Sunday, December 16, 2012

Mr. Ambassador, Meet Nuruddin Farah

“No poet or novelist wishes he was the only one who ever lived, but most of them wish they were the only one alive, and quite a number believe their wish has been granted.”− W.H. Auden.
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In the spring of 1980, I arrived in New York City seeking an education. I was fresh from Cairo, Egypt, where I had spent one and a half years. In my four months in the city, I was fortunate to stay in Astoria, Queens, with two diplomats at Somalia’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations: Abdi Artan, First Secretary, and Adan Farah Shirdon, Consular. Shirdon is the older brother of Somalia’s current prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon. Both Shirdon and Artan later became ambassadors to Djibouti and Canada, respectively.

After that summer, I headed to Ohio, where I knew no one, to commence my university studies.

The Somali ambassador at the time was Ahmed Mohamed Adan “Qaybe.” Ambassador Qaybe was a career foreign service officer who had served as an envoy to Washington and Moscow. He was tall, strong, intimidating, and brusque. He seemed blunt where others prevaricated. He had worked in senior posts in both the civilian and military governments and, not long ago, was the speaker of the House of Elders in Somaliland.

Qaybe, who hails from the Sol and Sanaag region, has become a fervent defender of the self-declared state of Somaliland. He has attacked some of his fellow countrymen for forming the Khatumo State. For example, Dr. Ali Khalif Galeyr, Somalia’s former prime minister− a hero to some and a polarizing figure to others− has become Qaybe’s favorite piƱata. Several months ago, Qaybe lashed out at Galeyr for the latter’s unbridled ambition and shameless pursuit of political position.

Moreover, Qaybe, who holds no doctorate, questioned Galeyr’s PhD and characterized it as an achievement from a third-rate American university. However, Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs from which Galeyr graduated is ranked by U.S News and World Report as one of the top graduate schools in public affairs. Syracuse University, after all, is the institution from which Joe Biden, the U.S vice-president, graduated.

A young Somali diplomat in our apartment complex told me about an incident in the Somali mission to the UN. The story was confirmed by two other diplomats.

One day, the Somali writer Nuruddin Farah came to the mission. By 1980, Farah had achieved middling success and had three novels, all in English, under his belt. I have no idea why Farah appeared in the diplomatic compound. Was he renewing his passport? Was he in Manhattan, in the neighborhood, and decided to stop at the mission? I do not know. At any rate, the said young Somali diplomat was gracious enough to have welcomed Farah. He was talking to the writer when Ambassador Qaybe walked into the office. The young man introduced Farah with the kind of reverence typically reserved for dignitaries.

“This is the Somali writer Mr. Nuruddin Farah, Mr. Ambassador,” announced the young diplomat.

Qaybe, the career bureaucrat, was caught off guard. He knew who Nuruddin Farah was. No one though had expected Nuruddin Farah, who had imposed on himself self-exile in the mid-1970s, to appear in a Somali government office.

After a few seconds of embarrassing silence, Qaybe exploded, “Are you the one who writes about cockroaches and lizards?”

The statement was like being smacked with a tsunami.

Nuruddin Farah was stunned and dumb-founded by the ambassador’s undignified and vituperative language. The remarks indeed rendered him speechless. Farah believed, albeit erroneously, that he would be bathed in celestial glow. But here was this uncouth and abrasive envoy treating him like a giant fly that kept orbiting in the diplomatic compound.

The young diplomat, who like Qaybe hailed from Sol and Sanaag, was utterly embarrassed. In fact, the ambassador’s words sent shudders up the spine of those present. There was a genuine feeling that Ambassador Qaybe had trampled on a national treasure: Somalia’s renowned writer. Yes, Farah was an avowed critic of the Siad Barre regime, but he nonetheless deserved respect and common courtesy.

The incident offered a telling tableau of two different personalities: one, a government official upholding its policies that stifled dissent and the other, a novelist who had built a reputation of challenging the legitimacy of such government. It was obvious that Qaybe did not want to be perceived as a high-ranking official cavorting with a dissident.

One thing became clear in that brief confrontation: There is no uglier scene than one involving a bruised ego.

True to his reputation, Farah came across as intelligent, detached, pretentious, and a bit haughty. He was the same man who was once interviewed by the BBC Somali Service and treated the audience dismissively. When asked which writers had influenced him, Farah told the interviewer to skip that question as the answer would not make sense to the audience. The audience, in Farah’s eyes, represented a monolithic group that knew nothing about literature. The novelist did not want to waste his time discussing an issue that he unilaterally deemed too sophisticated for his audience to comprehend. Why bother!

After Qaybe’s unfortunate remarks, the novelist tried valiantly to preserve a modicum of civility. He wanted to stay above the fray but there was no denying that he had a vacuous expression on his face. Of course, he was hurt. Farah must have felt unappreciated at best, and slighted, at the least.

Farah left the office without receiving a groveling apology.

One of these coming years, Nuruddin Farah might win the Nobel Prize for literature. He has been nominated for the award numerous times. He has published 11 novels, some with critical acclaim. Some of his recent novels though have been depicted as “less poetic and polished than his earlier novels,” (The Economist) because they rely heavily on “research and recent political events.” In his latest novel, Crossbones, Pico Iyer detected what other critics have been saying about Farah’s penchant for “textbook commentary.” In the November 8, 2012, issue of the New York Review of Books, Iyer pointed out that Nuruddin Farah’s “characters sound as heavy-handed as people declaiming from an Associated Press report.”

If Farah wins the Nobel Prize, I wonder what Qaybe would say about the Swedish Foundation. An astute Canadian writer named Margaret Atwood once said, “If you are not annoying somebody, you are not alive.”





Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Shangole and I


I knew Fuad Mohamed Khalaf “Shangole” when he was a lad.
Yes, the notorious Fuad Shangole, one of the top leaders of Al Shabab and a man on whose head the U.S government has placed a $5 million bounty.

Simply put, we crossed paths as children.

Shangole always hummed with energy, and he used to dawdle in the streets of Mogadishu acting tough and thuggish. Fortunately, that was in the 1970s and Al Qaeda and Al Shabab did not yet exist.

The truth is I had a personal grudge against Shangole, the lad. In a way, he was something I was not: tough and street-smart.  We both grew up in a rough-and-tumble neighborhood, but, at the risk of immodesty, I was the mild-mannered youngster who steered clear of street fights or hanging with rough kids.   
Shangole was acquainted with me but he never knew my name. The age difference, perhaps, was the reason why we never associated; he was five years my junior. I used to see him come and go at his grandfather’s compound where my uncle, Abdi Gurey, had his car rental business, “Auto Noleggio Wajir.” From time to time, I assisted my uncle with his paperwork. His place was the hub of the northeasterners living in Mogadishu because many used his postal box “702” for their mail. All kinds of people would come to his agency checking their mail, and there were always people there sipping tea or cappuccino, talking, and playing dominos.

I loved hanging with these adults as they conversed and joked around. But the biggest reasons I used to help my uncle were the sense of feeling responsible in the running of the business and, frankly, the occasional cash windfall.
In my small juvenile world, young Shangole was a minor nuisance. He minded his own business and never talked to the adults in the agency as he trudged past them on his way to his grandfather’s home upstairs.

My puerile grudge against him, though, was purely accidental.
One day, Shangole was passing by when one of my uncles made a perfunctory remark about him. “I love this boy because he is brave and exceptional,” my distant uncle said. He used the word “fariid” which in Arabic and Somali means unique and exceptional. Being the only youngster in the agency, my uncle’s statement was like a punch in the stomach. But I managed to maintain a veneer of politeness. I knew things about Shongole, the naughty boy, that my poor uncle did not.

