Mired in Major Losses: Al-Shabaab in 2014

It was a bad year for Al-Shabaab. In fact, it was the worst year for the jihadi group since its formation a decade ago.  The group lost key leaders, a large swath of territory and substantial revenues.

Al-Shabaab also lost many of its territories. Last year, the Somali government forces and those of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) named more than a dozen villages and small towns which were conveniently—and for public relations consumption—dubbed as “strategic towns” liberated from the militant group. In reality, what hurt Al-Shabaab the most was the loss of the strategic coastal city of Baraawe, Bulo Burte, and the entire region of Bakool. Baraawe was the headquarters of the group, its main training base, a main source of revenue, and very close to the capital, Mogadishu (180 km). 

If 2013 was a bloody year for Al-Shabaab because some of the group’s top leaders were either killed or banished by then-emir Ahmed Abdi Godane, 2014 can be simply categorized as the year of living dangerously. Key Al-Shabaab leaders were killed by an American air strike, some were captured, some defected, and some were added to American and UN sanctions list for wanted terrorists—or, oddly, removed from that infamous list.  A former Al-Shabaab leader from Puntland, Said Atom, was removed from the UN sanctions list because he had repudiated his violent past. However, the United States Government put a $3M bounty on Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir “Ikramah” (the man who coordinated the attack on the Westgate Mall), Yasin Kilwe (the group’s emir in Puntland) and Jaafar (Kilwe’s deputy).

Two key Al-Shabaab leaders were killed by the American drones: Ahmed Abdulkadir Camo “Iskudhuuq,” a commander, and Abdishakur Mohamed Ahmed aka “Tahlil” or “Shakir,” chief of intelligence. Surprisingly, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hirsi, a former head of intelligence of the group and a man on whom the U.S. put a $3M bounty in 2012, defected to the Somali government. Zakariya, however, deserted the group 19 months ago in disagreement with Godane. Zakariye will provide a trove of intelligence about the group to the Somali, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and American governments.

The major blow for Al-Shabaab undoubtedly was the killing of Godane himself in an American air strike. The emir was unique. He was a good organizer: secretive, mysterious, articulate, an excellent motivator, and an amateur poet. He ruled the radical group with an iron fist and succeeded in June 2013 to consolidate his power. His loss was perhaps one that the group is unlikely to recover from in the foreseeable future. 

The man who replaced Godane, Ahmed Diriye “Abu Ubaidah” has yet to address his fighters and the Somali public. His unusual silence has led to speculation as to whether he is even in charge. There are some accounts that say that Mahad Karate, the deputy emir, is the one who is calling the shots. What we know so far is that Diriye, immediately after his selection, has shown some interest in reaching out to the renegade Al-Shabaab fighters who have been in hiding for fear of Godane. 

The most prominent of these disgruntled jihadists is Mukhtar Robow Ali (“Abu Mansur”) who was one of the co-founders of Al-Shabaab, once a former deputy emir and spokesman. Robow became estranged from Godane and fled to the Bay and Bakool region. The new emir attempted to open a dialogue with Robow, but it did not go well. Robow demanded drastic changes in the way Al-Shabaab is managed and also asked for a full account of the killings of prominent Al-Shabaab leaders in 2013 by Godane such as Ibrahim Mee’aad “Ibrahim al-Afghani” Abdulhamid Olhaye “Moalim Burhan,” and Omar Hammami, the American jihadist. Moreover, Robow asked that a new leadership be formed that is broad-based, inclusive, and legitimate. He also said he had no problem even if the current emir was selected again. It was apparent that the leadership was not willing to open the files of past violations, killings, and harassment of foreign and local jihadists who had crossed Godane. Furthermore, some of the Al-Shabaab leaders simply saw Robow as a renegade who wanted to wrest power from the new and inexperienced emir. The current leadership rejected Robow’s demands, and the talks between the parties have since stalled.

The leadership also reneged on a promise to release some Al-Shabaab fighters who have been detained in secret locations during Godane’s reign. Some of the parents of these fighters were told to come to Barawe during the last Eid festival to be reunited with their children.

Al-Shabaab succeeded in attacking Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, three times last year—a proof that the Somali government even considering the weakened state of the radical group—has serious security breaches and flaws. The group was responsible for assassinating lawmakers such as Jama Mohamud Xayd and Sado Ali Warsame.

The year 2015 will be worse for Al-Shabaab because the group has become an easy target for American drones. It is astounding that key leaders of the group were successfully pinpointed for target killing. This indicates, among other factors, that the group’s leadership has been penetrated by foreign intelligence services—or, that some of the Al-Shabaab leaders are deeply involved in purging their rivals and therefore are discreetly leaking information about their whereabouts. The territories the group controls is shrinking, which means jihadists will further regroup in rural areas and increase bombing attacks on Mogadishu. If Al-Shabaab disintegrates in 2015—a distant possibility—it will remerge in a different outfit. The seeds of jihadism are still present in Somalia. Not long ago, the leaders of Al-Shabaab were once active members of now defunct Islamic organization called Al-Ittihad Al-Islami.

