Monday, January 6, 2014

Al-Shabaab in 2013: Boom and Bust

For Al-Shabaab, 2013 was a year of many twists and turns. It started in January with an ominous threat by the Al-Qaeda affiliate to the American jihadist Omar Hammami: Surrender in two weeks or face death. This was followed by the brutal killing in February of Shaikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah, a prominent Somali scholar in his seventies, while he was praying in a mosque in Puntland. After such a perverse start, the year ended when on December 20, the group killed another foreign jihadist, Abdirizak “Burundi” (The Burundian). For Hammami, January was a point of no return. The Al-Qaeda groups, after all, are not paper tigers; they mean business.  Nine months later, Hammami was killed in an ambush ordered by Godane, the emir of Al-Shabaab. Gone were the professed brotherly love and the years of comradeship and struggle. Such was the unceremonious end of the Hip Hop jihadist who once sang rap songs in praise of the militant group. For Al-Shabaab, issuing threats and killing are just two sides of the same coin. The year 2013 was no exception.

The year manifested the hounding and the marginalization of foreign jihadists, loss of more territory, a power struggle among the group’s leaders, a deadly terrorist mission abroad, an unusual military victory, and an unprecedented infiltration of the weak Somali government.

 What was unique about last year was the grumbling and opposition of key jihadists, foreign and local, against the imperial leadership of Godane. Hammami, Ibrahim Al-Afghani, and some of their colleagues went online and lashed out at the emir of Al-Shabaab. However, it is the tragic story of Abdirizak Burundi that seems taken from a Gothic novel: A former Christian who converted to Islam and immediately joined a religious terror group only to be killed by his colleagues. Abdirizak (last name unknown) was born in Rwanda, fled that country in 1994 after the brutal massacres of the minority group Tutsi by Hutu militias and their supporters. He was a Hutu and fled to Congo; from there he went to Uganda, then he settled in Nairobi, Kenya. It was in Kenya and after working for a non-religious Somali merchant that Abdirizak became interested in Islam and converted. He came to Somalia that same year, 2007, and was recruited by Al-Shabaab which at the time was fighting the Ethiopian forces in the country. Abdirizak mastered Somali, participated in terrorist operations with Al-Shabaab, and opened businesses in Mogadishu and later Barawe. He was critical of Godane’s treatment of foreign jihadists. In May, he traveled to the Bay region to visit one of his wives and new-born daughter but was intercepted by Al-Shabaab fighters who thought the foreigner was on his way to join the renegade Omar Hammami. Abdirizak was detained by the radical group and kept in a make-shift prison in Jilib for eight months. In December, his family was notified of his death without further explanation.

Al-Shabaab lost Mahadaay, a strategic town 113 km (75 miles) north of Mogadishu.  For consolation, though, Al-Shabaab is rejoicing to see some of the territories it once controlled in Lower Shebelle being destabilized by a militia allied with the government and led by Yusuf Indhacade in a campaign to disenfranchise the indigenous people. The biggest town Al-Shabaab controls now is Barawe where in June two of its top leaders were killed by forces loyal to Godane and another leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys, escaped only to fall into the hands of the government.  Two of the eight Al-Shabaab figures on whose heads the U.S had put a bounty in the last two years (Hammami and Ibrahim Al-Afghani; $5 million each) were killed by Godane.  Moreover, Mukhtar Robow, who also has a $5 million bounty on his head, is estranged from Al-Shabaab. By the rate Godane is going in killing his former colleagues, it means the U.S has saved millions in bounty payments, and it might even save more as Godane’s grip on the group’s command and control tightens.
Al-Shabaab succeeded in its attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, an incident allowing global jihadists to revel in a moment of pride and exuberance. For a short period, the terrorist operation gave Al-Shabaab a nodding approval from Al-Qaeda which had recently reacted with shudders to the murdering and marginalization of foreign jihadists by Godane. Moreover, Al-Shabaab succeeded in repelling an operation by U.S Naval SEAL Team 6 in Barawe, the same elite force that was responsible for killing Osama Bin Ladin. The operation was an unmitigated failure and embarrassment for the American Special Forces but a resume-enhancement for the terror group. The message was clear: Unlike Al-Qaeda central, Al-Shabaab can protect its own leaders from the Americans. It was that same year that the radical group also foiled a rescue attempt by the French forces to free France’s agent, Dennis Alex, who was held by Al-Shabaab.

Perhaps, the most embarrassing moment for the Somali government was in July when the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea issued a report which claimed the terror group had penetrated the security apparatus of the government, the very body that is supposed to fight terrorism. In August, former Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galeyr and a current parliamentarian, also accused President Hassan S. Mohamoud of being in cahoots with Al-Shabaab. In an interview with a Somali channel in Minneapolis, Galeyr claimed the existence of what he termed “Gacan-saar” (a secret handshake; an understanding between two parties) between government officials and Al-Shabaab leaders especially in Jubbaland. Galeyr mentioned telephone exchanges between these two parties: “These dealings between the federal government and Al-Shabaab are what led to the last minute cancellation of President Mohamoud’s invitation to attend the G-8 summit.”  President Mohamoud’s secret dealings with Al-Shabaab, stated Galeyr, is the biggest concern some Western and neighboring countries have about him. Another former prime minister, Ali Ghedi, added more fuel to the issue when he chastised the government for its inability to avert the spike of Al-Shabaab violence in Mogadishu. “The regime in Mogadishu has strayed from the correct path,” he said. Perhaps, it is the issue of corruption that has alienated the current regime in Mogadishu from Western powers and given Al-Shabaab an opportunity to strike with impunity. For example, an Al-Shabaab terrorist accused of the attempted murder of the country’s deputy army commander escaped the Central Prison in Mogadishu. The government fired the warden and four correction officers for taking bribes.
 
The former American secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, declared in October that Al-Shabaab posed a global threat and, hence, should be hunted down with drones and other means. In December, Ali Dheere, the spokesman of the group, issued his own proclamation by naming the U.S enemy number one and the UK enemy number two. This is an upgrade for the Americans in terms of ranking as previously the African terror outfit mostly focused on the Somali government, the African forces, Ethiopia, and Kenya as their main enemies. The radical group is beginning to sound more like other global jihadi outfits like Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Unfortunately, the year 2014 might not bring much relief for the Somali people already suffering from Al-Shabaab’s terror operations because of the chronic corruption in the government, which has given the group an unusual opportunity to become emboldened. Mogadishu today has made great progress in rebuilding and encouraging business, but, alas, it is less safe than it was in 2012. The Somali army is nowhere near being a viable force that can eradicate the terror group, the African forces (AMISOM) are underused with a limited mandate, and Al-Shabaab is not expected to provide any letdown in its terror campaign. Therefore, sit tight and brace yourself for another year full of twists and turns.

 

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