My uncle never spent time with Shangole, nor did he know the lad well enough to issue such a proclamation. In a way, his little exuberance about Shangole was understandable. He was indeed sending a message to me: Go and spend time with children your age instead of hanging with adults. Furthermore, my uncle knew my aversion to fighting and hustling.
I concurred with my uncle that Shangole was aggressive, pugnacious, and street smart. The lad was the type who would exhibit traits of juvenile delinquency, although I had no proof that he was ever sent to a juvenile hall in Mogadishu.

I have not seen Shangole since the mid- 1970s. His life has had no shortage of drama. I heard that he settled in Sweden, as a refugee, sometime in 1992 and later became a citizen of that country. While in Sweden, Shangole, perhaps, went through a personal transformation. He became religious and even served as an imam before finally moving to Mogadishu in 2004. His years in Sweden, as an imam, supposedly revealed little trace of dogma.
Shangole’s meteoric rise in the Al Shabab movement was breathtakingly swift. During the brief reign of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Shangole was the head of the department of education. After the expulsion of UIC from Mogadishu in 2007, Shangole became one of the top leaders of Al Shabab and the man in charge of issuing fatwas, religious edicts. According to the Associated Press, on December 7, 2010, Shangole threatened to attack the United States. “We tell the American President Barack Obama to embrace Islam before we come to his country,” he bellowed. Reports have claimed that he was involved in sadistic brutality like personally killing Al Shabab enemies and even cutting off the hands of people who violated the group’s decrees. He has developed a binary view of the world: You are either with Al Shabab or you are against it. Four years ago, there was an attempt on his life when a bomb exploded in a mosque in Mogadishu where he offered religious lessons.
What intrigued me was that Shangole, the adolescent street thug, became a full-blown terrorist in his adult life.

For me, I haven’t changed that much in terms of disposition. When I became a father, however, my oldest son, Mohamed, somewhat reminded me of my limitations as an action hero. He, like any 6-year- old, was enamored with action films. One day, I stumbled on a note he had scribbled about the men he admired the most. There were the names of Clint Eastwood, Bruce Lee, Sylvester Stallone, Chuck Norris, and Uncle Zaki. The latter was a friend of the family with a commanding physical presence. Zaki was a burly man, 6’4 tall, adventurous, and very adept at life in the outdoors. He was born in Washington, D.C to an Egyptian diplomat. I shared with him height—6’3—but not other notable attributes. This man,interestingly, used to go to a Chinese all-you-can eat cafe and consume large quantities of food. One day, the owner called his friend and invited the friend to come anytime to eat for free as long as he did not bring Zaki. The latter would laugh every time he told that story in an effort to demonstrate his prowess and a penchant for ravenous eating. To his credit, Zaki had no fat, only muscle. He passed away in 1995.

Mohamed’s list of the admired was telling. My name was nowhere to be seen. Yes, I was never into hiking, karate, or hunting, nor did I display any knowledge of military matters. My son, I suppose, merely saw me as a man who would ramble on about books.  When it came to physical activities, I was, for all practical purposes, boring to him. On one hand, I was disappointed that I did not make it to that ‘prestigious’ list. Any father would like to see his son list him among people he admires.  However, I could not contain my glee when I saw my son at least list the name of a family friend, a real man, among the action film stars. 
A decade later, of course, my son would rehabilitate me and upgrade my status as his hero, by parsing real life from fiction.

These days, Shangole’s career is at a crossroads. He is on the run and in hiding. He has made an impressive array of enemiesthe Somali government, Puntland, the U.S, and bounty hunters, not to mention ordinary Somalis who do not want the terrorist in their backyard.
I wonder what my uncle, who has since passed away, would have thought about today’s Fuad Shangole, a fugitive from justice, and the fact that I have been writing about Shangole’s militant group. It is a situation rich with irony: Two former youngsters, one carrying an AK-47 and the other a pen.

Such is the misfortune of our current circumstances.
 


 

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

Somalia's Salafi Groups and Fatwa Wars


In July of this year, a group of 22 Somali Salafi scholars met in Nairobi, Kenya, and issued a fatwa (a religious edict) that condemned a young Somali cleric based in Kenya named Shaikh Hassaan Hussein Adam. He is widely known as a spiritual supporter of Al-Shabab. The signatories and attendees of this meeting included a who’s who of the Somali Salafi community: Shaikh Mohamed Abdi Umal, Shaikh Mohamoud Shibli, Shaikh Abdirizak Mohamoud Takar, Shaikh Abdulkhadir Nur Farah, Shaikh Mohamed Idris, Shaikh Abdirahman Shaikh Umar and two former leaders of al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), Shaikh Ali Warsame and Shaikh Mohamoud Issa. The scholars condemned Shaikh Hassaan as a heretic and asked the Somali public not to buy his work or listen to his lectures.
Hassaan Hussein “Abu Salman” Adam, or “Shaikh Hassaan”, as he is popularly known, is on the United Nations’ (UN) sanctions list of persons accused of providing material support to the militant Al-Shabab.  A UN Security Council report in 2011 accused Hassaan of engaging in acts that threatened the “peace, security or stability of Somalia.” He was also accused of recruiting new members for Al-Shabab and raising funds for the group, not to mention issuing fatwas calling for attacks against the Somali government. Last year, Hassaan was arrested by Kenyan authorities and then released for reasons not bereft of domestic and ethnic politics. Hassaan indeed belongs to a major Somali clan that has a powerful presence in Kenya’s political corridor.  He is 33 years old, soft-spoken, supremely talented, and singularly driven. In spite of his scholarly bent, Hassaan appears to be a preacher with a concealed agenda because there is a subtle call for activism in his prolific lectures. He is blunt with his views and does have a habit of being accusatory.

What is known currently is that Hassaan is popular among young Somali Islamists worldwide because he espouses radical views about jihad. He is more or less Somalia’s version of Anwar al-Awlaki in terms of his youth, vigor, knowledge, and articulateness. Many Salafis from the old school, however, consider him to be extremely dangerous because, by all accounts, Hassaan provides Al Shabab radicals with the religious justification they need for their militant war in Somalia. He is, they say, an apologist for Al-Shabab because even though he does not carry arms, he is still able to articulate the ideology of Al- Shabab from the comfort of his home in Nairobi. Shaikh Hassaan’s lectures are very popular among the militant youth and are widely disseminated in Al-Shabab media outlets which also provide a glowing picture of him. Moreover, his lectures are instantly available as far away as Seattle in the U.S and as close as Mogadishu.
The Salafi movement, according to Quintan Wiktorowicz’s scholarly article, “The Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2006), is an array of trends that all share a “puritanical approach to religion.” Yet this “community is broad enough to include such diverse figures as Osama bin Laden and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia.” Within the Salafis, there are differences in politics and jihad. One jihadi figure aptly summarized the concept as “The split is not in thought; it is in strategy.” Recently, the Salafi presence in many parts of the world has become palpable. In 2010, a report by Germany’s intelligence service concluded that Salafism was becoming the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world.

Traditional Somali Salafis generally are in congruence with the ideology of al-Ictisaam movement. For starters, the al-Ictisaam is the product of the old al-Ittihad al-Islami group, which was the largest Islamic movement in Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, the group laid aside its arms and dissolved itself, but it does not refrain from politics and activism. Al-Ictisaam is the new version of the al-Ittihad sans arms. It is headed by Shaikh Bashir Ahmed-Salad Warsame, who is also the head of the Council of Ulama in Mogadishu. Prominent scholars like Shaikh Mohamed Abdi Umal, the late Dr. Ahmed Haji Abdirahman (who was assassinated by the Al-Shabab last year), Shaikh Mohamoud Shibli, and Shaikh Abdulkhadir Nur Farah are considered the top figures of al-Ictisaam.
There are three types of Salafis: the traditionalsome say the ‘politico’group as represented by al-Ictisaam, the armed Salafist groupor what French scholar Gilles Kepel would call Salafism Jihadism manifested by al-Shabab, and the neo-Salafis, better known as Salafiyyah Jadidah (the New Salafis). Shaikh Ali Mohamoud “Ali Wajiis”, Dr. Ahmed Dahir Aweys, Shaikh Mohamed Abdi Dahir, and Shaikh Abdulkhadir Cukaasha, a scholar based in Nairobi, are major symbols of the neo-Salafis. Shaikh Cukaasha is one of the disciples of the late Shaikh Mohamed Moalim Hassan, the father of Somalia’s Islamic resurgence. In the 1980s, he became one of the Salafi scholars of al-Ittihad. His break with AIAI came during the peak of the group’s armed incursions inside Somalia. Cukaasha was opposed to AIAI carrying arms and condemned the jihadist policy of the group’s leaders. He was then upbraided and ostracized by the AIAI leaders including Hassan Dahir Aweys and Abdullahi Ali Hashi who ironically became top figures in Al-Shabab a decade later.