Mixed Somalis Are No Strangers to Awkward Questions

When Zulaikha, a light-skinned red head, was in kindergarten, she had an epiphany. She found out that her Somali mother was unique. At the time, Zulaikha was a student in a predominantly white school. When the young children saw a black woman picking her up after classes and sometimes volunteering at their school, they were perplexed.

“Zulaikha, are you adopted?” the children would ask. And when Zulaikha told them no, they would ask, “Then how come your mother is black?”

Zulaikha and her siblings, Amina Caddey, 25, and Yusuf Mohammad, 26, are the offspring of a white father and a Somali mother. They are also active members in the Facebook group, “Are You Half-Somali?”—a private group that is strict about who joins.

The objective of the group is clear. “It is for mixed Somalis to exchange their views, thoughts, experiences, and, most of all, positively the blessing of belonging to more than one culture.” Even though the group is private, “Non-half Somalis are welcome, but haters are not.”

The group occasionally receives nasty messages, ostensibly from some Somalis who question its intention and its very existence. These naysayers are mostly individuals who believe there is no such thing as a half-Somali. “Anyone whose father is not Somali is not Somali, these critics believe,” explains Yusuf Mohammad.

Interestingly, the majority of the half-Somali group members have Somali mothers, says Yusuf. He is also one of the administrators of the group, which includes half-Somalis of German, Native American, French, Japanese, Chinese, Arab, Finnish, and Indian ancestries. Indeed, the group is a mini-United Nations group that has one common denominator— a Somali half.

Amina Caddey likes associating with members of this diverse group. “I like to network with people who have a similar background and share with them our uniqueness,” she explains.

One day, Amina went to a student conference with her cousin, a full-blooded Somali. The cousin introduced her to another young Somali woman who was immediately shocked by Amina’s light skin. After a minute of staring at Amina closely, the young lady finally issued a verdict:  “I can see the traces of Somaliness in you,” she told Amina. “But you are so white.” 

Amina laughed and told her that she hears that from other Somalis all the time. Once, an elderly Somali woman asked Amina’s cousins why they were hanging out with two white kids. When the elderly woman was told that Amina and her sister Zulaikha, in fact, related to the children, the Somali woman was astounded. Then, suddenly, the woman started inquiring about the clan of their white father.

“It was a bizarre encounter,” Amina said, smiling. “Many people simply want to put me in a box.”

Yusuf recalled attending a weekend Islamic school. The first day, the Egyptian teacher asked students who spoke Arabic to raise their hands. Several students did. Then the teacher turned to Yusuf and admonished him for not raising his hand. “I do not speak Arabic,” explains Yusuf. Baffled, the teacher became speechless. “I guess, she automatically assumed I was an Arab,” he says.

The half-Somali group was founded in 2008; however, it experienced an unprecedented peak in 2011 when many “halfies”—as they call themselves—joined.

The half-Somali group has interesting tales to tell—some extremely rare, others simply outrageous.

There is one rare case of a young lady who is half-Somali and half-Japanese. The Japanese, coming from a nation that is homogenous like Somalia, rarely marry outside their group. However, love, as it is popularly said, is blind. A Japanese journalist covering a story in Kenya met a Somali woman, and the two fell in love. Today, the couple’s daughter, who grew up in Japan, is also part of the half-Somali group.

Then there is the weird case of a person who tried to join the group because she was half-Somali and half-Somalilander. “It was a ludicrous attempt,” Amina Caddey notes, “to instill politics in an otherwise cultural and multi-ethnic group.” Incidentally, the residents of Somalia and Somaliland—a self-declared independent entity—are both ethnic Somalis.

A half-Somali group might appear strange to many Somalis, but its members bring a greater richness of culture and a whole new perspective to the Somali community at large. The cultural horizons have indeed expanded worldwide. It was, after all, a child with a strange name, a Kenyan father and a white mother from Kansas who became the forty-fourth president of the United States of America.   

(Reprinted with permission from Sahan Journal, December 23, 2014). 

Puntland President's Travels: An Itinerary for Change or a Waste of Time?

Almost a year has passed since the election of Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas” as President of Puntland. Many people, including this writer, welcomed his election and saw it as an opportunity to develop Puntland and make it a beacon for the rest of Somalia. Puntland, after all, has never attempted to secede from the rest of Somalia. Given his unique background as a former economics professor and prime minister, Gaas was expected to bring something new to Puntland.

