Thursday, July 22, 2010

Mogadishu Memoir (Part IIX: Crimes & Concoctions

“Glory is the worst enemy of power, and nostalgia the worst poison for the future,” said Jacques Attali, Economic Advisor to French President Sarkozy after condemning the disgraceful performance of the French National Football team in the 2010 World Cup tournament.
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I was either 10 or 11 years old when some of the children in my neighborhood told me that a young prisoner named Aweys, who was with a group of state prisoners doing construction work at Isku-Raran, was asking about me. I feigned ignorance and denied having any connection with a criminal. Well, Aweys happened to be my older brother and sadly he took the wrong path in life because he was involved in petty crimes, assault, and various schemes which subsequently made him spend a great deal of time in and out of prison, and when he was out of prison, instead of learning from his past mistakes, he would go right back to hanging out with hoodlums. Some of my family members had told me that he had a big heart but he also had a volatile temper. His propensity for trouble-making and constant run- in with the law had rendered him the status of being persona non-grata among relatives. My brother seemed to show an interest to know more about me through other people, but never made any attempt to contact me or connect with me. I never had the pleasure of personally meeting him and tragically he met his fate in Mogadishu in the 1990s at the hands of bandits “Mooryaan”. One of my older brothers aptly summed up Awey’s fate when he said, “If you live by the knife, you die by the knife.”
Every time I heard about “Gaalshiro” (Carcere in Italian)–the Central Prison in Mogadishu-I remembered my brother Aweys; a frequent guest there. Gaalshiro was located close to Hamar Weyne and De Martino Hospital (Maartiini). To add insult to injury; criminal offenders and political prisoners were housed together because food was so scarce and horrendous at the prison that relatives of prisoners had to bring meals to their loved ones. As many people flocked to Mogadishu from the provinces in 1960s, the rapid urbanization of the city contributed to the rise of crime. In that period, the types of crimes committed were pick-pocketing, house burglaries, alcohol-abuse, petty theft, assault and battery. There was no proliferation of firearms and the criminals’ weapon of choice was lethal, widely available, and cheap which was a dagger or “Toorrey” as the Somalis call it. The Civilian government was not successful in dealing with criminals because of the intrinsic nature of corruption in its unreliable judicial system. It was common for certain criminals to bribe their way out of incarceration. But the military government of Siad Barre showed a grasp of the magnitude of the task at hand and started imposing tougher enforcement. Capital punishment, which was in the book but rarely enforced, was re-introduced for those who killed. In early 1970s, “Geedka” or the ‘pole’ became popular because that’s where criminals and some of Siad Barre’s political opponents were executed. The executions were administered behind the Police Academy and they were widely publicized. As a child, I had witnessed at least the public executions of two or three violent criminals. People in Mogadishu somewhat appreciated the introduction of capital punishment because it deterred many of committing violent crimes.
One constant tactic to use for both the civilian and the military governments was the use of torture to illicit confessions. Suspects were normally slapped, shoved, beaten, and at times even taken to the ocean to be subjected to something similar to ‘water-boarding’. Political prisoners also suffered the same torture tactics and were deprived from due process. “Godka” or ‘the pit’ was basically a detention center that specialized in all kinds of torture under Siad Barre. The East German Communist government helped Siad Barre’s regime in the construction of “Laanta Buur” and “Labaatan Jirow” prisons where political dissidents were incarcerated.
KU-DHAC
In my neighborhood and close to Dhagax-Tuur, there was a market called “KU-Dhac”. It was primarily thieves’ market but there were of course legitimate vendors as well. Petty thieves sold stolen goods clandestinely to either customers or third parties. The market was like a big pawn-shop and practically one could get all kinds of merchandise; new, used, stolen or legitimate. The old anecdote about a family that was being burglarized is worth-mentioning here. A wife tells her husband to go and confront the thieves but the husband, sensing danger, tells his wife “Don’t worry, I will go to Ku-Dhac market tomorrow and purchase the stolen products.” I used to go through the Ku Dhac market on my way to Dugsi even though I had once witnessed a man being chased by a dagger-wielding fellow. The military government later demolished the market and installed the statue of “Mohamed Somali” or Dhagax-Tuur.

