Somalia's New Cabinet: Business as Usual

The new cabinet appointed by Prime Minister Abdiweli Shaikh Ahmed on January 17 has been raising  uproar. The naming of a cabinet has been perhaps the most grueling process in recent Somali history. The president was heavily involved in the selection of the appointees and his prints are all over. Some of the hopefuls were promised positions—others were even invited to Mogadishu—only to be rejected in the eleventh hour. The new cabinet was announced in the wee hours at 2 AM. The dramatic responses have already begun and protestations are being heard from all corners: the cabinet is too big; two of the appointees resigned the same day of the announcement; women are upset for being marginalized; some clans are up in arms; groups like Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama have vowed to boycott the federal government; Dammul Jadiid is monopolizing power; and too many inexperienced persons are in the cabinet. The features of this new cabinet are as follows:

Size: This cabinet is big. It has 25 ministers, 25 deputy ministers, and five state ministers. The previous cabinet was unusually lean with only ten ministers, however, this one is unnecessarily large, and is a clear manifestation of a bloated government. In reality, all of these appointed ministers are merely officials by name. Many have no basic infrastructure such as offices, nor do they possess the necessary manpower that should go with their big titles.  

Resignations: The most embarrassing moment for the president and the prime minister was when two deputy minister appointees, including the Mayor of Mogadishu, resigned in protest of what they called the “lowly” positions they were given. Mogadishu mayor, Mohamoud Ahmed Nur “Tarzan” called for an immediate press conference in which he said he had not been consulted about the position. “I will not accept the position of a minister,” he declared, “let alone a deputy minister.”

Tarzan’s appointment as deputy minister was humiliating and purely Machiavellian on the part of President Hassan Sh. Mohamoud. The president could have replaced Tarzan quietly with another mayor, but he had neither the courage nor the decorum to ask Tarzan to resign. It is the president, after all, who appoints the mayor of Mogadishu. Perhaps, either Ali “Amerika” (the Somali ambassador to Kenya) or Abdirahman “Yariisow,” (the government spokesman), might replace Tarzan. That is, unless the president comes up with another option in the last minute.  The president wanted to humiliate Tarzan publicly and he got his wish. Now, it is unlikely that Tarzan will last in his current position.  Tarzan, a man of an outsized ego, finally got his match in the president. One wonders how the president and his prime minister managed to appoint individuals to these positions without first consuling with them. It is, at best, sheer unprofessionalism.

Women: President Mohamud’s earlier promises to give women equal representation in the government have hit a snag. The new cabinet has only two women out of 25 (5%). This is a downgrade from the last cabinet in terms of percentage (20%) which had two women in powerful posts out of ten. One of the newly appointed ministers has been given the traditional portfolio of women’s affairs, and the other has been promoted from deputy minister in the ministry of public works to full minister. There are two new female deputy ministers out of 25 and no female state ministers. Mohamoud has alienated many groups and clans, but his alienation of women, who represent half of the population, is tragic.

Dammul Jadiid: This secretive but powerful group is still occupying key positions. There are more than a dozen appointees in the cabinet that belong to Dammul Jadiid, including the new deputy prime minister and minister of religion. Traditionally, deputy prime ministers are chosen from key posts such as finance, foreign affairs or defense.  The new deputy prime minister has all of the qualifications that President Mohamoud likes: he is inexperienced, a member of Dammul Jadiid, and hails from the north. Dammul Jadiid’s naked power grab is now in epic proportions.

Farah Abdulkadir, the architect of President Mohamoud’s election, was appointed as Minister of Justice and Constitution. This is a clear indication that President Mohamoud is already laying the ground work for his re-election in 2016. Abdulkadir is the right man to help Mohamoud influence future amendments of the provisional constitution.

Abdikarim Hussein Guled, another stalwart of Dammul Jadiid, is also back as the minister of national security. This new position is usurpation from the interior ministry, which is traditionally responsible for the police and intelligence services. Guled now is the new chief of security and intelligence, and he has his own ministry.

