent Abdirahman Farole would be re-elected. Gaas won by a single vote. As he said immediately after his election, the work has already begun. Villa Somalia, the seat of the Somali presidency in Mogadishu, welcomed the new Puntland president. The exuberance by President Hassan S. Mohamoud might though be short-lived. Gaas may surprise many with the way he will lead his administration and regarding his relations with Villa Somalia.

Gaas ran for the Somali presidency in 2012 and lost. In the last round of the election, he supported the current president, Mohamoud, against Gaas’ old boss, the incumbent President Shaikh Sharif Ahmed. Mohamoud had promised the position of premier to Gaas, if the former won, as part of horse-trading. It turned out Mohamoud had made similar promises to others including Ahmed I. Samatar. Then, after Mohamoud was elected, he gave an interview to Voice of America pleading to “his friends” not to get angry with him if he did not choose them as prime minister. His statement raised an obvious question: To how many of his friends had he promised the position of next prime minister?

Then, a month ago, according to a source, President Mohamoud told Gaas that he had reserved the position of the prime minister, which had become vacant after the ousting of A. F. Shirdon, for the latter’s clan.

 

Now, things have changed between Gaas and Mohamoud. While Gaas is president of a regional government, he is, in all practical senses, a co-equal of Mohamoud. Mohamoud favored Gaas over his rival, Farole. However, the dynamics of their relationship have changed for the following:

1.     Gaas’ first and foremost responsibility now is to the people of Puntland, not Mogadishu.  That means he should focus on the interests and development of Puntland. Each president has his own constituency. While the two can cooperate on national issues, Gaas is unlikely to kowtow to Mogadishu.  President Mohamoud is not popular in Puntland because he has twice failed to appoint a Puntlander as the premier. Gaas will have to balance between his working relationship with Villa Somalia and his job as the head of Puntland.

2.     Gaas may have to be extra careful in dealing with President Mohamoud. First, Mohamoud has a history of equivocation and breaking promises. Second, he has shown to the world that he is a dictator. It is either his way or the highway. His hoarding of power in Mogadishu is palpable. There is fear by some that Mohamoud’s goal is to make Puntland a puppet regional government that he is only interested in extracting its resources. Corruption, after all, has been the culture of Mogadishu. The recent meltdown in the Central Bank is a good example of the allegations of corruption. The UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia has accused the regime in Mogadishu of widespread corruption. The bank, according to the report, has become a “slush fund” for regime officials.

3.       Moreover, the regime in Mogadishu has lost its luster and is now viewed by donor nations as hopelessly incompetent. The Western donors are leery of trusting Mohamoud with the $2.5 billion donated to Somalia a year ago. Gaas has an excellent relationship with many in the international community. He can tap some of these needed funds to help develop Puntland and make it a strong viable regional government in Somalia. A strong Puntland is not only good for Puntlnaders but also to the rest of the country.  A weak Puntland government, on the other hand, is a burden on the nation. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland has never attempted to secede from the union.

4.       Being one of the architects of the Roadmap, Gaas is in a position to positively influence the amending of the provisional constitution and future power sharing arrangements with the federal government. Unfortunately, there is no strong federal government based in Mogadishu. Mohamoud is unable to exert his control on many parts of south Somalia. It might be wise for Gaas to give the regime in Mogadishu time to get its house in order.

Gaas was once a prime minister of Somalia and, in his short stint, had accomplished a lot. Now that he is the president of Puntland, he will have more room to implement his political, economic and social program.  He is, after all, the big fish in Puntland.

 

Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel was President Obama’s first chief of staff. He decided to quit his job and run for mayor of Chicago. After winning that position, he started implementing his political, social, educational and economic program in the city. Some time ago, he was talking to his predecessor, Richard Daley. Rahm looked at Daley and said, “Rich, you lied to me. You told me this was a good job. It is actually a great job. If I had known how great, I would have [ran against] you.”

Al-Shabaab in 2013: Boom and Bust

For Al-Shabaab, 2013 was a year of many twists and turns. It started in January with an ominous threat by the Al-Qaeda affiliate to the American jihadist Omar Hammami: Surrender in two weeks or face death. This was followed by the brutal killing in February of Shaikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah, a prominent Somali scholar in his seventies, while he was praying in a mosque in Puntland. After such a perverse start, the year ended when on December 20, the group killed another foreign jihadist, Abdirizak “Burundi” (The Burundian). For Hammami, January was a point of no return. The Al-Qaeda groups, after all, are not paper tigers; they mean business.  Nine months later, Hammami was killed in an ambush ordered by Godane, the emir of Al-Shabaab. Gone were the professed brotherly love and the years of comradeship and struggle. Such was the unceremonious end of the Hip Hop jihadist who once sang rap songs in praise of the militant group. For Al-Shabaab, issuing threats and killing are just two sides of the same coin. The year 2013 was no exception.

The year manifested the hounding and the marginalization of foreign jihadists, loss of more territory, a power struggle among the group’s leaders, a deadly terrorist mission abroad, an unusual military victory, and an unprecedented infiltration of the weak Somali government.