In his first year, the president succeeded in initiating a five-year development plan, taxation reform, a biometric fishery database (a program that registered fishermen to distinguish them from pirates), and stronger relations with the European Union. He also clamped down on an Al-Shabaab stronghold in the Galgala Mountains, started an infrastructure projects such as improving Bossasso Port and is now in the throes of building an international airport there, established city councils in many towns, and finalized the Garowe Bilateral Accord with the Federal Government.  While one year is not sufficient time to render a verdict on Gaas, I am very concerned about one aspect of his rule: His frivolous travels and penchant for staying away from Garowe, the capital of Puntland. Gaas is constantly traveling, mostly in the region. Many times, his travels suggest he cannot wait to get out of Garowe for a change. Garowe is growing fast and booming, but it is still a provincial city.

I doubt whether Gaas has spent an entire month in Garowe since assuming office in January 2014. For a regional state president, he has embarked on several international travels. While some of these foreign travels were necessary, such as attending the Global African Investment gathering in London in October, other trips were unnecessary, and Gaas could have let other Puntland officials represent the region.

Why is President Gaas always traveling?

The official version of the Puntland Government is understandably simple: It is his job to travel. However, two Puntland intellectuals who are Gaas supporters gave me two other reasons. One told me that when Gaas is in Garowe, he is inundated with people who want to see him. “This man [Gaas] actually works better when he is away from Garowe,” the first intellectual said. The other intellectual gave a cynical answer and suggested that Garowe is, after all, the stronghold of former President Abdirahman Farole—the man Gaas defeated in the last elections—and his Ciise Maxamuud clan. “I guess, there is no love lost between Gaas and the residents of Garowe,” the man lamented.

Perhaps, a satellite presidential office in Bossasso, the largest city in Puntland, would be necessary in the future, without diluting the power of Garowe.

One major deficiency of Somali leaders is their tendency not to delegate. Unfortunately, federal and regional presidents—since Siad Barre—have become used to getting involved in trivial matters that detract from affairs of state. Tribal Elders, politicians, job seekers, and others are always trying to see the president for a favor. This system of patronage undermines the government and robs the president of valuable time doing other important things. In the case of Puntland, I can understand why Gaas is overwhelmed by people asking for favors. This is a practice Gaas has to curtail. While the president is flattered by those who seek his attention, time spent attending to these matters is time that could be devoted to many important issues such governing. Perhaps, the president could delegate this matter to his vice president, who has plenty of time at his disposal. Setting up a day of the week specifically to see foreign dignitaries, government officials, and tribal chieftains would ease the demand imposed on Gaas’ busy schedule and enable him to prioritize his tasks.

Gaas has appointed a cadre of ministers, some of whom I believe are capable of doing excellent jobs. Unfortunately, they appear to have been marginalized by the president’s imposing and looming presence. Many of the projects Gaas has attended, accompanied inevitably by media fanfare, could be opened and introduced by his ministers. In other words, Gaas does not have to be present at many of the projects being launched in the region. A benefit of delegating officials to be on the front is that it would give them incentives to do more and feel that they are all part of a team working for the common good. It would also be in the interest of a fair division of labor. Perhaps, a less obvious reason for Gaas not to occupy the limelight all the time is the danger of over-exposure—a cruel reality in politics. The public is unforgiving when it is tired of a politician who is always in the news.

Another mindboggling phenomenon in Puntland is the big crowd of VIPs that always arrives at the Garowe Airport when the president returns from his trips. Dignitaries in waiting include the vice president, ministers, deputy ministers, tribal chieftains, and students carrying boards and pictures of the president. Is this really necessary? Why are all these ministers at the airport welcoming the president when they should be at their desks working?  This is a tradition Gaas needs to stop because it is a waste of resources and an exercise in futility. Governance is work and accomplishment, whereas political campaigning involves fanfare and constant exposure.

Finally, the new President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, deserves to be acknowledgement as a leader of a failed state that is in the process of recovery. Ghani is co-author of Fixing Failed States (2009), a book that provides a practical guide to the reconstruction of post-conflict countries. In his first month in office, Ghani instituted new changes in his administration. He set a one-hour time limit on cabinet meetings, and even once refused his powerful interior minister admission to a meeting because he was a few minutes late. Ghani abolished lavish dinners at the presidential palace, saying that official meetings were purely for business, not pleasure.  He travels in the capital, Kabul, with a few cars so as not to create traffic gridlock. He allows officials to give public reports by allowing each one to speak for five minutes. Importantly, he has stated, “We will create a scorecard of our promises and report back on their delivery systematically.”  These reforms have rattled many in Afghanistan, who were used to doing business as usual. Gaas, like Ghani, is a former professor who can do the same by introducing an efficient, inclusive, accountable, and gender-sensitive government. Gaas is a different breed of leader in Somalia because of his unique educational background and work experience. He should lead better and be innovative. The first step, perhaps, is eliminating his frivolous trips that cost the regional government badly needed resources.  