The rift between the al-Ictisaam scholars and the young Shaikh Hassaan, while ideological in nature, can also be explained as an interplay of power and ideology. Until recently, Al-Shabab has been in power in many areas of the south whereas the defunct AIAI, now al-Ictisaam, lost its power base after it demilitarized. Many of the Al-Shabab leaders including Ahmed Abdi Godane, Ibrahim Afghani, and Mukhtar Robow, were once AIAI members, but became disenchanted after that group disbanded its armed militias. The constant in the Al-Shabab leadership is its demonization of al-Ictisaam as a spineless group that has shamelessly abandoned its jihadi mission and ideology. Al-Shabab, on the other hand, appears to those who listen to Hassaan’s lectures, to be the ones who are offering a far more muscular stance on dealing with the Somali government.
It was in the midst of this political backdrop that Shaikh Hassaan issued a fatwa last year where he enunciated the “devious” nature of al-Ictisaam as an Islamic movement. This young cleric then rendered a verdict, accusing the group of being apostates, “Dhaa’ifa Murta’dah.” Furthermore, Shaikh Hassaan declared that it is religiously permissible to kill the scholars of al-Ictisaam as long as the goal is stopping their “fasaad” (transgression). The fatwa generated stinking rebukes from al-Ictisaam members and sympathizers. The crime of al-Ictissam, according to Shaikh Hassaan, is that it issued a fatwa that allowed participation in the country’s political process spearheaded by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Somali government, Somaliland, and Puntland are seen by A-Shabab radicals as infidels that should be fought and eliminated.

Shaikh’s Hassaan’s fatwa on al-Ictisaam has, for the last few weeks, generated new interest after the Puntland security forces apprehended some of Dr. Ahmed Haji Abdirahman’s killers. The young defendants, who allegedly carried out this heinous crime, spilled the beans and had a tangle of a story to tell. They accused Shaikh Hassaan of being a secret member of Al-Shabab and of issuing the fatwa to kill Dr. Ahmed Haji. In essence, the young defendants are saying that they were inspired by Hassaan’s edict to carry out their targeted assassination. The public confessions of these perpetrators has become, to al-Ictisaam members and sympathizers, a clear rallying point to expose what they perceive as Hassaan’s deleterious influence on the minds of many young Somalis.
The Salafis and the U.S
Immediately following the 9-11 tragedy, the American government went through a period of panic and confusion about dealing with Muslims, in general, and Islamic groups, in particular. In the last few years, however, there has been a clear policy to differentiate, for instance, between the Salafi jihadists and the neo-Salafis. In 2010, the U.S Department of State issued a visa to Shaikh Abdulkhadir Mohamed “Cukaasha” in Nairobi to visit America and attend an Islamic conference in Atlanta. The state department even offered protection for the cleric, according to a person close to Cukaasha, during his tour in the U.S. but the cleric politely declined. The goal of the American government was to have Cukaasha, who is opposed to Al-Shabab’s violence, speak to young Somali Islamists in Atlanta and Minneapolis about the danger of joining Al-Shabab’s armed struggle. What was not known to Cukaasha and his American sponsors, however, was the cool way that the cleric would be received in the Somali communities that he visited and by the Salafi establishment.

Many Salafi imams and leaders in the U.S, who are also inimical to Al-Shabab tactics, simply saw Cukaasha’s trip as an attempt to strengthen the small number of Somali neo-Salafis in North America. Cukaasha, according to people he talked to, was flummoxed and felt frozen out by his former colleagues in the Salafi community. Thus the visit, in essence, aggravated the already frayed relationship between the Salafis and the neo-Salafis. To Washington, which has become weary of the radicalization of Somali youth, the neo-Salafis are a counter force to ward off jihadi elements in America.  
On the other hand, in early October of this year, the U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took an unprecedented move by terminating the American citizenship of a prominent Somali Salafi scholar based on errors in his original citizenship application already filed and approved more than a decade earlier. This technicality, while seemingly small, might portend something larger, such as perhaps curtailing the influence of certain Salafi scholars in the U.S. Because the case is still under appeal, this scholar’s name will not be divulged here.   

Another incident involved the renowned Shaikh Mohamed Abdi Umal.  Several months ago, he generated a media sensation when he said that it was “halaal” (permissible) to eat the meat of hyena. Umal was also denied an entry visa to the U.S to attend an Islamic conference in Minneapolis on July 27, 2012, that was organized by the Abubakar Islamic Center, the same institution widely investigated by the FBI—but later cleared of any wrongdoingregarding the missing Somali youths. Umal’s visa was also denied on a technicality, namely, there was not sufficient time to process his visa application. However, it was clear to the Somali religious establishment in Minneapolis that the cleric, a prominent figure of al-Ictissam, was not welcome in the U.S. It was also not the first time that Shaikh Umal has been denied entry to America.
In July 2009, the U.S government barred the famous Somali preacher from Norway, Shaikh Mustafe Haji Ismail Harun, from entering the country. Shaikh Mustafe, a Salafi, is an Islamic scholar who hails from Somaliland and is well-liked by Somalis from all walks of life. He was supposed to be the keynote speaker at an Islamic convention in Minneapolis and had checked with the U.S Embassy in Oslo. At that time, he was told there were no problems preventing him from attending the conference.  Norway, incidentally, has a visa waiver with the United States. After arriving at Newark International Airport after a nine-hour flight from Norway, Shaikh Mustafe was questioned by U.S federal agents for three hours and informed that his name had been cleared, but he was still sent back to Oslo.

In a nutshell, the conflict between al-Ictisaam scholars and Shaikh Hassaan’s al-Shabab is at least partly dictated by the nature of political Islam. Each Islamic group has a phalanx of scholars who readily offer religious justification for their own actions and policies. Both groups wrangle and tangle as the spiraling saga of fatwa issuing intensifies. The views of Shaikh Hassaan, although radical and dangerous and not in the mainstream even among the Salafis, still offer a spiritual and ideological grounding for those Somali militants who are waging what they consider a “legitimate jihad” against the Somali government.

Monday, November 5, 2012

Somalia's New Cabinet: A Mixed Blessing

Finally, after a tortuous 17-day wait, Somali Prime Minister has unveiled his cabinet. The features of the new cabinet are the following:


1. Size: This is the smallest Somali cabinet in history at only 10 members. This is a lean cabinet, perhaps even a malnourished body. President Hassan Sh. Mohamoud was right when he said that many clans may not see themselves represented in it. The previous bloated cabinet ministries were, however, manifestations of tribal representation with no actual power. They gave false hope to many that they were indeed actual wielders of power when in fact many were names on paper. The government ministries at times did not even have buildings and staff. This new cabinet represents a change in terms of both numeric composition and a consolidation of various portfolios into a single grouping. For instance, combining finance and planning is a smart move. Yet such consolidation also creates problems, for example, blurring certain responsibilities. For instance, education and health both fall under the Ministry of Social Services. Somalia needs two separate cabinets for education and health at this juncture of rebuilding.