Jamal Barrow, deputy foreign minister, and Mohamed Nur Gacal, state minister for foreign affairs, two Dammul Jadiid figures, were not so fortunate. Barrow is replaced by another colleague of his in the group. Gacal was slated to be a minister of education, yet his contentious relationship with Foreign Minister Fowzia Yusuf ended up hurting him. Mohamoud decided to leave these two out of the new cabinet. “My friend,” the president has told Gacal, according to a source, “I am sorry, but you will not be in the cabinet.”

Inexperience: Inexperience is a major feature of the new cabinet. Unfortunately, many of the appointees are inexperienced in government affairs. Many were brought there not because of their qualifications but instead for their clan credentials. This has been the hallmark of President Mohamoud’s administration: to avoid qualified and educated people who might overshadow him. Mohamoud’s selection of two prime ministers in the span of a year who are remarkable for their inexperience is a good example of what kind of cabinet the president desires.

Sharif Sakiin: After Dammul Jadiid, the second big beneficiary of the new cabinet is Sharif Hassan “Sakiin,” former speaker of the parliament. He has at least six of his allies appointed as ministers, state ministers and deputy ministers. President Mohamoud has struck an unholy alliance with the controversial former speaker and future leader of what is now proposed as the South West state. Sakiin has become a king-maker, and was instrumental in gaining votes for Mohamoud in the parliament during the ousting of PM Shirdon.

 

The new cabinet will be confirmed in due time, but it would be unrealistic to expect any miracles from these ministers. For the time being, it will be business as usual: the president will keep running the show from Villa Somalia, and the new ministers will obey his marching orders. They will retain their fancy titles and fat paychecks. In my estimation, though, they will be lucky if they last more than a year.

 

Extrajudicial Killings in Kenya: The Easier Route

On December 20, the head of Kenya’s National Police Service issued a report about the country’s 2013 crime rate. The good news was that crime rates had fallen 8 percent compared from the previous year. Inspector General David Kimaiyo attributed the decrease to what he called “public cooperation with the police and the increased police mobility.” He even introduced the notion of “community policing,” a popular model based on engagement and partnership between the police and the community. 

According to the report, economic crimes decreased by 21 percent, theft of livestock by 17 percent and offenses against persons by 7 percent.  The bad news, however, was an increase in some crimes, such as robbery (10 percent), homicide (6 percent), rape (22 percent) vehicle and other thefts (3 percent) and robbery with violence by 9 percent. There were also 509 incidents of mob injustice in 2013. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab killed 111 persons, 71 of whom died during the Westgate Mall bombing.

Oddly, the police report was remarkable in what it failed to mention: extrajudicial killings.  Kenyan human rights organizations have criticized the government for sponsoring such crimes. In November 2013, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and the George Soros-funded Open Society Initiative issued a report titled, “We Are Tired of Taking you to Court: Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit,” that concluded the Kenyan government was running a police death squad that targets suspects with links to terror groups.  Most of the extrajudicial killings take place, according to the report, in the heavily Muslim populated city of Mombasa which has become a hotbed for Al-Shabaab recruitment. In 2012, Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a cleric on the U.S and UN sanctions list for providing “financial, material, logistical or technical support for Al-Shabaab”  was killed in the streets of that city. In October 2013, Sheikh Ibrahim Omar was also shot dead in Mombasa after allegations of involvement with the Westgate Mall bombing. More than 20 others met the same fate in 2013 or simply disappeared. According to the report, a Kenyan police officer told a detainee, “We are tired of taking you to the court. Next time, we will finish you off in the field.”

The government resorts to these unlawful killings, according to human rights groups, when it is unable to build a strong case against terror suspects. These groups have asked both the United Kingdom and the U.S governments to suspend aid to the Ant-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) due to its direct involvement with these unlawful killings. The unit receives training and funding from Washington and London. This elite counter-terrorism unit has regularly arrested suspects but the number of terrorists convicted in courts remains dismal.