 

Perpetual Conflict: Why the Discord Between the Somali President and Prime Minister Continues

The recent conflict between President Hassan S. Mohamoud and Prime Minister Abdiweli Ahmed has caused a gridlock in government operation. The prime minister did a limited and pointed reshuffle, which involved only two cabinet ministers. The problem with this new change was that it involved two close friends and allies of the president. The president, sensing a declaration of war by the premier, issued a decree rescinding the reshuffle. Some politicians and the UN Special Representative to Somalia, Nicolas Kay, have made many attempts to mediate in the conflict between the president and the prime minister, but to no avail.  

The Somali Parliament convened twice after more than 100 legislators attempted to introduce a motion of no confidence in the prime minister. Supporters of the prime minister interrupted these sessions and they were adjourned. Interestingly, Nicholas Kay recently warned Somali legislators against accepting bribes to vote Prime Minister Ahmed out of office, an admonishment that enraged some parliamentarians but was well-received by others for its frankness on the state of malfeasance in Somali politics.

Is the conflict between the president and the prime minister due to ambiguities in the provisional constitution?

While the provisional constitution needs some heavy-duty amendments, it is not the reason why the country’s two top leaders are at loggerheads. Furthermore, the constitution states that the prime minister has the power to “appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Ministers.” The president, in essence, has no business interfering how the prime minister runs the council of ministers so long the premier does not violate the constitution.

This endemic conflict between the president and the prime minister is nothing new. Since 2000, the last four presidents of the country have had major problems with their prime ministers. Ironically, with the exception of President Abdullahi Yusuf, each president had three prime ministers in their respective single terms. President Yusuf’s term was unique because he had no control over Mogadishu more than half of his term as his government was initially based in Nairobi, Kenya, and later the Somali towns of Jowhar and Baidoa respectively.

Of the 10 prime ministers the country has had since 2000, only two were not dismissed (Mohamed Abdi Yusuf and Abdiweli Gaas). Oddly, these two left office after a year because the tenure of their respective governments ended. However, the relationship, for instance, between Gaas and President Shaikh Sharif in the final several months of their term was marred by dysfunction, political competition, and mistrust.

The average Somali prime minister stays in office about 1.3 years. The only one who stayed three years in office was Mohamed Ali Ghedi, under President Yusuf.  President Yusuf’s other premier, Nur Hassan Hussein “Nur Adde,” lasted 2.3 years, a tenure so acrimonious that it finally led to the president’s eventual retirement.

Six prime ministers stayed in office an average of 1.1 years, and one (Mohamed Farmajo) only about seven months. Hassan Abshir and Nur Adde were the only ones who stayed about two years and 2.3 years respectively.

Interestingly, all these prime ministers universally complained about the head of the state trampling on the constitution and, hence, acting as imperial president. The presidents, in turn, questioned the prime ministers’ intransigence and tendency to act on their own. Many times, the sitting parliament became a tool for the sitting president.

Somali President Hassan Mohamoud (l) and PM Abdiweli Ahmed

The conflicts between Somali presidents and their premiers cannot be contributed simply to ambiguities in the constitution or a clash of personalities. The causes lie deeper than that and can be partially explained by the following:

1.       There is the Siad Barre syndrome. Every Somali president wants to be like the late dictator who ruled Somalia for 21 years. The Somali word for president “Madax-Weyne” (The Big-headed) semantically does not help the psychology of the country’s leader very much. Furthermore, the current system is confusing. For instance, according to the constitution, the president, as head of the state, appoints the prime minister, the head of the government, but he cannot dismiss him; only the parliament can. The prime minister is in charge of the Council of Ministers and, hence, the day-to-day operation of the government.  While the current president presumably understands his constitutional powers and limitations, he has been accused of usurping the prime minister’s powers by acting as both the president and prime minister. For the two years he has been in power, President Mohamoud has had two prime ministers he himself carefully and diligently selected.  Comprehending the constitution is one thing, but abiding by it is another. Prime Minister Abdiweli himself braced for confrontation from day one. According to a source close to the prime minister, Abdiweli told some of his supporters that he would “fight” the president and would never be like his predecessor, Abdi Shirdon. At least the prime minister has kept his promise because his working relationship with the president has been marred by discord and open hostility. 

2.      It is ironic that Somalia has neither an effective parliament nor the existence of a judiciary. Since its election in 2012, the parliament has yet to legislate a single law. In addition, according to two legislators who talked to this writer, the going rate for buying a parliamentary vote is an astounding $1,000 and very few get a maximum of $2,000. The executive branch is mostly the one that buys parliamentary votes to further its agenda. The Parliament is the authority that is supposed to check and balance the executive, but it instead has become an appendage of the former. The biggest reason legislators want to vote out the current prime minister is the absence of they called “wada-shaqeyn” (working together) between the president and the prime minister. “The prime minister must go,” one parliamentarian told VOA, “simply because he cannot work with the president.”   