Jamal-Jaan
One of the famous hide-outs of criminals in Mogadishu in 1960s was “Jamal Jaan”. It was located on “Aw-Aweyska” neighborhood of Hamar-Weyne and next to a perilous section of the Indian Ocean that locals called it “Geel-Laq”. Alcohol addicts and fugitives used “jamal Jaan” as a place to evade authorities. It was rumored that the law-enforcement agents of the civilian government were afraid to venture into that notorious hide-out.
Gangs
I remember hearing about the stories of individuals that were notorious for their long list of criminal activities especially the infamous gangster named “Jaykey” (Shiikhaal) who was as rugged as a rock, cruel, and had dramatics for flare. Moreover, he had imperious way of dealing with people and he once proclaimed to be “Il Dio Di Benadir” or ‘The God of Benadir’. I used to see Jaykey in the streets close to Afar-Irdoodka and I remember him emulating American cowboy actors by the way he dressed and smoked cigarettes. There was another gangster in Boondheere neighborhood called “George” (Abgaal) who was as popular as Jaykey. It was ironic that these two gangsters joined the Somali National Army in the 1970s and were later court-martialed and killed for allegedly orchestrating a mutiny.
Tough kids
Among the youngsters in Isku-Raran neighborhood, there were some tough boys that I knew but did not socialize with. Some of these tough youths used to hang around as a group and play soccer together; on rare occasions, they bullied other kids, but they were not criminals. Among these were the boys of Reer Hassan Geesood, Cadow, Miiraaf, and Mohamoud Haji Adan to mention a few. On rare occasions, these youths would get involved in power struggle that led to physical beating. One of the women that lived on my street, Caanood, used to yell at some of us children for playing in front of her house. She would bark, “You mama-boys, why don’t you play with kids like Burhan Hassan Geesood”. Burhan was our age all right, but he was a tough kid that neither I nor the kids I played with wanted to mess with. He had two tough older brothers (Caato and Muse) that were pugnacious and belligerent.

Attempted Political Assassination
During the civilian government, I heard a bizarre story of an attempted political assassination of General Jama Ali Qoorsheel (Warsangeli) who was Deputy Police Commissioner. My recollection as a child of this incident is murky. A distant uncle of mine and a police officer was shot several times for foiling the attempted political assassination of Qoorsheel. The conspiracy had taken place in Qoorsheel’s house in Hamar Jab Jab in the wee hours of the morning but the General was not harmed. This uncle of mine used to visit my mother from time to time after the incident and after he had recovered from his wound, but I have been unable to locate him as a source for this memoir. Perhaps, members of General Qoorsheel’s family can elucidate the intricacies of this attempted political assassination.
Political Crimes
The military government waged a campaign of fighting “tribalism” and made it a state crime. I remember government officials holding countless rallies and even burning effigies of what was termed ‘tribalism’. It was one of these rallies in our neighborhood that I heard an anecdote in which Brigadier General Hussein Kulmiye Afrah had asked one of the dignitaries sitting next to him about a local leader who rose and denounced tribalism as a pernicious disease that needed to be extricated from Somali society. “Kan yuu yahay (who is this guy [clan-wise]?”, Afrah had allegedly inquired.

In 1969, Siad Barre was not an absolute leader of the military government but he was a master manipulator who was well adept in consolidating power incrementally. In the first few months of the coup, Barre maneuvered in sending Major General Mohamed Ibrahim ‘Liilq-liiqato’ (Shiikhaal) and the second highest ranking officer in the armed forces to Germany, Colonel Abdullahi Farah Hoolif (Majertein) to Egypt as ambassadors respectively. Officers Mohamed Farah Aidid (Habar-Gidir) and Abdullahi Yusuf (Majertein) were each offered diplomatic posts abroad because they were not in tune with the new regime. When these two officers refused to be posted abroad, Barre jailed them for a total of six years which consequently led to Aidid suffering from a bout of nervous breakdown in Mandhera prison. Liiq-Liiqato, on the other hand, was seen by Barre as a threat because of his ranking status and older age in contrast to the younger members of the SRC. General Mohamed Abshir (Majertein), a retired Police Commissioner, was arrested along prominent civilian government officials and they were all sent to a presidential guest house in Afgoi which was made a make-shift detention center. Farah Gollalleey (Abgaal) a former parliamentarian and one of the detainees best known for his acerbic and biting assessments summarized that early period of the military government as the following’
“Ama afkaaga hayso’
Ama Afweyne ammaan
Ama Afgoi aad”.
“You either keep your mouth shut,
Or flatter Afweyne [Barre]
Or Go to Afgoi”

