Turmoil in Al-Islah, Somalia's Muslim Brotherhood

Four years ago, in an interview for Ikhwanweb, the official website of the international Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Bashe Omar, chairman of al-Islah, assured members of the Brotherhood across the globe that there were no problems bedeviling the Somali branch. “The movement is not suffering any internal problems,” Omar emphatically said. “In fact, it is in its strongest stages in terms of fairness, commitment, and sacrifice.”

For the last few days, however, al-Islah has been anything but a harmonious organization.

Sheikh Mohamed Ahmed Nur “Garyare,” a co-founding father of the group, announced that the movement had frozen the membership of three of its top leaders: Chairman Ali Bashe Omar, Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed (current president of Mogadishu University and former chair and co- founding member of al-Islah) and Mustafa Abdullah Ali, head of the southern division of the organization. The accusations leveled by Garyare and his supporters against the three leaders ranged from the mundane--poor leadership, sowing discord among members-- to the more serious charges of misappropriation of funds and treason. Dr. Ali Sheik was specifically accused of cavorting with unnamed foreign entity, in the name of fighting “terror.” In an interview with the BBC, Garyare made it clear that he was, for all practical purposes, the new leader of the Islamic movement. The cleric, who lives in Toronto, Canada, was dismissed by a recent declaration of the deposed leaders as an individual who speaks for none but himself. The current discord in al-Islah resembles the one that occurred in the Somali parliament several months ago when the speaker was deposed and a new leadership was installed, which led to the unending question of who is actually in charge of the Somali legislature. The drama continues.

For students of Somali politics, the question is: What led the turmoil in al-Islah to occur now? The international Muslim Brotherhood is having the best era in its 84 years of existence—thanks to the Arab Spring. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt won both the parliamentary and presidential elections, the Al-Nahda is currently in charge of Tunisia, and Syria’s Brothers are in the forefront in the existential fight against Bashar Assad. Morocco’s branch of the MB is also in control of the government. The only exception has been Libya where a pro-Western secular leader, Mahmoud Jibril, won the recent elections to lead that country. But then again, Libya was able to buck the trend, if one is to believe the Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer, because it is “less a country than an oil well with a long beach and myriad tribes.”

Al-Islah, the internationally-recognized MB outfit, can best be described as a small organization with an elitist bent. Many of the rank- and- file members are educated and have no commonality with the average Guled or Maryam. Whereas the Egyptian MB shares the same elitist quality with its brethren in Somalia, it was nevertheless able to articulate its political and social agendas with the Egyptian masses. Al-Islah, on the other hand, has generally steered of being part of Somalia’s political process because it lacked vision, grass-roots support among the masses, and a willingness to cooperate with other--and in some cases bigger-- Islamic movements in the country. For the last two decades, al-Islah has distinguished itself by telling the international community that it is not Salafi, and hence militant. The leadership has failed to define its movement other than reciting that it is not Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) or al-Shabab. The movement’s former vice chair, and now presidential candidate, Abdurrahman M. Abdullahi “Baadiyow” had articulated, in his various writings that the state of militancy in Somalia is due to the presence of Salafis in the country. The Sufi orders and the Muslim Brotherhood, argued Baadiyow, are peaceful and tolerant, whereas the Salafis are “confrontational.” Therefore, “the root of the Islamic conflict lies with the ideology of Salafism as practiced in Somalia.” However, Baadiyow’s moderate beliefs have not endeared him to the very audience he has attempted to reassure in the West. According to several independent sources of al-Islah—one a top-ranking figure— who spoke to this writer, Baadiyow is not allowed to fly to the United States.  It is not clear why Washington did that as Baadiyow, in his writings, speeches, and interviews, has never advocated violence.