2. Women Representation: Two women have been appointed to the new cabinet, and both have two major portfolios in foreign affairs and social services. The latter ministry is more important than the former due to the major tasks of reconstruction that still lie ahead. Prime Minister Shirdon has made history by appointing Fowsiya Yusuf Haji Adan as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is the first time that a woman has been selected either as Deputy Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. Having 20% female representation in the cabinet is also a step forward because women now occupy two crucial ministries and hence are not merely token representatives to the political process.

3. Dearth of Experience: One glaring flaw in this new cabinet is the absence of government experience for the appointed ministries. Three cabinet ministers have but a six-month experience under the short-lived government of Prime Minister Mohamed Farmajo (Abyan, Maryan, and Fiqi). The rest are newcomers. Having such inexperienced government officials at the helm has been the mainstay of President Mohamoud’s administration. The president and the prime minister are novice at running the country, and this new cabinet is no different. Somehow, President Mohamoud seems to favor newcomers, perhaps they are more likely not to pose any threat to him.

4. One Brand of Islamists: Unlike former President, Shaikh Sharif Ahmed, who always made sure to appoint various Islamists to his administration, Mohamoud gave cabinet posts only to his group, Damul Jadid (New Blood). Abdikarim Hussein Guled (Interior and National Security) and Abdullahi Abyan Nur (Justice and Religion) are members of the president’s Islamist group. Maryan Qassim (Social Services) is an Islamist from al-Islah, Somalia’s branch of International Muslim Brotherhood. Oddly, there is no cabinet minister from either al-Ictissam (Salafi) or Tajamuc (Ala Shaikh), two major Islamic movements. Muhyidin Mohamed Kaalmooy (Public Works and Reconstruction) is said to be an Islamist close to the New Blood. In essence, if the new cabinet is approved, President Mohamoud’s Islamist ministers will be in charge of the country’s education, higher education, culture, health, police force, national security, public works, reconstruction, justice, family and religious affairs.

5. An Olive Branch for Farmajo: The former PM did not gain the premiership job under President Mohamoud, but three members of his former cabinet and his Tayo Party are now well represented in the new cabinet. Maryan Qassim, the Chair of the Tayo Party, is now an appointed minister. None of Abdiweli’s cabinet made it to the new cabinet, however.

6. North Marginalized: Sure, the new appointed Foreign Minister does hail from the north, but she is anything but a unionist. Fowsiya Yusuf H. Adan in the past ran for the Presidency of Somaliland and lost. She formed the Peace, Democracy and Prosperity Party, which was later disqualified. Fowsiya has no history of clearly championing the unity of Somalia. To the contrary, she has favored the secession of Somaliland. Why would President Mohamoud agree on the appointment of someone, like Fowsiya, as Somalia’s Foreign Minister who once campaigned for becoming the president of Somaliland in his own government? What went wrong? Fowsiya is a friend of President Mohamoud and worked with him when he was establishing his educational institute in Hargeisa. In fairness, she also worked in the Somali embassies in Washington and Eastern Europe, but not as an ambassador. Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar and Dr. Ali Essa, two northerners, may have been suitable for the post than Fowsiya, and both do have a record of championing Somali unity.

7. The President as the PM: The new cabinet is the work of President Mohamoud, not Prime Minister Shirdon. The president wanted a 9-member cabinet, and Shirdon wanted 14 or more. The president insisted on lean cabinet, and he got what he wanted. He is micromanaging the running of the country and overstepping his functions. Why this president encroaching on functions and grabbing the powers of the prime minister is not difficult to decipher. Mohamoud simply wants to run the government from Villa Somalia. Even after Shirdon’s approval by parliament, it the president who meets foreign dignitaries and the PM is neither seen nor heard.

The new cabinet, of course, will be approved by parliament. The Somali legislators are going to give the president and his prime minister the chance to rule. The likelihood of Mohamoud’s government being successful hinges on his future willingness to work with people who are neither his friends nor his ideological allies. If President Mohamoud keeps on conducting business as he does now, his administration will be the continuation of another sad chapter of the recent Somali governments.




Wednesday, October 17, 2012

I Dream of Mogadishu

I have not seen Mogadishu since 1987.


In fact, I have not lived in my hometown since 1978. But I visited it briefly—not more than two weeks each time—about four times between 1978 and 1987.

The Somali civil war finally reached Mogadishu in January 1991 when President Siad Barre and his supporters were driven out of the city. What happened next in the capital is beyond comprehension. Thousands of people were killed by Barre’s fleeing soldiers, others because they belonged to the wrong clan, and many were caught in the cross-fire of renegade fighters. Thousands were uprooted, and the city was destroyed by marauding armed militias. Government buildings were looted and damaged. Many of the residents suffered continuous bombardment from warring factions and ended up being killed or wounded while others fled to the countryside or flocked to neighboring countries, especially Kenya. Today, at least 600,000 Somali refugees still live in Dhadab camp, on the Kenyan side of the border.

The destruction that occurred in Mogadishu was unfathomable. Keith Richburg, a Washington Post reporter, wrote a vivid portrayal of the city in the early 1990s in his interesting book, Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa (1997):

“When I first saw Mogadishu in 1992, the capital looked like a transplanted set from

“Mad Max” movies, about a surreal post-nuclear world where scavengers survive by

slapping together debris and bits of scrap metal. Mogadishu hadn’t gone through a

nuclear inferno−but it seemed about as close as you could come in an urban setting.”

According to Richburg, sections of Mogadishu were so dangerous that a “Green Line” divided the warring factions, a term aptly borrowed from Beirut during Lebanon’s civil war. One particularly dangerous and treacherous section was called “Bosnia.” The American government’s brief humanitarian intervention in Somalia was preceded by an opinion article in the Washington Post penned by its flamboyant ambassador in Nairobi, Smith Hempstone, who warned about sending troops there. The piece was fittingly titled, “If you liked Beirut, you will love Mogadishu.” In essence, Mogadishu became a derelict and dilapidated city.

The armed militias took the entire city hostage in their bellicose pursuit of hegemony. They became unhinged in a shocking display of brutality and terror toward residents. People in the city were unable to extricate themselves from the situation. As a result, they led a regimented existence created by a culture of fear. Mogadishu residents experienced high unemployment because all the major institutions and businesses were destroyed. It was a situation just like that encountered by the late Arab-American reporter of the New York Times, Anthony Shadid. In his memoir, A House of Stone (2012), Shadid referred to his ancestral home of Lebanon during its civil war as “tribes bereft of citizenship.”

One thing that has gone viral on the internet, and even in some books, is the notion of juxtaposing old images of serene Mogadishu and the newer pictures: a contrast of growth vs. destruction, civilization vs. decay, peace vs. war, and normalcy vs. anarchy.
Mogadishu is the same city that the famous Moroccan traveler, Ibn Batuta, visited in 1331 and found to be steeped in history and tradition. Mogadishu was prosperous, diverse, and well connected to the world markets. Men, the Arab traveler said, were hefty eaters to the extent that they appeared corpulent with protruding stomachs. To the keen traveler, the city seemed prosperous and lively. In the 1990s, oddly, there were rumors in Mogadishu that incoming travelers were weighed at the old military airport in Balli Doogle for ransom purposes. Rumor had it that if you had extra pounds you were likely to pay more money to protect yourself from kidnapping. That is when appearance became deadly.

I was in California when streams of Somali refugees arrived there in1991 and afterward. Before their arrival, the Somali community was small and cohesive. We visited each other, occasionally ate together, and helped the needy. The arrival of droves of Somalis fresh from Somalia, a country that had abysmally failed, was jarring. Refugees from various clans who hated each other were placed in San Diego. However, although resentment and suspicion permeated their relationships, they were not in a position to engage in violence.