3.      The power structure in the country is based on an unwritten understanding between the bigger clans.  For instance, the president and prime minister come from the two largest clans in the country, the Hawiye and the Darod. Being a member of these two clans is not in itself enough for being a president or prime minister; one has to come from the two largest sub-clans of each of these two big clans (Abgaal or Habar Gidir for the Hawiye and Marehan or Majertein for the Darod).  Somali politics was referred to, in humorous vein by one politician, as an everlasting struggle between Tom and Jerry, the famous cartoon characters. The two clans are constantly chasing each other and trying to outdo each other. What this division of power creates is layers of various constituents and divided loyalties for either the president or the premier. Many times, the interest of one clan group may overlap the interest of the country. For the current administration, the general elections scheduled for 2016 are creating panic and a rush to win over new supporters among the myriad clans.  It won’t come a surprise if President Mohamoud appoints a new Majertein premier (a sub-clan of the Darod) because his first two premiers were Marehan, another sub-clan of the Darod.

The conflicts between Somali presidents and their prime ministers are unlikely to change until there are viable and effective branches of the government, such as the legislature and the judiciary which can serve as check and balance for the executive branch. Otherwise, there is nothing much a new prime minister can do. Last year this time and shortly before the selection of the current prime minister, Professor Afyare Abdi Elmi astutely tweeted.  “I do not know who the next PM of Somalia will be, but I am not sure what he can really do—we need to think of a long-term solution.”

That is unlikely to happen before 2016.

(Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, November 21, 2014).

Is This Husband A Whiner?

Several years ago, a couple asked me to mediate between them. They were having a rocky relationship and I agreed to listen to them. Oddly, the wife did not say anything except to call her husband a “whiner.” The husband, however, wanted to talk. He was, after all, the one pushing for the mediation. Here is his story: 

My wife is just like a cult leader. She controls our family and hates to be questioned or second-guessed.

When I married her six years ago, she was a wonderful woman, kind, funny, smart, and a good parent. Today, I can safely say that I am married to a narcissistic, self-absorbed, control freak, and an abusive woman. At the beginning of our relationship, I was enamored with my wife and so never saw the ‘real’ her. She presented a fake personality to me, not her true nature. Or perhaps, I was blinded by my love and my strong attraction to her. In short, I was a fool and now I am paying the price. My marriage is in name only. I am married legally, but in reality, I live the life of a single man.

My first shock was finding out how selfish my wife is. Everything is about what she wants. My wife, my four step-children, ages 18, 19, 20, and 22, and I live together in a big house. My wife and I both work, and the children attend school. We have a spacious living room with a big TV screen. I am opposed to having TVs in the bedrooms. However, the television is totally controlled by my wife. Before my marriage, I had always enjoyed watching sports on ESPN, my favorite channel. The children also have their favorite programs. However, every time my wife walks into the living room, we all know what will happen next. “Who is watching this dumb program?” are the first words out of her mouth. Then, she grabs the remote control and switches the television to the channel she likes. Her selfishness bothers me a great deal, and I have told her how I feel, but to no avail. Simply put, my wife does not care what anybody else wants to watch.

Let me move to more serious grievances.

My wife chooses when we will be intimate. For instance, she has unilaterally decided that there will be no sex on the weekdays. She works Monday to Friday. The weekends are the only time she is willing to play. If I approach her on a weekday, I am rebuffed and told, “Didn’t I tell you nothing happens until the weekend?” She almost growls her directive at me. There are many weekends when nothing happens.  She wakes up early in the morning and goes straight to the living room. These are the days that she deliberately avoids me. In essence, even weekends are not a safe bet.  Now, how can I say I have a normal marriage when my sex life is regimented and solely dependent on my wife’s designated schedule? I have lost interest in intimacy due to my frustrations. In truth, I no longer find my wife physically attractive. Don’t blame me, please. Sex is not just physical; it is also an emotional bonding. I don’t have that anymore. The next thing you will hear from me is that I have become a monk.

I am just a trophy husband. My wife works hard to show the world we have a perfect marriage, and tells her relatives our relationship is solid. Furthermore, she has told mutual friends of her ex-husband that she is happier now and merrier. Ironically, her ex had the same issues I am currently experiencing. I have been feigning for her relatives that we are a loving, caring couple. What am I going to tell people? Am I going to say I am miserable and unhappy? No, I can’t do that. We attend family functions together and need to present an image of a strong and united married team, a picture perfect family!

My wife always wants to have the last word. She argues with me, and then suddenly she becomes verbally abusive. She is very strict with the children and I disagree with her often. She tells the children what to do, who to befriend, and how they must communicate with their biological father. She gets upset if they spend time with their father without her knowledge. When they do visit him occasionally and come back, she will not go to sleep until she debriefs them thoroughly.  Ironically, all the children are now adults and should be able to lead their own lives.