 There are two camps in al-Islah: One group emphasizes the development of Islamic identity for the individual and the society based on Islamic ideals, whereas the other camp has shown a Machiavellian approach to attaining political power. Sheikh Garyare and many members of the organization want the group to return to its roots and ideals, and not be corrupted by the pursuit of power. Dr. Ali and Baadiyow (who oddly escaped the wrath of Garyare) believe that the MB should have a political party in order to gain power, because political power brings about change faster, and is more effective (a lesson al-Islah learned from Tajamuc, better known as Ala Sheikh). Not long ago, a prominent member of the group had circulated a bizarre and unethical idea to buy votes from the council of traditional elders, $5,000 a piece, in order to win parliamentary seats. Baadiyow, in fairness, has publicly called for clean and fair elections, but demands that he disclose who is funding his candidacy have fallen into deaf ears.

The root cause of the discord among al-Islah was the proposal to form a political party. The proposal was, of course, led by Baadiyow and Dr. Ali, and was rejected by Garyare and his supporters, mainly because they felt disempowered by the ‘politico’ wing of the group, which by then had full control of all the finances, as well as the group’s jewel: Mogadishu University.

For the last several years, al-Islah suffered defections and dissent. A new group, naming itself the New Blood, has emerged and collaborated with two other major Islamic groups, the Tajamuc and al-Isctissam, a Salafi group whose members were once part of now defunct Al-Itihad. The Tajamuc is unique because it is a local homegrown Muslim Brotherhood outfit with no ties to Cairo, the headquarters of the international Muslim Brotherhood. The Tajamuc, unlike al-Islah, has established extensive working relationships with other moderate Islamic groups in the country.

The recent turmoil in al-Islah weakens the organization as the divergent leaders of the group are going through identity crises. The fact that the leaders have failed to iron out their differences internally, but have aired out their dirty laundry to the public, is an indication that there is an organizational break-down caused by a lack of necessary mechanisms to resolve conflict. The discord among the leaders might have an impact on the functioning of Mogadishu University, perhaps, the most successful project the group has ever undertaken in Somalia, the institution provides high-quality educations to thousands of Somali students. Some say that the organization is over-extending itself, especially in its pursuit of power, and, hence, does not know its own limitations.  Perhaps, it would be better off heeding to the popular Egyptian adage, “Calaa addil xaafaha, mid riglayk,” (based on the length of the mat, extend your legs).

Government Corruption in Somalia of Yesteryears

Peter Bridges served as the American ambassador to Somalia from 1984 to 1986. In his memoir, Safirka: An American Envoy (2000), Bridges chronicled his dealings with top Somali government officials.

Bridges was considered a straight shooter. Before his appointment, his knowledge of Somalia was scant, and his experience in Africa nil. His prior postings had been Panama City, Moscow, Prague, and Rome (twice). In all, he served under seven American presidents. Bridges became the first ambassador appointed by Ronald Reagan immediately after his reelection, and he was one of 280 former American diplomats who overwhelmingly endorsed Obama in 2008. In one of his articles in The Huffington Post, Bridges concluded his ringing endorsement with a familiar phrase: that American politicians use after airing their commercials, “…and I approved this message.” Bridges wrote, “Barak Obama did not approve this message. It’s all mine.”

Bridges’ observations of Somalia seem, at times, to have been comical and stereotypical. He issued constant complaints about Somali government buildings’ structural flaws, bats in the Somali National Theater, animals wandering in the streets, and the bumpy roads of Mogadishu; he also characterized Hotel Uruba, at the time the city’s best hotel, as a place  “that was said to feature a rat in every room.” Even the American ambassador’s residence received its share of criticism. The Somali Foreign Ministry, in particular, Bridges called it, “the shabbiest ministry building I had ever seen.”

One thing that Bridges emphasized about his years in Mogadishu was the level of corruption in the Somali government. Bridges was managing one of the largest American military and foreign aid projects in sub-Saharan Africa. He wrote that every Somali cabinet minister he had met would badger him about the need for more aid. Interestingly, Bridges knew that the requests were unnecessary and unjustified. In fact, Bridges included a zinger about Somali officials being persistent beggars. The British ambassador to Somalia at the time of Bridges’ tour of duty, William Fullerton, advised him to read Richard Burton’s classic book, The First Footsteps in East Africa (1856). Burton wrote that Arabs called Somalia “Bilad wa[x] issi,” (Land of Give Me Something). “The longer you are there,” Fullerton warned Bridges, “the more you will think that name is apt.” Bridges grudgingly acknowledged that both Burton and Fullerton were right. Even so, on rare occasions, a government official would come up with a creative approach to foreign assistance. For example, Vice President Hussein Kulmiye Afrah told Bridges in 1985 that Somalia needed to exploit wind and solar energies instead of relying on oil handouts from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