I used to see two friends who drank tea together every day in a fast food restaurant. They belonged to the same clan but were from two different sub-clans. One day, I noticed the two were no longer socializing. When I inquired about the reason for their estrangement, one of them told me that they had a falling out because of recent flare-ups of fighting in the port city of Kismayo. It was apparent then that the Somali civil war had reached San Diego sans violence.

My mother stayed in Mogadishu for the first few months of the civil war. She was attacked with gunfire once when a group of marauding gangs robbed her in her house. My cousin, Shukri, was fourteen and she suffered a minor injury when a splinter hit her arm. When the fighting got intense, my mother fled to Afgooye to my brother-in-law’s villa. A militia headed by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, a warlord, occupied Afgooye and forced my mother out of the villa. She and my cousin returned to her home. My mother did not want to leave her house until my sister persuaded her to leave. She flew to neighboring Djibouti where I met her and arranged an entry visa to the U.S for her and my cousin. She arrived in San Diego in May 1991.

I can only speculate that my mother went through two stages after her escape from Mogadishu: stress and indifference. In the beginning, she was edgy, worried, and apprehensive about what the future held for her in America. She initially thought that the civil war back home would subside and that she would be able to return to her beloved city of Mogadishu and her villa. My mother always wanted to have her own house when my sister and I were growing up, but she couldn’t afford it. Only after the two years when my sister and I left the country−in 1977 and 1978, respectively−was my mother able to purchase a house. She was so proud of her house that she became distraught when she left Mogadishu. Her neighbors agreed to look after the villa in her absence. However, my mother never returned to Mogadishu and passed away in San Diego eighteen years after her arrival.

Several years after her arrival in California, my mother started showing indifference to Mogadishu. She no longer talked about the city or her house. She had spent 40 years in the region of Benadir, of which Mogadishu is the capital, and only 20 years in Qardho, her birthplace. When I offered several times to take her to Somalia for a two-month vacation, she declined. Her usual answer was astonishing: “What am I going to do there?” She had accepted the reality that the civil war in Mogadishu was not winding down but instead intensifying. To her, Mogadishu slid slowly into an abyss.

I have never lost hope for Mogadishu. Somehow, I knew that the city would recover from its destruction and decay. One thing I had faith in was the people of Mogadishu−the ones who fled, the ones who stayed, and others who joined them afterward. Those who fled kept up with news of the city. I saw people from Hargeisa who would tell me about their good memories of Mogadishu. They missed it as much as the people who called the capital home. The city had captivated them intensely. There is something magical about Mogadishu. The city has the capacity to shape its residents regardless of their background. It molds them as time goes by and exposes their softer sides. Mogadishu provides ample scope for acceptance, compassion, and forgiveness. It is an ancient city that has always been rich in its tapestry of people.

Although the capital has a long way to go in terms of recovering from its devastation, there are glimmers of hope that people are coming together. Some of those who fled are back−not only reclaiming their properties, but also feeling confident in their safety. People who would have been hunted two decades ago are building businesses in the city and are now an integral part of the new Somalia. These people have shattered the psychological barrier that crippled them and made them prisoners to their fear and biases. They thought they would be killed and ostracized. Instead, they have found their brethren welcoming them with open arms. Of course, there have been cases in which returnees were murdered by criminal elements. However, this does not represent the majority of Mogadishu residents who no longer believe that the capital must be devoid of its original residents.

I believe there is hope in the reconstruction of Mogadishu−not just in building houses, but also in building trust and confidence. Mogadishu residents are doing just that, even if incrementally. Rome, after all, was not built in a day, and so it is with Mogadishu. The city’s past mood of utter despondency has been replaced with feelings of hope for rejuvenation. Yes, residents were subjected to a great deal of trauma, but people had time to wallow in that trauma. Now they are war-weary and, above all, they have become, as rational choice theory proponents would say, committed to wanting more rather than settling for less than good. They want to maximize their personal advantage by doing what is healthy for the long term.

The Canadian comic Jim Carey, in Dumb and Dumber, makes an interesting revelatory statement. After chasing a beautiful married woman cross -country, he finally asks her about the chances of the two ever living together happily. “Not good,” is her stark answer. But Carey’s character is not the type who takes no for an answer. Above all, he wants a percentage estimate of their likely union and pleads with her to give him a number. “You mean not good like one out of a hundred?” he asks. The woman clarifies, “I would say more like one out of a million.” Carey is quiet for a minute and finally bursts out, “So you are telling me there is a chance!” He may be statistically challenged but he is definitely looking at the positive.

I am too old to feign naivetƩ and too smart to be pessimistic. The grim axiom defining Mogadishu is that a bright future is emerging. It is slowly recovering. I may be unable to erase the past, but at least I am not bitter. I am optimistic that my beloved city is not yet fully formed; it has something else to reveal.

Yes, there are still plenty of chances.

*This article is excerpted from the author’s new book, Mogadishu Memoir, which will be published soon.



Thursday, October 11, 2012

Is Shirdon an Asset or a Bust?

An unusual confluence of events transpired in Mogadishu last week. Last Monday, President Mohamoud visited Baidoa and asked a crowd there whom they wanted to be prime minister. “Farmajo fadaane,” (We want Farmajo) was the answer. A source told me a few days later, on Thursday night, the Abgaal imam and the ugas of Hawadle dined with President Mohamoud. The two chieftains told the president that they had come for two things: “Faataxo iyo Farmajo” (Fatiha and Farmajo). Fatiha is the first and the most important chapter of the Quran, and Farmajo was a former prime minister. The request before the president was simple and straightforward: appoint Farmajo as prime minister, and we will recite the Quranic verses and pray for you. The president was respectful of his guests but remained non-committal. On Saturday, Mohamoud named Abdi Farah Shirdon as his prime minister. Shirdon, if approved, will be the sixth prime minister since 2004 and the fourth since 2009.


Shirdon, 54, is not the most qualified person the president had interviewed for the job. When George Bush Senior selected Dan Quayle as his running mate, he received a scathing criticism from many, including some powerful Republicans. What shocked Americans was Bush’s response, when he described Quayle as the most qualified person for the job. Quayle was anything but qualified to be vice president. A comedian aptly summarized it when he said, “Why is everybody against Dan Quayle? He has done nothing!” As my colleague Mukhtar Omer has eloquently articulated, the month-long waiting for the naming of a mediocre prime minister was, at best, disappointing. Shirdon graduated from the Somali National University in 1983 with a degree in economics. Apart from a two-year stint in the ministries of finance and agriculture as an economist, Shirdon has no experience in government. He was a businessman for many years, although the nature of his business is not clear. The official biography about him that Villa Somalia has issued to the media is a half-page and pathetic. For one thing, it is bereft of any details about what Shirdon did, not to mention that it is full of basic grammatical errors.

On April 28, 2012, Shirdon founded the Rajo (Hope) Forum. The only interview he has ever given was with Somali Channel TV after the formation of his group. He outlined his philosophy and his proposed solution for Somalia’s problems. His talk was a blend of nationalism and political realism. Shirdon said Somalia had become a battleground for foreign troops (AMISOM) and Al-Qaeda forces. “Somalia is for Somalis,” he stated. Shirdon wants the number of foreign troops reduced −the same forces that are currently protecting both him and the president−but offers no concrete plan in securing Mogadishu. He gave lukewarm support to the Roadmap, and instead emphasized the need for a more comprehensive plan by the Somalis themselves. Shirdon favors a plan that will restore confidence and hope in the people and guarantee security in the country. How that is going to happen is never addressed. At the very least, he was somewhat truthful when he said that Rajo Forum is based in Nairobi, Mogadishu, and the central regions of Somalia.