If the children and I voice our opinions, we come under withering attack. I have been called—yes, right in front of the children—all kinds of names: “a moron” “an asshole” “stupid” “sociopath” and “psycho.” I have heard my wife berate our children and scream at them simply for doing things she disliked or expressing opinions she disagreed with. As a result, the children are terrified of her, and some have actually started to conceal their plans from her. I talked to my wife about this issue, but she only reprimands me and berates me for “causing trouble between her and her children.” Her mantra is, “Mind your own business.”

I always believed that your spouse was supposed to be the most important person in your life, not the least important. I also thought that spouses should never take each other for granted. I was taken in by my beliefs and my emotions. My wife marginalizes me, mistreats me, and only wants to control me. I am now aware of her evil machinations. I refuse to be a trophy husband, a marginal spouse, and someone only taken for granted. I want to spend the last minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, and years of my life in a peaceful, loving, caring and fruitful environment. Call me a whiner if you want, but even if I am, I have many good reasons for whining.

***

After the husband finished talking, I asked the wife what she thought of his grievances. She kept quiet for a bit and then wept. “I have never put myself in his shoes,” she admitted. “I have to do something different before I lose both my husband and my children.”

 

Is ISIS Allied to Or Influencing African Jihadi Groups?

In August 2014, Africa’s spy chiefs met in Nairobi as part of the African Union’s Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA). They expressed deep concern about the growing threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the likelihood that the radical outfit might influence the continent’s own jihadi groups. Areas of concern for the chiefs included an “alliance being built by terror groups worldwide, sophisticated sources of funding, and [Africa’s] porous borders.”

A major risk of ISIS establishing itself in Africa is through the continent’s organized jihadi groups. This begs the question: Does ISIS has a relationship with these groups?

Here is where major African groups stand:

Boko Haram

This Nigerian group is currently the most lethal of all African terror groups. Known for its bombings, bank robberies and kidnappings, the group has in the last 2 months captured a large swathe of territory – a tactic that is said to have been inspired by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Abu Bakr Shekau, the then head of Boko Haram, boasted about the capture of Gwozo, calling it a “state among the Islamic states.”

In July, Shekau publicly declared support for ISIS. What is interesting about his declaration is that Shekau thanked, prayed for, and equally praised three famous jihadi leaders: Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (ISIS), Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (Al-Qaeda), and Mullah Omar of the Taliban.

A point worthy of further analysis is whether these three groups are perceived, by the group’s leadership, as having the same status as Boko Haram. Boko Haram however, seems to considers itself to be an independent jihadi group that shirks alliances and entanglements with global jihadi groups. The US State Department has ruled out any affiliation between Al-Qaeda central and Boko Haram. Shekau’s public support for ISIS can also be explained as simply being a demonstration of this erratic figure’s penchant for self-promotion.

ISIS’s current priority is strengthening its positions on the Levant and defending itself against American-targeted airstrikes. For ISIS’s leadership, the only de facto caliphate that matters is its own. Thus, all existing jihadi groups–as well as the territories they control, fall under its jurisdiction. According to a statement by ISIS: “The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations become null by the expansion of the khilafah’s [caliphate’s] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a branch of Al-Qaeda central under the leadership of Abdelmaled Droukdel and operating largely in Algeria and northern Mali, has rejected ISIS’s claim of being an Islamic caliphate. Last July, Droukdel emphasised that the group’s Bay’at (oath of allegiance) to Zawahiri still stands.

But several AQIM splinter groups have emerged lending their support to ISIS.  AQIM’s former judge of its central region, Abu-Abdullah Othman al-Asemi, is one notable figure to have come out in support. Another group, naming itself Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate), split with AQIM and pledged support to ISIS.

For the time being, Al-Qaeda loyalists are reigning in the Maghreb countries, particularly in Algeria and Mali, but the equation might change if ISIS expands outside the Levant. AQIM under Droukdel is a self-sufficient group and has, since 2003, amassed about $50M from kidnappings for ransom.

Tunisia

Tunisia has become an incubator for jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq. It is not entirely clear how many Tunisians are currently fighting along with ISIS but Abdel Bari Atwan, former editor of London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi and an authority on Arab jihadi groups, estimates the number of Tunisian fighters in Syria and Iraq at about 5,000 and Algerians at 2,000. Of the ten countries that have sent the most fighters to Syria and Iraq, according to a chart compiled by the BBC, three (Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya) are in North Africa, with Tunisia supplying around 3,000 men.

The latter is close to the conservative figure of 2,400 that Tunisia’s Interior Ministry has officially declared. According to Al-Shorouk, a Tunisian newspaper, the majority of Tunisians are with ISIS, whereas Algerians and Moroccans fight with the Al-Nusrat Front (an Al-Qaeda affiliate). The Tunisian government claims that 400 Tunisian jihadists have now returned to the country. What is interesting is that 9,000 young Tunisians have been prevented from going to Syria and Iraq by their government.