 What was unique about last year was the grumbling and opposition of key jihadists, foreign and local, against the imperial leadership of Godane. Hammami, Ibrahim Al-Afghani, and some of their colleagues went online and lashed out at the emir of Al-Shabaab. However, it is the tragic story of Abdirizak Burundi that seems taken from a Gothic novel: A former Christian who converted to Islam and immediately joined a religious terror group only to be killed by his colleagues. Abdirizak (last name unknown) was born in Rwanda, fled that country in 1994 after the brutal massacres of the minority group Tutsi by Hutu militias and their supporters. He was a Hutu and fled to Congo; from there he went to Uganda, then he settled in Nairobi, Kenya. It was in Kenya and after working for a non-religious Somali merchant that Abdirizak became interested in Islam and converted. He came to Somalia that same year, 2007, and was recruited by Al-Shabaab which at the time was fighting the Ethiopian forces in the country. Abdirizak mastered Somali, participated in terrorist operations with Al-Shabaab, and opened businesses in Mogadishu and later Barawe. He was critical of Godane’s treatment of foreign jihadists. In May, he traveled to the Bay region to visit one of his wives and new-born daughter but was intercepted by Al-Shabaab fighters who thought the foreigner was on his way to join the renegade Omar Hammami. Abdirizak was detained by the radical group and kept in a make-shift prison in Jilib for eight months. In December, his family was notified of his death without further explanation.

Al-Shabaab lost Mahadaay, a strategic town 113 km (75 miles) north of Mogadishu.  For consolation, though, Al-Shabaab is rejoicing to see some of the territories it once controlled in Lower Shebelle being destabilized by a militia allied with the government and led by Yusuf Indhacade in a campaign to disenfranchise the indigenous people. The biggest town Al-Shabaab controls now is Barawe where in June two of its top leaders were killed by forces loyal to Godane and another leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys, escaped only to fall into the hands of the government.  Two of the eight Al-Shabaab figures on whose heads the U.S had put a bounty in the last two years (Hammami and Ibrahim Al-Afghani; $5 million each) were killed by Godane.  Moreover, Mukhtar Robow, who also has a $5 million bounty on his head, is estranged from Al-Shabaab. By the rate Godane is going in killing his former colleagues, it means the U.S has saved millions in bounty payments, and it might even save more as Godane’s grip on the group’s command and control tightens.

Al-Shabaab succeeded in its attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, an incident allowing global jihadists to revel in a moment of pride and exuberance. For a short period, the terrorist operation gave Al-Shabaab a nodding approval from Al-Qaeda which had recently reacted with shudders to the murdering and marginalization of foreign jihadists by Godane. Moreover, Al-Shabaab succeeded in repelling an operation by U.S Naval SEAL Team 6 in Barawe, the same elite force that was responsible for killing Osama Bin Ladin. The operation was an unmitigated failure and embarrassment for the American Special Forces but a resume-enhancement for the terror group. The message was clear: Unlike Al-Qaeda central, Al-Shabaab can protect its own leaders from the Americans. It was that same year that the radical group also foiled a rescue attempt by the French forces to free France’s agent, Dennis Alex, who was held by Al-Shabaab.

Perhaps, the most embarrassing moment for the Somali government was in July when the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea issued a report which claimed the terror group had penetrated the security apparatus of the government, the very body that is supposed to fight terrorism. In August, former Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galeyr and a current parliamentarian, also accused President Hassan S. Mohamoud of being in cahoots with Al-Shabaab. In an interview with a Somali channel in Minneapolis, Galeyr claimed the existence of what he termed “Gacan-saar” (a secret handshake; an understanding between two parties) between government officials and Al-Shabaab leaders especially in Jubbaland. Galeyr mentioned telephone exchanges between these two parties: “These dealings between the federal government and Al-Shabaab are what led to the last minute cancellation of President Mohamoud’s invitation to attend the G-8 summit.”  President Mohamoud’s secret dealings with Al-Shabaab, stated Galeyr, is the biggest concern some Western and neighboring countries have about him. Another former prime minister, Ali Ghedi, added more fuel to the issue when he chastised the government for its inability to avert the spike of Al-Shabaab violence in Mogadishu. “The regime in Mogadishu has strayed from the correct path,” he said. Perhaps, it is the issue of corruption that has alienated the current regime in Mogadishu from Western powers and given Al-Shabaab an opportunity to strike with impunity. For example, an Al-Shabaab terrorist accused of the attempted murder of the country’s deputy army commander escaped the Central Prison in Mogadishu. The government fired the warden and four correction officers for taking bribes.

 

The former American secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, declared in October that Al-Shabaab posed a global threat and, hence, should be hunted down with drones and other means. In December, Ali Dheere, the spokesman of the group, issued his own proclamation by naming the U.S enemy number one and the UK enemy number two. This is an upgrade for the Americans in terms of ranking as previously the African terror outfit mostly focused on the Somali government, the African forces, Ethiopia, and Kenya as their main enemies. The radical group is beginning to sound more like other global jihadi outfits like Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Unfortunately, the year 2014 might not bring much relief for the Somali people already suffering from Al-Shabaab’s terror operations because of the chronic corruption in the government, which has given the group an unusual opportunity to become emboldened. Mogadishu today has made great progress in rebuilding and encouraging business, but, alas, it is less safe than it was in 2012. The Somali army is nowhere near being a viable force that can eradicate the terror group, the African forces (AMISOM) are underused with a limited mandate, and Al-Shabaab is not expected to provide any letdown in its terror campaign. Therefore, sit tight and brace yourself for another year full of twists and turns.