Shirdon’s appointment has received little popular support for several reasons:

a) Shirdon is an old friend of the president and a newcomer. He was never elected to any office nor did he hold a political position. His government experience is as thin as his resume. Shirdon was primarily selected not to overshadow the new president and not to rock the boat. There are no indications that the new president is weak, but he is a newcomer who is overwhelmed by the demands of the office. He has been propelled into an arena with which he is not familiar. For many years, Mohamoud was at home in community activism where he rarely took any decisive action. Now, he spends an inordinate amount of time listening to competing groups and has difficulty saying no when he should. One attribute that is a killer in Somalia’s political stage is being ‘nice’ and giving each group the impression that the president is with them. It will take some time for President Mohamoud to assert himself. Shirdon is unlikely to challenge the supremacy of President Mohamoud.

B) Shirdon is perceived by many Darod as a token representative of their tribe. A Marehan interim prime minister, married to a Hawiye politician, and who hails from Galgudud−a region which is predominantly Hawiye− will face serious challenges from Puntland. By appointing a Marehan prime minister, President Mohamoud has made a political statement to Puntland: Drop Dead. Puntland is a big Somali region with a large number of people from various clans. The Majertein, a sub-clan of Darod, is the predominant clan there. To many Puntlanders, this is the second time in two years that a Hawiye president has appointed a Marehan prime minister, which is a slap in the face for the Majertein. Farmajo, also from Galgadud, was hostile to Puntland and ended up alienating that region. President Mohamoud, like his predecessor Shaikh Sharif, is doing the same thing. The Farmajo fiasco was short-lived, of course, and President Ahmed appointed Abdiweli Gaas Ali. If history is the guide, that is when Puntland started participating in Somali politics and became an important pillar in the implementation of the Roadmap. Puntland will be disengaged, once again, from Mogadishu and that means issues like federalism, political reconciliation, piracy, and sharing the wealth and the resources of the Somali people are out of the window. Puntland is not going to secede, but it will not be part of Somali politics for a while.

c) The recent success in Kismayo by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) led to the expulsion of the radical Al-Shabab group from that important port city. President Mohamoud wants to appoint a new administration there which is totally against what he has recently been preaching that locals should select their own leaders instead of having them appointed by Mogadishu. When Mohamoud went to Baidoa and Beledwyne last week, he emphasized the need for the residents of these two important cities shaping their respective leadership. I know President Mohamoud was adamant about knowing what the potential candidates for the premiership thought of Kismayo and Somaliland. I wonder what Shirdon, who will be viewed with suspicion by some of the competing clans in Kismayo, said to the president. I guess we may never know all of the intricacies of the selection process.

d) The neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, are closely watching Shirdon. It is no secret that Shirdon was opposed to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 and the policies of President Abdullahi Yusuf. Shirdon’s views about Kenya are murky. For one thing, he is opposed to more foreign troops in Somalia. Kenya has troops in the Lower Juba and has alliance with the Ogaden in that region. The Kenyan Somali politicians, especially the influential Ogaden figures, play a crucial role in how Nairobi approaches the Lower Juba region. The manner in which the Ogaden politicians in Kenya perceive Shirdon will be interesting. The days when Mogadishu could ignore Nairobi are gone. There are more Somali refugees and immigrants today in Kenya than any other country. Somali leaders, in essence, have to take that into account.

e) Shirdon had the key backing of important figures of President Mohamoud’s New Blood Islamic group. For instance, Farah Abdulkhadir (a presidential advisor), Kamal Hassan (Chief of Staff), and Abdi Abtidon (former Minister of State for Defense), to mention a few, were in favor of Shirdon. Does that mean Shirdon, who is not an Islamist, is captive to the New Blood?

f) Finally, the people in northern Somalia were hoping to see one of their own at the helm as prime minister. A number of Somalis from many walks of life thought Dr. Ahmed Ismail Samatar would be appointed as the new prime minister in defiance of the conventional wisdom that a Hawiye president should appoint a Darod PM, and vice versa. That did not happen and President Mohamoud made the point that the premiership is a position of the south, by the south, and for the south.
Many are hoping that both President Mohamoud and Shirdon will be given the benefit of doubt. This is not the time to derail over the progress that Somalia has made for the last few weeks. That might be the best course as Shirdon and Mohamoud have both shown willingness to work together and rescue Somalia from its abyss. The lack of experience, unfortunately, has become a fait accompli, and there is not much that can be done now. Previous Somali leaders like Ali Geedi, Abdiweli, Farmajo, Shaikh Sharif, Abdullahi Yusuf, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, and Nur Cadde did not have experience in running the country. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan was the most experienced politician to lead Somalia since 1991, and his tenure was disastrous. While there is no substitute for experience, seasoned politicians can also be obstacles to real change because they have their myopic interests to protect.

I hope Shirdon, who is married to an activist, will give a boost to Somali women, who have been marginalized and even had their allotted slots in parliament robbed from them. Perhaps, for the first time in Somali history, there might be more women in the cabinet as opposed to a token representative who is always in charge of women’s affairs. This sexist cabinet portfolio will hopefully be abolished because Somali women do have stake in defense, education, reconstruction, transportation, foreign affairs, finance, and the security of the country. Let us all hope that tomorrow will be better than today and will give the president and the interim prime minister a chance to lead. They may shock the world and even inspire the skeptics.

Saturday, October 6, 2012

The Man Who Dressed Obama in Kenya Speaks Up

Muhumad Hassan Mumin, better known as “Dhukow,” has fond memories of Barack Obama. He was, after all, the man who dressed the then-US Senator from Illinois in traditional Somali attire in 2006.


Things have never been the same for either of the two men. One became the president of the most powerful nation in the world and the other is still living in his hometown of Wajir, in northeast Kenya, still a respected Elder.

In an exclusive interview with Radio Wardheer on Monday, Dhukow, 83, said he never imagined that Obama would become the president of the United States.

Obama was a senator at the time who had interest in visiting in Dhukow’s part of the world, he said.

The picture of Obama in traditional Somali elder garb became sensational a year later when the senator from Illinois declared his intention to run for the office of the American presidency. Speculation was rife that Obama, who is Christian, was a secret Muslim.
Dhukow also got his 15 minutes of fame when the world saw him dressing Obama.

“People still call me Obama,” said Dhukow, laughing.

But Barack Obama and people in his campaign were not laughing when the image went viral on the internet. Matt Drudge, the influential blogger, first posted the picture but all indications were that the Hillary Clinton campaign, Obama’s main rival in the Democratic primaries, had something to do with airing it.

“I just want to make it very clear that we were not aware of it, the campaign didn’t sanction it and we don’t know anything about it,” declared Clinton campaign manager Howard Wolfson.

Two Clinton Iowa volunteers, however, resigned after they were responsible for forwarding a hoax e-mail falsely claiming that Obama was Muslim and bent on destroying America.

The leaders of the Obama campaign were livid and blamed the Clinton campaign for attempting to use “divisive “tactics to scare voters away from Obama. David Plouffe, Obama’s campaign manager then accused the Clinton camp of engaging in “the most shameful, offensive fear-mongering we have seen from either party in the election.”

Obama himself attacked the Clinton campaign in an interview with WOAI radio in San Antonio, Texas. “Everybody knows that whether it is I, Senator Clinton, or Bill Clinton−that when you travel to other countries they ask you to try on traditional garb that you have been given as a gift,” said Obama.

Dhukow denied that he ever talked to the visiting Obama about religion.

“We did not have a private meeting,” asserted Dhukow.

It was Obama who had requested to meet with the Elders and local government officials, said Dhukow.

“He was our guest,” said Dhukow of Obama “and, according to our Somali tradition, we gave him a gift.”

Dhukow remembers that Obama was happy and laughing when he was dressing him. Obama even joked about the Somali sarong. The senator said that he had heard of a man wearing pants and a sarong on the top and the sarong fell off. “The man thought he was naked and people laughed at him,” Obama told the Elders.