The Kenyan government denies that it is culpable for extrajudicial killings. The usual government response has been that the suspects died in a gun battle due to intra-rivalries (for good effect, the police display weapons to the mass media), that rogue political officers are the ones to blame, or, in the case of disappearances, the suspects simply fled to Somalia. A radical cleric in Mombasa has in fact lamented, “The government is murdering us.”

Extrajudicial Killings are not new in Kenya. In 2008, a government-funded group, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, issued a report, “The Cry of Blood,” that identified police as responsible for the killings and disappearance of more than 500 young men. The report classified these extrajudicial killings as crimes against humanity because they deprived the victims of all due process.

The general view among human rights groups is that the extrajudicial killings, instead of stemming the tide of religious radicalism, alienate many Muslims who could otherwise serve as partners in the war against terror. As Jonathan Horowitz of the Open Society and the co-author of the group’s report has argued “[The ATUP’s conduct] has “eroded the rule of law in Kenya and created distrust between the public and police, creating conditions which can provide fuel for terrorists.”

That is, after all, what Inspector General Kimaiyo has been advocating: community policing.

(Written by Hassan M. Abukar. Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, January 16, 2016).

Abdiweli Gaas and Villa Somalia: A Cautionary Note

Dr. Abdiweli Gaas surprised many with his victory as the new president of the regional government of Puntland. There was a general perception among many that the incumbent Abdirahman Farole would be re-elected. Gaas won by a single vote. As he said immediately after his election, the work has already begun. Villa Somalia, the seat of the Somali presidency in Mogadishu, welcomed the new Puntland president. The exuberance by President Hassan S. Mohamoud might though be short-lived. Gaas may surprise many with the way he will lead his administration and regarding his relations with Villa Somalia.

Gaas ran for the Somali presidency in 2012 and lost. In the last round of the election, he supported the current president, Mohamoud, against Gaas’ old boss, the incumbent President Shaikh Sharif Ahmed. Mohamoud had promised the position of premier to Gaas, if the former won, as part of horse-trading. It turned out Mohamoud had made similar promises to others including Ahmed I. Samatar. Then, after Mohamoud was elected, he gave an interview to Voice of America pleading to “his friends” not to get angry with him if he did not choose them as prime minister. His statement raised an obvious question: To how many of his friends had he promised the position of next prime minister?

Then, a month ago, according to a source, President Mohamoud told Gaas that he had reserved the position of the prime minister, which had become vacant after the ousting of A. F. Shirdon, for the latter’s clan.

 

Now, things have changed between Gaas and Mohamoud. While Gaas is president of a regional government, he is, in all practical senses, a co-equal of Mohamoud. Mohamoud favored Gaas over his rival, Farole. However, the dynamics of their relationship have changed for the following:

1.     Gaas’ first and foremost responsibility now is to the people of Puntland, not Mogadishu.  That means he should focus on the interests and development of Puntland. Each president has his own constituency. While the two can cooperate on national issues, Gaas is unlikely to kowtow to Mogadishu.  President Mohamoud is not popular in Puntland because he has twice failed to appoint a Puntlander as the premier. Gaas will have to balance between his working relationship with Villa Somalia and his job as the head of Puntland.

2.     Gaas may have to be extra careful in dealing with President Mohamoud. First, Mohamoud has a history of equivocation and breaking promises. Second, he has shown to the world that he is a dictator. It is either his way or the highway. His hoarding of power in Mogadishu is palpable. There is fear by some that Mohamoud’s goal is to make Puntland a puppet regional government that he is only interested in extracting its resources. Corruption, after all, has been the culture of Mogadishu. The recent meltdown in the Central Bank is a good example of the allegations of corruption. The UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia has accused the regime in Mogadishu of widespread corruption. The bank, according to the report, has become a “slush fund” for regime officials.

3.       Moreover, the regime in Mogadishu has lost its luster and is now viewed by donor nations as hopelessly incompetent. The Western donors are leery of trusting Mohamoud with the $2.5 billion donated to Somalia a year ago. Gaas has an excellent relationship with many in the international community. He can tap some of these needed funds to help develop Puntland and make it a strong viable regional government in Somalia. A strong Puntland is not only good for Puntlnaders but also to the rest of the country.  A weak Puntland government, on the other hand, is a burden on the nation. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland has never attempted to secede from the union.