Italian aid to Somalia in the 1980s amounted to a quarter billion US dollars. The money was spent on such projects as a road in northern Somalia, the renovation of a pharmaceutical plant, and the construction of a fertilizer plant that never produced a sack of fertilizers. According to an article in the Washington Post, “ The Italian Connection: How Rome Helped Ruin Somalia,” (01/24/1993), a former Somali minister testified in Italy that at least 10 percent of the Italian aid to Somalia was pocketed by members of Siad Barre’s family and their cronies. Many of the Somali state-owned companies made “no economic sense,” argued Bridges, but “did make business sense—family business sense.”

Bridges also mentioned how the Somali government inflated the number of refugees in the country in order to secure more foreign aid. For example, Abdi Mohamed Tarrah, Commissioner of the Somali National Refugee Commission, had the tendency to play with refugee numbers. “If there were no refugees,” Bridges stated,  “there would be no commission—and no Commissioner.”

One issue that angered Bridges was how Siad Barre courted Libya during a period of high tensions between Washington and Tripoli. Reagan had bombed Libya and Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli, and the Libyans, were, of course, itching to retaliate against the Americans by any means necessary. Siad Barre, meanwhile, started courting Libya in part to dissuade Qaddafi from aiding Somali rebels based in Ethiopia. Bridges warned Barre about re-establishing diplomatic ties with Libya. However, Barre, the wily politician, saw an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: court Libya’s financial assistance and undermine his rivals. One day, Bridges read a news item from the Somali News Agency about Somalia and Libya resuming diplomatic relations “in consideration of the emphatic necessity to prepare for and face the problems posed by imperialism and its likes.” Bridges was livid! He asked to see Abdirahman Jama Barre, the foreign minister, who reassured him that the statement referred to the Ethiopian imperialism. However, when Bridges met Siad Barre, the Somali president said the word “imperialism” was in reference to the Soviet Union. One thing became clear to Bridges: Qaddafi had bribed Somali officials to resume diplomatic relations. Bridges said that he had heard credible reports that Jama Barre pocketed $1 million from the Libyans.  

In November 1985, the World Bank organized a conference in Paris to provide urgent aid to Somalia which was experiencing a budget gap of $100 million.  Many countries pledged to help except Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Bridges could not understand why fellow Muslim and Arab countries would not lend assistance to Somalia. He was later told by an Arab ambassador that Siad Barre had diverted $20 million to “private pockets,” that was intended for Somalia to purchase oil. In one instance, oil from Saudi tanker was even sold to the Apartheid regime of South Africa, a country under economic boycott, rather than delivered to Somalia.

Finally, there was the matter of Somali Ambassador to Washington, Abdullahi Ahmed Adow, who had purchased a house on Foxhall Road; the property was reported to be “the second-largest residential real estate sale in the District of Columbia that year.” Bridges did not accuse Ambassador Adow of any wrongdoing, but he sardonically noted that Adow “had done well for a nomad’s son on a Somali official salary.” However, Adow’s attractive wife, Asha, was another story. She asked Ambassador Bridges whether the Americans were interested in renting one of several villas she owned in Mogadishu for, oddly, six thousand US dollars cash; no Somali  shillings, please. Bridges was taken aback by the request and politely declined. What happened next was beyond comprehension. Bridges claimed that Asha Adow threatened to rent the villa instead to the Libyan Embassy. In essence, Bridges felt he was being blackmailed. If the Libyans had rented the said villa, they would have had access to the American military compound that operated a stone’s throw from the villa.  Bridges was upset and had to tell Somali officials that Somalia would regret renting the villa to the Libyan Embassy. An international incident was, hence, averted.