Dhukow has seen all kinds of leaders coming to Wajir and being dressed in Somali garb. Daniel Arap Moi, former president of Kenya, and Kibaki, Kenya’s current president, also were dressed up. In addition, Dhukow was present when the daughter of the British queen and an Algerian leader visited Wajir and were in dressed traditional clothes.

Obama visited Wajir’s animal market and asked Dhukow and others about camels. He also asked questions about the American foreign aid to Wajir Hospital and how the funds were managed.

When asked if he had contacted Obama after he became president, Dhukow said no.

I thought that he would remember me and Wajir,” lamented Dhukow. There is a sense of disappointment in his voice. Nevertheless, the Elder wants Obama to win this November.

“People had told me that Obama would buy me a house or even university scholarships for my children,” Dhukow said with sadness in his voice.

So far, nothing has been forthcoming.


Thursday, September 27, 2012

Who is Advising the New Somali President?

Over the last two weeks, Somalia has experienced seismic political changes. A sitting president, Shaikh Sharif Ahmed, found himself left in the dust by a newcomer, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, who defeated him in a landslide. The Al-Shabab group has started a massive campaign of suicide bombings in Mogadishu that have led to the death of many people, including a parliamentarian. The new president has given several interviews, but he has yet−until the writing of this article−to appoint a prime minister. While it is difficult to gauge his intentions, Mohamoud has so far made proclamations that are reassuring to a country that was torn apart by radicalism, civil war, and dysfunction. But he has also said things that make some people scratch their head.


In an interview with the VOA, Mohamoud made remarks that appeared to show his naivetĆ©. He pleaded with “his friends” not to be upset with him if he did not appoint them as prime minister. The logical question is: Mr. President, how many people are we talking about? There are at least two verified cases in which Mohamoud and two other politicians –both highly educated –made an agreement with Mohamoud only for the new president to forsake them. These two individuals were promised the plum job of prime minister and are ruing because they feel double-crossed. The new president, in fairness, has yet to address this matter. But one thing is clear, Mohamoud is a politician committed to getting what he wants, even if it means engaging in equivocation.

There is the issue of the Al-Shabab and how to deal with the group. Mohamoud provided the usual rhetoric of Somali politicians when he stated that the young radical Al-Shabab fighters “are our children” and that they have been misled. Children who have been misled! The days of such double-talk are over because, first, Al-Shabab militants are not children but adults committed to killing their enemies. Second, no one would give legitimacy to a group that is losing battles and territories, and on its way to extinction. While the days of Al-Shabab, as we now know it, are numbered, the threat of radicalism is still present. Another group with similar ideology, but a different name, is likely to emerge after the Al-Shabab with unbridled vigor to resist reform. The outgoing interior minister has even gone so far as to offer factory jobs to Al-Shabab fighters; if they abandon the militant group. One might wonder; how one deals with terrorists who may have killed and maimed; without first conducting an investigation and then serving justice.

Somaliland is another matter that the new president highlighted−as Somalis say “wuu ku simbiriiraxday” (he has slipped) −when he naively made two contradictory statements. On one hand, he wished that things would be the way they were in 1960 when Somaliland joined its brethren in the south and formed one state under one flag. However, the president also said that “no one will be forced into Somali unity.” That statement was confusing to the people in Somaliland, a self-declared state, who were busy sending congratulatory messages to the new president. It is obvious that the new president and his coterie of advisors in Villa Somalia have not yet formed a well-thought -out and clear policy regarding key issues such as Somaliland and neighboring countries. It would have been better if Mohamoud had waited until he appointed a prime minister to issue confusing statements. A seasoned politician would focus on the major priority of the new regime which is −as the president himself said, “Security, Security, and Security.” Somaliland is an issue that should not consume the government when the south itself is in shambles. The new president, of course, gets the benefit of the doubt and these mishaps can be forgiven because, after all, he is a rookie.

This brings us to the question of who is advising the new president. There are, so far, three close advisors that we know of: Farah Abdulkhadir, Abdikarim H. Guled, and Dr. Mohamed Ali Dodishe.

Farah Abdulkhadir is the man mentioned as the major presidential advisor. Abdulkhadir is a member of the parliament and one of the people who encouraged Mohamoud to run for the presidency. The two are believed to be good friends and share the same approach in dealing with Somalia’s pernicious problems. Abdulkhadir was, until recently, a manager of the Kuwait-based Islamic organization named AMA (Africa Muslims Agency), and has a degree in Islamic studies. He is, of course, an Islamist and a bright individual. Contrary to rumors that he is the power behind the president, Abdulkhadir is an advisor with whom the president feels comfortable. All indications are that Mohamoud is his own man and, hence, does not carry water for anyone.

Dr. Mohamed Ali Dodishe is another close advisor of the new president and a longtime friend. Dodishe was once the head of the Al-Shahid Centre for Research and Media Studies, an Islamic nonprofit group. He is not as well-known as his father: Ahmed Shaikh Ali Ahmed Burale, a onetime faction leader from Jubbaland and a former leader of the Somalia National Front (SNF). Burale was once the head of the Somalia Appellate Court and a legal advisor to President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. He had written books in Somali and even translated the classic literary book, Kalila Wa Dimna, by Abdalla Ibn Moqfa’a, which is a collection of fables of people and animals. For those who know Dr. Dodishe, he is an intellectual who articulates his thoughts frankly, but he is also cautious to a fault.

Abdikarim Hussein Guled is one of the top leaders, and perhaps, the most respected figure of Dam al-Jadid (New Blood) and a key advisor of President Mohamoud. Guled became the the head of AMA after Farah Abdulkhadir had left. He is best known for being the chief of FPENS (Formal Private Education Network in Somalia). A source familiar with Guled has described him as “the brain and the person who understands the complexity of Mogadishu the most.”

While any president has the right to surround himself with friends and loyalists, it takes guts and a high level of self-confidence to seek out opposing viewpoints. Barack Obama shocked the world when he made his once avowed political rival in the Democratic Party primaries− Hillary Clinton− his secretary of state. The new president has to prove to the country that he has –aside from his friends of Dam al-Jadid − an array of advisors who can be frank with him and who form the microcosm of Somali society: women, non-Islamists, traditional elders, and the youth. He is, after all, the president of all Somalia and not just the leader of one group.

Sunday, September 16, 2012

Who Will Be Somalia's Next PM?

The new Somali president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, did not have much time to rest after his victory; the next day, a group of masked men attempted to kill him in a failed suicide mission. Then, unconfirmed reports claimed that his private email was hacked. The biggest task ahead of the president now is to appoint a prime minister, a job which has attracted all kinds of seekers and dreamers.

Former Somali president, Siad Barre, used to say, “It is not who you are [clan wise] but what you know.” In an ideal situation in which knowledge and competence matter, someone like Dr. Ahmed I. Samatar, a former journalist (BBC) and a professor of political science for 30 years in the US, would be a shoo-in for either the office of the presidency or the premiership. Samatar and Mohamoud became close friends during the presidential campaign because they had the similar priorities in saving the country. According to sources close to both men, there was even a gentleman’s agreement between the two. However, no one knows for sure if Mohamoud had similar agreements with other candidates. Moreover, Samatar is not Darod, and, in a political environment where clans matter, his chances are slim. Those advising the new president have the understanding that the next prime minister should be Darod. The challenge is to determine which sub-clan. So far, the Majertein and the Marehan are neck and neck in the competition for the position. The Marehan might have a better chance because they have history on their side. Since the Abdiqassim regime, there have been five Darod prime ministers (three Majertein, a Dhulbahante, and a Marehan). The Majertein, obviously, have taken more than their share in filling that position, thus, It will not be a surprise if history is repeated. Dr. Ali Khalif Galeyr, a Dhulbahante, is also in contention for the position but his success is not likely.