After getting rid of some of the disgruntled officers outside the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Barre began conspiring against his own colleagues. Major General Ainanshe (Isaak) had opposed Barre on critical issues like who would be the head of the military government. Major General Salad Gabayre Kediye (Abgaal and the son-in-law of former President Adan Abdille Osman) was perhaps the most charismatic officer who had posed a clear threat to Siad Barre. Gabayre apparently wanted to be the head of the armed forces but Barre favored Mohamed Ali Samatar instead. It was said that Barre had secretly campaigned against Gabayre and wooed SRC members one by one. In a mock election within the 25-members of the SRC, Ainanshe and Samatar emerged as frontrunners and Gabayre lost. Then, in the run-off, Samatar defeated Ainanshe. To placate Gabayre, he was offered the position of Defense Minister. Gabayre became more sullen and embittered because he realized that his political fortunes were coming to wane. Incidentally, the 25-member SRC body had 10 Darod, 7 Hawiye, several Dir (1) Isaak (4), Isse (1) Gadabursi (1) officers; two minority officers, Samatar (Tumal) and Fadhil (Arab) and, to the dismay of 4.5 clan system proponents, no Digil and Mirefle representation. Those who knew Gabayre characterized him as an uncommonly leader and a brave man not known to cower or cringe, but his ambition, like Barre, took a quantum leap. In fact, in a speech given by General Mohamed Ali Samatar at Somali National University in late 1970s, he profusely praised the impeccable character of Salad Gabayre and his wide popularity among officers. Samatar also mentioned how close he and Gabayre were as the two had attended the same military academies abroad. In essence, Samatar admitted that the incarceration of Gabayare was a preventive measure on one hand as the latter was feared of toppling the regime. Mohamed Ali Samatar Interestingly, Samatar, in that lecture, gave a much abbreviated account of the roles of General Ainanshe and Colonel Abdulkhadir Dheel (Majertein). Ainanshe or “Odayga” (the old man) as Samatar referred him was not part of the planning and the execution of Siad Barre’s military coup in 1969 and hence became an afterthought. Moreover, Aninanshe, according to Samatar, had asked to be named as an ambassador. “Why would the Vice-President of the country downgrade himself to the rank of an ambassador?” Samatar inquired. This odd request raised serious suspicions in the minds of Barre and his minions that, perhaps, the ‘Old man’ was up to something. Samatar also accused Ainanshe as an unengaging man, bereft of discipline, dedication and commitment. Barre, perhaps, used Samatar and Abdallah Fadil, two good friends of Salad Gabayre to elicit nuggets of information about Salad Gabayre’s plans of staging a coup. It was no secret that Fadil testified against Salad Gabayre in the kangaroo court the regime set up to convict the alleged coup organizers. When Barre’s regime fell in 1991, Abdalla Fadil was mercilessly butchered by Aidid militia in retaliation, among other things but not exclusively, for his early double-crossing of Salad Gabayre. The inclusion of General Ainanshe and Colonel Dheel were perhaps a pure political ploy by Siad Bare to get rid of his opponents once and for all. Abdi Warsame Isaak (Dir) was a member of the SRC and, in an interview with VOA Somali service “Ifbixii & Dhicitaankii Kacaankii 21kii October 1969” on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the “revolution”, hinted that the inclusion of Ainanshe and Dheel in the coup plot was at best suspect. Ainanshe was a cautious individual not known for undertaking impetuous actions and Dheel had already left the army because he had falling with Siad Barre before the 1969 coup. Dheel was a man of sanguine temper and he had, according to my sources, physical confrontations with Barre during the civilian government. There was even an incident in which Dheel grabbed General Siad Barre by the neck in an official meeting and the two were separated. Dheel had ridiculed and insulted his superior, General Barre, for being “provincial” and “pedestrian”. In that same interesting VOA program, Osman Jeelle (Hawadle) and also former SRC member opined that the coup plot, perhaps, was blown out of proportion and the killing of these officers was unnecessary and “avoidable”. “Prison could have done the job better”, Said Osman. At the risk of oversimplification, a long-time confidant of Siad Barre and former high-ranking government official who knew Barre since the colonial period told me that Siad had always misgivings about the Majertein and the Isaak; the Majertein for “their guile and treachery” and the Isaak for their “uppity” attitude. It is interesting to note here that Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal tried to remove Siad Barre from his position as the head of the armed forces but that his efforts were thwarted by Darod leaders at the time. Mohamed Ali Samatar, in his lecture at the Somali University, mentioned that General Ainanshe placed an early call in the morning of October 21, 1969 to Egal to find out what the curfew was all about but that the latter was already under arrest. Whatever Siad Barre’s attitude toward the Majertein whom he ruthlessly targeted after the 1977 War and Isaak tribes had been, his genocidal campaign against the latter remains crime against humanity; from the massacre of Jezzira in which 47 innocent Isaak were shot point blank to the all-out war against the rebel group Somali National Movement (SNM) when the latter launched desperate military offenses and the regime responded with iron fist; thousands of civilians in the north were massively killed, maimed, and dislocated.
The Execution of a Father
The American journalist Philip Gourevitch chronicled the Rwandan massacre in his fascinating book, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda (1999). The title of his book was a telegram presciently sent by a group of Tutsi individuals surrounded in a church. These terrified souls were well-aware of the painful fate awaiting for them as their extermination became imminent. Imagine being a ten year old Somali girl coming home from school and the kids in your neighborhood tell you that your father would be killed tomorrow at GEEDKA. This is what happened to the daughter of Abdulkadir Dheel Abdulle. Ms. Dheel was evidently traumatized as she told me many years later, about that painful news. “I was very close to my father and loved him dearly,” she said. The children’s’ words proved prescient when the next day, on 7/3/1972, Siad Barre sent Gabayre, Ainanshe, and Dheel to the gallows. The government portrayed the ‘coup’ plotters as power-hungry sycophant bent on destroying the nascent regime. During the court proceedings, Salad Gabayre questioned why Ainanshe and Dheel were being lumped together with him because the two had nothing to do with his failed attempt to topple the Barre regime. Moreover, Gabayre and Dheel were rivals and that Dheel had indeed threatened the former to kill him due to personnel disputes in the army during the civilian government. It was Gabayre, with the blessing and the full knowledge of Siad Barre who dismissed Dheel from the armed forces in late 1969.