Recently, there have been skirmishes between Tunisian jihadists who had fought with ISIS and those who fought with Al-Nusrat Front within the country. A splinter group of AQIM called Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade has declared its support of ISIS. There are fears that these armed clashes might lead to a bloody war between these two jihadi wings, similar to the battle brewing in Syria between ISIS and Al-Nusrat. This will place an extra burden on Tunisia’s security services, which are already overstretched in preventing unrest in Libya from spilling over into their country.

Libya

Thanks to Qatar’s massive funding of Libya’s jihadists and the militants’ inheritance of Qaddafi’s huge weapons stockpile, Libyan fighters are active in Syria and fight under the ISIS banner. What distinguishes Libya from other North African jihadists is its hardware. According to a UN report released in March 2014, Libya has become an important source of arms for the fighters in Syria. There are also reports that a Libyan militia named al-Battar Brigade has returned from Syria and established itself in Benghazi.

Al-Shabaab

In August 2014, Abu al-Ayna al-Khorasani, an ISIS leader, publicly asked Al-Shabaab to join what he called “the global fight against American interests.” Surprisingly, Al-Shabaab’s leadership ignored the plea. The African outfit is an Al-Qaeda affiliate and is unlikely to associate itself with ISIS’s caliphate in the foreseeable future. Unlike Boko Haram and ISIS, Al-Shabaab does not call itself a caliphate but instead has used the term ‘emirate’.

Ahmed Diriye ‘Abu Ubaidah’ the new emir wasted no time after his selection last month in declaring his allegiance to Zawahiri. Moreover, Al-Shabaab has close ties with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While the relationship between these two groups is not operational, it does involve consultation, mutual moral support, and the transmitting of vital information between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda central.

There are reports that some foreign jihadists have left, or attempted to leave, Somalia to fight with ISIS. These jihadists became disenchanted with the Al-Shabaab leadership and have been hiding in Somalia for fear of being hunted by Ahmed Godane, the group’s former emir. According to some sources, Kenya has arrested a small number of these foreign jihadists as they were leaving Somalia, but Nairobi has yet to issue a statement on this matter.

There are documented cases of a small number of young Somalis, men and women, in North America and Europe who have joined ISIS. The phenomenon of Somali women in the west joining ISIS is new. Even at the height of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment of Somalis in the west several years ago, no female recruits joined them. ISIS, however, targets these women from the West to marry its fighters. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, prefers its female supporters in the West to raise funds for the group.

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For now, it appears that ISIS has some support among smaller splinter groups of existing African jihadi groups, mostly in North Africa. If the fortunes of the militant group change and the group expands, it might have serious repercussions for Africa. Several factors favor ISIS vis-à-vis Al-Qaeda central:

 

ISIS is no ordinary jihadi group. It has huge wealth at its disposal. An American intelligence official has told the Guardian that the radical group doubled its assets after it captured Mosul from $875M to $2B, making it the wealthiest jihadi group in the world. For instance, ISIS controls 6 of Syria’s 10 oil fields, not to mention other oil fields in Iraq. ISIS is consequently capable of financing Africa’s jihadi groups.

ISIS is winning its competition with Al-Qaeda central. ISIS’s ability to lead a standing army, its panache in the social media and propaganda, and its cruelty in dealing with what it perceives as “enemies of Islam” are helping it to win followers. Paradoxically, in comparison with ISIS, Al-Qaeda central now appears soft. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda neither has financial resources nor controls substantial territories. Worst of all, Zawahiri’s group has not carried out any spectacular terror act, in the eyes of global jihadists, since 2001.

 

Some of the Al-Qaeda affiliate leaders in Africa such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Abdelmaek Droukdel, and Mohamed al-Zahawi of Ansar ash-Sharia of Libya are veterans of jihad who fought with Osama bin Laden. Their loyalty is with Al-Qaeda and their colleague Zawahiri. However, these leaders lead a younger generation that has less attachment to Zawahiri, whom they see as not being inspirational or charismatic like bin Laden. The young North African jihadists are itching for action and are less interested in watching video tapes of Zawahiri hiding in the confines of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

 

ISIS is preoccupied with the Levant now but has ambitiously vowed to expand its caliphate to the rest of the world and certainly values the addition of more African fighters to this end. Mohamed al-Aroui, the spokesman of Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior, has lamented that “the only way to deal with [jihadists] is with the stick.” Unfortunately, in their August meeting, Africa’s spy chiefs missed the point when they failed to address the options of fighting jihadists through social media, curtailing government corruption (a major recruiting tool for jihadists) and dealing with the root causes of the alienation of Africa’s youth.

 

(Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, October 28, 2014).

Deconstructing a Myth: How One Somali Woman Saved her Man

The following is a true story of a young man I met in California while doing research on Somali families in the U.S. His short but powerful story intrigued me because it debunks certain cultural myths, perceptions, and misperceptions about the role of women in Somali culture. I will let Dalmar (not his real name) tell you his account.