4.       Being one of the architects of the Roadmap, Gaas is in a position to positively influence the amending of the provisional constitution and future power sharing arrangements with the federal government. Unfortunately, there is no strong federal government based in Mogadishu. Mohamoud is unable to exert his control on many parts of south Somalia. It might be wise for Gaas to give the regime in Mogadishu time to get its house in order.

Gaas was once a prime minister of Somalia and, in his short stint, had accomplished a lot. Now that he is the president of Puntland, he will have more room to implement his political, economic and social program.  He is, after all, the big fish in Puntland.

 

Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel was President Obama’s first chief of staff. He decided to quit his job and run for mayor of Chicago. After winning that position, he started implementing his political, social, educational and economic program in the city. Some time ago, he was talking to his predecessor, Richard Daley. Rahm looked at Daley and said, “Rich, you lied to me. You told me this was a good job. It is actually a great job. If I had known how great, I would have [ran against] you.”

Al-Shabaab in 2013: Boom and Bust

For Al-Shabaab, 2013 was a year of many twists and turns. It started in January with an ominous threat by the Al-Qaeda affiliate to the American jihadist Omar Hammami: Surrender in two weeks or face death. This was followed by the brutal killing in February of Shaikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah, a prominent Somali scholar in his seventies, while he was praying in a mosque in Puntland. After such a perverse start, the year ended when on December 20, the group killed another foreign jihadist, Abdirizak “Burundi” (The Burundian). For Hammami, January was a point of no return. The Al-Qaeda groups, after all, are not paper tigers; they mean business.  Nine months later, Hammami was killed in an ambush ordered by Godane, the emir of Al-Shabaab. Gone were the professed brotherly love and the years of comradeship and struggle. Such was the unceremonious end of the Hip Hop jihadist who once sang rap songs in praise of the militant group. For Al-Shabaab, issuing threats and killing are just two sides of the same coin. The year 2013 was no exception.

The year manifested the hounding and the marginalization of foreign jihadists, loss of more territory, a power struggle among the group’s leaders, a deadly terrorist mission abroad, an unusual military victory, and an unprecedented infiltration of the weak Somali government.

 What was unique about last year was the grumbling and opposition of key jihadists, foreign and local, against the imperial leadership of Godane. Hammami, Ibrahim Al-Afghani, and some of their colleagues went online and lashed out at the emir of Al-Shabaab. However, it is the tragic story of Abdirizak Burundi that seems taken from a Gothic novel: A former Christian who converted to Islam and immediately joined a religious terror group only to be killed by his colleagues. Abdirizak (last name unknown) was born in Rwanda, fled that country in 1994 after the brutal massacres of the minority group Tutsi by Hutu militias and their supporters. He was a Hutu and fled to Congo; from there he went to Uganda, then he settled in Nairobi, Kenya. It was in Kenya and after working for a non-religious Somali merchant that Abdirizak became interested in Islam and converted. He came to Somalia that same year, 2007, and was recruited by Al-Shabaab which at the time was fighting the Ethiopian forces in the country. Abdirizak mastered Somali, participated in terrorist operations with Al-Shabaab, and opened businesses in Mogadishu and later Barawe. He was critical of Godane’s treatment of foreign jihadists. In May, he traveled to the Bay region to visit one of his wives and new-born daughter but was intercepted by Al-Shabaab fighters who thought the foreigner was on his way to join the renegade Omar Hammami. Abdirizak was detained by the radical group and kept in a make-shift prison in Jilib for eight months. In December, his family was notified of his death without further explanation.