Despite Bridges’ allegations, there are those who say that Siad Barre was only interested in political power, and that he never gained any financial benefits from ruling Somalia for more than 21 years. If this assumption is correct, then he at least condoned the practice of corruption because he was perfectly aware that members of his government and family were guilty of embezzling from the country’s coffers. For Barre, allowing some of his ardent supporters to get rich was a reward for their loyalty. For the small number of his family that benefited from his long reign, it was simply an entitlement, and Barre had no problem with that.

The Anti-Al Shabab Campaigner in Mogadishu

Nine months ago, Omar Abdirahman Mohamed-- commonly known as Omar-Dahir—Chairman of Midnimo Political Party and the director of the Center for Moderation and Dialogue in Mogadishu received a most unsettling phone call from an anonymous caller.


“The [Somali] people and the [Islamic] religion will be protected from people like you,” the caller said.

Omar-Dahir instantly knew that the caller was a member of the radical group and Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al Shabab. The group is known for making such ominous and mysterious calls. He was being threatened, and he got the message immediately. Life has not been the same since. Omar-Dahir, like any Somali politician closely allied with the government, is today actively being pursued by the Al Shabab. He is on constant guard, and rarely goes to his home for fear the Al Shabab assassins might flay him alive.

“When you regularly take a public swipe at the Al Shabab in Mogadishu,” explains Omar-Dahir. “Two things are certain to happen-- threats and murder, and not necessarily in that order.”

The Somali government and the African Union forces are currently fighting the militant Al Shabab militia in the old fashion way-- bullet by bullet. But Omar-Dahir has also been in war of words with the group. It is not clear where his campaign against the Al Shabab begins and where his political ambitions and agenda end.

Omar-Dahir is a no ordinary rival of the Al Shabab; he is a graduate of the Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia, and personally knows the top leaders of Al Shabab. They were once active members of the Islamic Courts Union which briefly ruled Mogadishu in 2006.

“Once upon a time, they were my friends,” Omar-Dahir laments.

The word “they” here is not a generic term, instead, the pronoun specifically stands for Ahmed Godane, the co- founder and current commander of the Al Shabab, and his top lieutenant, Ibrahim Afghani. These two are individuals, who originally hailed from Somaliland, and Washington has recently placed a bounty of $7 million and $5 million, respectively, on their heads.

Omar-Dahir has a grudging respect for his old friend, Godane, and now his new nemesis. Nevertheless, he still wants to bring the fugitive to justice.

“He is much smarter than most people give him credit for,” says Omar-Dahir about the Al Shabab leader. “Come on, the guy has done some graduate work in Pakistan, and speaks Somali, Arabic, and English fluently.” But behind this veneer of education, according to Omar-Dahir, lies a dangerous, criminally-sophisticated, and disturbed man, with a long list of woes, issues, and diabolical goals.

“I can tell you that both Godane and Ibrahim Afghani do not want peace or reconciliation,” attests Omar-Dahir. “All they want is the establishment of an Islamic state as they narrowly define it.”

Omar-Dahir remembers Godane and his cohorts during the Islamic Courts Union’s rule when they were actively and secretly arming and organizing themselves. When the Courts were wiped out by the Ethiopian forces, Godane’s Al Shabab militants got their opportunity and declared themselves to be Jihadists a la Al- Qaeda fashion

Omar-Dahir is a medium-height, soft-spoken man in his early fifties. He speaks as though he is weighing every word that he utters. “I sat in front of Godane and Ibrahim Afghani as I am sitting in front of you,” he said as he slumped back into his chair. “They see the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and anybody who does not agree with them as ‘Kuffar’ (infidels).” Infidels, according to the two, deserve to be killed.
Calls for political reconciliation with Al Shabab irk Omar-Dahir. He does not understand why some Somali politicians and pundits circulate such an “asinine” idea. “These radicals want the elimination of the government. Period,” he asserts. They do not want peace. “How can you negotiate with a group of killers who want to get rid of you in the first place?”