I was once a poor communicator, selfish, immature, and antisocial. Today, I can comfortably say I am a normal, happy person—thanks to a Somali woman who helped me undergo a transformation to become a better man. All the negative perceptions about Somali women engendered by our proverbs and cultures are bull. I can recite more than 20 proverbs that demean women and question their intelligence, character, and judgment. For instance, one Somali adage goes, “A man who follows a woman’s counsel is doomed.”

Rubbish!

Women are as smart, if not smarter, than men are. Furthermore, there are a lot of men who follow women’s advice. I am one of them.

I grew up in a family in which my father treated my mother like an appendage. He disrespected her, yelled at her, and made sure my siblings and I showed her no respect. My father’s putrefied view of women was—and, sadly, still is—contemptible. The fact that my siblings and I were all boys further isolated my mother in our household. Unfortunately, she had no support system, no allies, because her family lived several hundred kilometers away. 

My family settled in the United Sates when I was 15. I was always a serious student and made excellent grades. In high school, I liked some of the young Somali girls, but I was a bit insecure. In college, though, I met a young woman who had been raised by her mother and stepfather, but did not get along with her parents. Her mother always sided with her stepfather because she did not want to alienate him as the father of her five children.

Idil and I clicked. We became best friends and gradually fell in love. Initially, we were fine because I did not show her the real me. I was polite, courteous, and respectful. However, after a few months, I started dictating to her. It seemed I was dominating her every move and thought.

Though my family was dysfunctional, we were living in a middle-class home. I knew the basics of etiquette—table manners, how to dress properly and stylishly, and how to conduct myself. In reality, though, I had a limited emotional repertoire. Idil, on the other hand, had been raised in a poor household and her childhood had been one of scarcity.  A short window was allocated to meal times, and children ate anywhere but the dining table. If you were late for lunch, chances were you wouldn’t find any leftovers.

After almost a year of enduring my verbal abuse, Idil finally summoned the courage to split with me. It was a crushing blow for me because she occupied an indelible place in my heart. I missed her all the more because I had no one to pick on. My well-kept façade began to crumble. Suddenly, I became deflated, lonely, and emotionally devoid.

I graduated from college and found a good job as a social worker. It was at that time that I met Anisa. As a work colleague, she was petite, smart, steady, confident, and intensely single minded, and motivated by a bright future. She had a purity of heart that really attracted me to her.  I started talking to her and asking her out. She finally agreed to go out with me for lunch.

Anisa was a strong young lady who was opinionated and outspoken, a woman of steadiness and constancy. She would stop me if I made a sexist remark, or would constantly ask me the rationale for my actions. Like a teacher, she lectured me but in a gentler, kinder way. She never seemed overbearing because she mixed humor with her corrections of my faux pas. Instead of constantly complaining, I started expressing myself in a non-threatening way. Instead of pointing fingers at her, I began listening to what she had to say.

Anisa and I became an item and we decided to get married. She saw me as an ambitious young man with leadership skills. I saw her as a woman who made me a better man. I introduced her to my family.  Surprisingly, Anisa, connected with my mother. It was the first time I saw my mother relaxed and comfortable and was delighted to see her and my mother laughing, joking, and having a good time when Anisa was around.  Then, Anisa and my mother started shopping together. I was nervous because I did not want my fiancé to know the embarrassing details of my family life. I was, as I said earlier, insecure and ashamed of my family.

It was these social meetings between my mother and Anisa that opened my eyes to the extent of my family’s dysfunction. Anisa and I talked about my parents and the way I had been raised. It was like sitting in therapy sessions. For the first time, I started seeing my mother in a different light, as a victim of verbal and emotional abuse orchestrated by her husband and, to a lesser extent, her own children. I also saw myself as a survivor of an emotionally wrecked family environment. I felt pain for what my mother had gone through.

My mother was a 17-year-old girl from a rural area who got married to my father, an educated 26-year-old urban man with a good government job. My parents’ relationship was not only unbalanced but also toxic. She had to depend on him financially, and did not have anyone to lean on. Essentially, she was trapped in a bad marriage. When my mother decided to go to an adult school in our neighborhood, my father balked. He did not want her to learn.

I am getting married to Anisa very soon. I am fortunate to have met her because today I am a better man. Most of all, I am a better son to my mother. My mother and I are very close now and she has shown no evidence of a lingering grudge against me. I am lucky to have two beautiful women in my life. Unfortunately, the only person to whom I am not close is—you might have guessed right—my father. He never liked Anisa, nor is he happy with my close relationship with my mother. Truly, you can’t please everyone in this life. I saw an interesting quote somewhere that said, “Don’t dwell on who let you down. Cherish those who hold you up.”

End of the story.

In a nutshell, men do not have to go far to appreciate women or to realize that the myths perpetuated about them in Somali society are absolute nonsense; they can look at their mothers and sisters and realize that apart from often being smarter than their husbands, they play an invaluable role in sustaining and nourishing the family—sometimes against all the odds.