Al-Shabaab lost Mahadaay, a strategic town 113 km (75 miles) north of Mogadishu.  For consolation, though, Al-Shabaab is rejoicing to see some of the territories it once controlled in Lower Shebelle being destabilized by a militia allied with the government and led by Yusuf Indhacade in a campaign to disenfranchise the indigenous people. The biggest town Al-Shabaab controls now is Barawe where in June two of its top leaders were killed by forces loyal to Godane and another leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys, escaped only to fall into the hands of the government.  Two of the eight Al-Shabaab figures on whose heads the U.S had put a bounty in the last two years (Hammami and Ibrahim Al-Afghani; $5 million each) were killed by Godane.  Moreover, Mukhtar Robow, who also has a $5 million bounty on his head, is estranged from Al-Shabaab. By the rate Godane is going in killing his former colleagues, it means the U.S has saved millions in bounty payments, and it might even save more as Godane’s grip on the group’s command and control tightens.

Al-Shabaab succeeded in its attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, an incident allowing global jihadists to revel in a moment of pride and exuberance. For a short period, the terrorist operation gave Al-Shabaab a nodding approval from Al-Qaeda which had recently reacted with shudders to the murdering and marginalization of foreign jihadists by Godane. Moreover, Al-Shabaab succeeded in repelling an operation by U.S Naval SEAL Team 6 in Barawe, the same elite force that was responsible for killing Osama Bin Ladin. The operation was an unmitigated failure and embarrassment for the American Special Forces but a resume-enhancement for the terror group. The message was clear: Unlike Al-Qaeda central, Al-Shabaab can protect its own leaders from the Americans. It was that same year that the radical group also foiled a rescue attempt by the French forces to free France’s agent, Dennis Alex, who was held by Al-Shabaab.

Perhaps, the most embarrassing moment for the Somali government was in July when the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea issued a report which claimed the terror group had penetrated the security apparatus of the government, the very body that is supposed to fight terrorism. In August, former Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galeyr and a current parliamentarian, also accused President Hassan S. Mohamoud of being in cahoots with Al-Shabaab. In an interview with a Somali channel in Minneapolis, Galeyr claimed the existence of what he termed “Gacan-saar” (a secret handshake; an understanding between two parties) between government officials and Al-Shabaab leaders especially in Jubbaland. Galeyr mentioned telephone exchanges between these two parties: “These dealings between the federal government and Al-Shabaab are what led to the last minute cancellation of President Mohamoud’s invitation to attend the G-8 summit.”  President Mohamoud’s secret dealings with Al-Shabaab, stated Galeyr, is the biggest concern some Western and neighboring countries have about him. Another former prime minister, Ali Ghedi, added more fuel to the issue when he chastised the government for its inability to avert the spike of Al-Shabaab violence in Mogadishu. “The regime in Mogadishu has strayed from the correct path,” he said. Perhaps, it is the issue of corruption that has alienated the current regime in Mogadishu from Western powers and given Al-Shabaab an opportunity to strike with impunity. For example, an Al-Shabaab terrorist accused of the attempted murder of the country’s deputy army commander escaped the Central Prison in Mogadishu. The government fired the warden and four correction officers for taking bribes.

 

The former American secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, declared in October that Al-Shabaab posed a global threat and, hence, should be hunted down with drones and other means. In December, Ali Dheere, the spokesman of the group, issued his own proclamation by naming the U.S enemy number one and the UK enemy number two. This is an upgrade for the Americans in terms of ranking as previously the African terror outfit mostly focused on the Somali government, the African forces, Ethiopia, and Kenya as their main enemies. The radical group is beginning to sound more like other global jihadi outfits like Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Unfortunately, the year 2014 might not bring much relief for the Somali people already suffering from Al-Shabaab’s terror operations because of the chronic corruption in the government, which has given the group an unusual opportunity to become emboldened. Mogadishu today has made great progress in rebuilding and encouraging business, but, alas, it is less safe than it was in 2012. The Somali army is nowhere near being a viable force that can eradicate the terror group, the African forces (AMISOM) are underused with a limited mandate, and Al-Shabaab is not expected to provide any letdown in its terror campaign. Therefore, sit tight and brace yourself for another year full of twists and turns.