Omar-Dahir sees no moderates in the ranks of Al Shabab. However, radicals such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow are not as powerful as people think, believes Omar-Dahir. Not mincing words, he explains: “In fact, both Aweys and Robow are afraid of Godane so much that they cannot do anything without his approval.” Moreover, Aweys and Robow share the same ideology, are not much different than Godane and Afghani, and view any negotiations with the government with sheer contempt. In addition, the two leaders are afraid of the “Amniyaat”, a secretive intelligence and assassination unit of the Al Shabab that is under the control of Godane.

Several months ago, Sheikh Aweys publicly stated that waging Jihad was not the monopoly of one group, (i.e. Al Shabab) and that anyone could undertake it. Aweys’ speech earned a verbal lashing from Godane and other Al Shabab officers. Aweys’ fatwa was neither accepted by the radical group nor even debated. It was just summarily rejected out of hand.

Omar-Dahir and four volunteers run the Center for Moderation and Dialogue which is now engaged in a propaganda war with the Al Shabab. They are all volunteers, Dahir says, and hence receive no salaries and funding from any source.

“No help from the Somali government, or the Saudis, or the Americans?”

“Not really,” Omar-Dahir replied.

Omar-Dahir claims that he is committed to exposing what he calls “the carefully-constructed charade” of the Al Shabab. He goes to the radio stations, and talks to whoever will listen to him about the clear and present danger the Al Shabab group poses for Somali youth and children. Volunteers at the Center give interviews to local media, lecture at mosques, and public gatherings. The Center also publishes booklets, leaflets, and pamphlets. Omar-Dahir also trains Somali imams and journalists about the language Al Shabab leaders use, and how to decipher their doubletalk. “Some of the imams do not know such concepts as “at-Tasamux” (tolerance) “al-Ghuluwi” (extremism), so I teach them in order to refute the Al Shabab, “says Omar-Dahir.

Omar-Dahir acknowledges that reporters for the government-run Radio Mogadishu are the most courageous in the fight against the Al Shabab. “Some of these brave reporters, males and females, haven’t even left the station since 2009 because they are wanted by the Al Shabab,” says Omar-Dahir. “They sleep at the station and still carry on their coverage of the Al Shabab.” Omar-Dahir has found great solace and support in these journalists who, like him, are not afraid to call a spade a spade.

Radio Mogadishu does have its limitations; however. It is a FM station that does not reach beyond Mogadishu. The Al Shabab group is strong in areas outside Mogadishu, according to Omar-Dahir, where Radio Mogadishu cannot reach any audiences, and where no middle class, intellectuals, learned people, and strong institutions exist, and the level of Islamic awareness is weak. Most of Al Shabab recruits come from small villages and rural areas where the radical group controls the terrain and thinking. “Mogadishu has not been kind to the Al Shabab, when it comes to recruiting,” boasts Omar-Dahir. “What is badly needed is a shortwave radio with a long reach,” says Omar-Dahir.

The Al Shabab offer a four-month intensive religious training to their clerics, Omar-Dahir adds. He warns too that the group has been effective in brainwashing young recruits, and then controlling every aspect of their lives. Recruits, adds Omar-Dahir, are also offered incentives such as marriage. Parents, in areas under the control of the group, are pressured to give away their daughters to “Al Shabab mujahidin fighting for the cause of Islam.”

Omar-Dahir is still optimistic that the propaganda war against the Al Shabab will be won eventually. It is a war of attrition, Omar-Dahir says, that will last until Somalia gets stronger institutions, better radio stations and TV, and lasting peace and stability. “It is challenging to fight a radical group that regularly uses Facebook and Twitter,” explains Omar-Dahir with a calm brave earnestness. “The militant group also controls radio stations, such as HornAfrik, Somaliweyn, Furqan, and Andalusia.”

“We are still far behind in fully utilizing the mass media and social networking,” Omar-Dahir admits. “But we will win the war because the Al Shabab group is living on borrowed time.”

Omar-Dahir’s optimism is tempered by the bleak reality that the Al Shabab, though battered now, is still alive, and does control a large swath of land in Southern Somalia.