When Dheel was arrested in 1971 for the coup plot, he was a businessman operating a pharmacy. The killing of these officers ushered a new era in the country when political dissent became synonymous with self-destruction. When the Somali populace heard the song, “Danaystow dugagu waa daldalaad aan dacwa lahayn. Sama Diidow Dabin baa kuu Dhigan Lagugu Dili Doonoo” (You) opportunist, your demise is lynching without due process. You rejected peace and there is a noose waiting for you”, over the radio, it was an ominous sign that someone was arrested for a serious political breach and that the individual was inevitably making his way to the GEEDKA. I have never heard a song that filled many Somalis with terror and apprehension than this song. The military government not only killed the bread-winners of these families but it went after the women and the children in some cases. The effect was catastrophic for these families as some were reduced to abject poverty.


After the Somali army was defeated in 1977/78 during the Ethiopian War, Siad Barre’s henchmen began a massive campaign of house searches in Mogadishu. Soldiers would come to houses and search for anti-government forces or weapons. The husband of my sister’s best friend, Hawo Haji Abdullahi Qore, was involved in an attempted coup staged by Majertein officers. Colonel Abshir Muse happened to be in Italy when the botched coup, led by Colonel Cirro, was prematurely staged. The government’s response was swift and heavy-handed. Several officers, including Colonel Cirro, were sent to the gallows. Abdullahi Yusuf escaped to Ethiopia. It was ironic that, several years later, Siad Barre was successful in luring a small number of these Majertein defectors, including Colonel Abshir Muse, back to Mogadishu. One of these officers was my relative, Said Ali Haji “Said Garaame” and an artillery specialist. I last saw him in one of my visits to Mogadishu in the 80s. Siad Barre had heard about an incident of heavy artillery firing by the rebel group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Force (SSDF) and asked who was directing them. “Said Garaame”, he was told. “I never heard that name,” Barre muttered. Of course, he could not have because Said Garaame was a young officer trained in then the Soviet Union. When Said Garaame became disenchanted with the SSDF, he decided to leave the group and return to Somalia, but he was already a wanted man. Garaame turned to a relative and a government official in order to intercede. Enter; Mohamed Hassan Barre “Shimbiralaaye” (Majertein), an intriguing fellow, and highly educated who had spent many years with the United Nation’s FAO as an agricultural specialist. Shimbiralaaye was later appointed as Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Planning, and Finance respectively. This seemingly quiet and low-key politician, perhaps, had secret mission for Siad Barre for a while; luring disgruntled Northeastern officers who had defected to SSDF back to Somalia. In return, Siad Barre, once these former rivals came back to Mogadishu, would pardon them and they would go back to their old jobs. Siad Barre was targeting the ‘Osman Mohamoud’ officers because they had a great deal of respect and admiration for Shimbiralaaye; a self-made man not known for being an ideologue. At any rate, Shimbiralaaye was successful in being a go-between-guy between these Majertein officers and Siad Barre. Barre, who had waged a brutal campaign against the Majertein (‘Omar Mahamoud) clan in late 1970s was facing a new, and perhaps, a formidable clan in the Isaak and he could not have afforded fighting in two fronts.
When officer Said Ali Haji returned to Mogadishu, he was taken to Siad Barre by Shimbiralaaye. That was the first time Barre met the pesky young officer face to face. Barre, the consummate politician, was capable of charm and lectured the young officer about patriotism asking him to use his exceptional skills to defend motherland. “I know that you “Bah-Gareen” [a sub-clan of Osman Mohamoud] are not going to listen to me since you had disobeyed your own king long time ago,” Siad Barre ruefully added.