Dr. Mohamed Sh. Ali “Doodishe,” is a name on the minds of many, according to sources very close to the president. A political scientist by training, Doodishe graduated on and taught in Sudan. He is Marehan and boasts a special characteristic: He is a member of the New Blood, an Islamic group that counts on the new president. While Doodishe fulfills the clan requirement, he is not likely to cause political headaches for the president for several reasons. First, he is an Islamist from the New Blood, a group the president ideologically identifies with, and the two might have the same outlook and plan for the government. Second, according to the new constitution, the president has the power to appoint the prime minister but cannot dismiss him or her. Every Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was hampered by the endemic power struggle between its president and prime minister. This problem may no longer be as acute as it was previously because the powers of each position are clearly now delineated. “Wouldn’t it be easier for you, M. President,” Mohamoud has been told by his advisors, “to have a prime minister from our group that we can handle instead of an outsider?” According to the people very privy to the president’s thinking, he hasn’t made up his mind, but he finds the idea of Dr. Doodishe as prime minister interesting.

Doodishe, while a friend and a colleague of the new president, brings baggage of his own. It will seem unwise for an Islamist president to appoint another Islamist as prime minister. This could be problematic, because too much concentration of power in the hands of the Islamists in the executive branch torpedoes efforts of reconciliation, discourages coalition-building, and promotes the abuse of power.

If Doodishe is not selected, the other Marehan contenders are Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, Abdiwahab Elmi Omar “Goonjeex,” and Saacid Farah Garaad (Shirdon). The latter once came close to being appointed as prime minister in the government of Shaikh Sharif only for Farmajo to get the nod in the eleventh hour. Farmajo was a prime minister for six months and gathered mixed responses from people. He has many supporters who believe that he is clean, competent, and a nationalist. The latter is an attribute that has lost traction recently in Somali politics. But then, there are others who view Farmajo as someone who lacks political acumen, and might be a liability if the new president wants to court Puntland. That illustrates an example of what I call “the Farole factor.”

Dr. Abdirahman Sh. Mohamed “Farole” is president of Puntland. Under the new federal system adopted by Somalia, Puntland is an entity that cannot be ignored. Farole has recently intimated that Puntland might entertain the idea of deciding its future (a euphemism for secession) if a certain political leader were elected as president. That ‘certain’-leader was the former president Shaikh Sharif who lost to the new president. Farole, however, was quick to welcome the selection of President Mohamoud. The new president, of course, would need to work with Farole and Puntland, but one might ask; at what price? Will Farole have a say in the selection of the new Darod prime minister? The president has the right to appoint whomever he wants, but clan politics is a matter that involves deliberate consideration. If the Farole factor is as important as some perceive, then the new president would want to maintain working relations with Puntland. Consequently, some potential candidates for the premiership; Farmajo, Galeyr and Abdiweli, might be out. Each of these politicians has had falling out with Puntland’s strong man; Farmajo for marginalizing Puntland when he was prime minister; Galeyr for being a leader of Khatumo State, and Abdiweli for not heeding to Farole during the adoption of the new constitution, the naming of both the Elders Group and members of the parliament from Puntland. It was apparent that Abdiweli, himself a Puntlander, did not want to pander to Farole.

Abdiweli did well during his short stint as prime minister and might be re-appointed. The outgoing government headed by Shaikh Sharif and Abdiweli as its Prime Minister—in conjunction with AMISOM forces and the UN Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Mahiga-- deserve much credit for 1) the expulsion of al-Shabab from many parts of the south, including Mogadishu, 2) the writing and adoption of the new constitution, and 3) the ending of the transitional period of the government. Moreover, he brought Puntland on board. Abdiweli’s detractors, however, emphasize the allegations of graft against him, President Shaikh Sharif and former speaker of the parliament, Sharif Hassan, by the United Nations’ Monitoring Group for Eritrea and Somalia. Abdiweli’s critics do not consider him an agent of change, and some see his close relationship with Kenya, a neighboring country which has strong territorial, economic and political interests in Somalia, disturbing.

Other Darod contenders such as Hussein Khalif (Majertein), Dr. Abdirahman Hashi (Dhulbahante), Saeed Abdullahi Dani (Majertein), and Abdirizak Osman Juriile (Dishiishe), interestingly seem to have the alleged support of Farole. Engineer Mohamoud Jama Hamud (Warsangeli) is a northerner who is also a contender, and he believes that he is uniquely qualified to work on the unification of the Somali communities.

Finally, the new president came from nowhere to trounce a sitting president. He might surprise many by appointing a newcomer, just as he is.

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

Somalia's New President: A Victory for Islamic Groups

On Monday, Somalia selected a new president, Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, an Islamist. Mohamoud has been an Islamic activist for a long time. He is counted as one of the sympathizers of the New Blood, a group of Islamists who broke away from al-Islah, Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood, during the reign of the Islamic Courts Union. I use the word “counted,” because there is no record of Mohamoud as a member of any Islamic group. What is not in doubt is the fact that he is an Islamist of the Muslim Brotherhood persuasion. Rival candidate Abdurrahman Baadiyow, on the other hand, has been a member of al-Islah more than two decades.


One phenomenon that was apparent during Monday’s selection process was the prevalence of Islamists among the candidates best able to generate votes in the first round of the election. For instance, four of the six highest vote getters were Islamists: Hassan Sh. Mohamoud, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, Abdurrahman Baadiyow, and Abdulkhadir Ossoble. Each of these four candidates is believed to represent four different trends: Tajamuc or Ala-Sheikh (Shaikh Sharif), al-Islah (Baadiyow), Ossoble (al-Ictisaam) and Mohamoud (the New Blood). Professor Afyare Elmi of Qatar University was prescient when he predicted in 2010 that Islamists would rule Somalia one day. The Arab Spring has brought the Islamic movements to the forefront of political power.

One can confidently say that the four Islamists did a remarkable job garnering votes. Baadiyow was articulate and bold in his presidential campaign speech before the Somali parliament which he declared that the current Transitional Federal Government leaders were failures. He did not get the votes that he had hoped; the recent turmoil in al-Islah did not make things easier for him. The good news is that the Islamists are more likely to learn from this new political experience. Still, the Islamists in Somalia have not reached the level at which they can mobilize the masses for political purposes and win elections. They are in an early stage where personality dominates the political process rather than the institutions. The new president did not win because he is the founder/leader of a political party called Peace and Development Party (PDP). He won, in part, by forging alliances with various clans and capitalizing on the lawmakers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Somalia, like Tunisia and Egypt, will test Islamist leaders who are at the helm. Muslims in these countries have granted Islamists a chance because they see them as clean and not corrupt. Now, the ball is in the courts of the Islamists. Will they rule by building coalitions and leading by example? Will they be tolerant, unifiers, and fight for justice and equality before the law?

Many Somalis are optimistic that Somalia is headed in the right direction. It was impossible, two years ago, to move around Mogadishu safely. Today, the country is enjoying relative peace, and the days of chaos, political cannibalism, and warlords are behind us. US Republican Senator Mitch McConnell said in 2010 that he wanted President Obama to fail. Many of us, on the contrary, are praying for Somalia’s new president to succeed.

Monday, September 3, 2012

Faqash

A young Somali northerner in Toronto, who was born and raised in Mogadishu, has become a fervent supporter of Somaliland and its causes. In other words, as it is said in left-wing parlance, he has become “more Marxist than Marx.” He hangs out with die-hard Somalilanders and attends their political and social events. However, the young man has never been to Somaliland and, in fact, has never traveled beyond the city of Jowhar, which is 100 km north of Mogadishu.


One day, an elderly man new to the group approached the ‘funny’-speaking young man and asked him:

“Who are you?”

“I am Isaaq,” responded the young man.

“Isaaq is a big tribe; what is your sub-clan?”

“Habar Yonis.”

“Habar Yonis is a large sub-clan.”

The young man was baffled and, in a sign of desperation, asked the men if they could, perhaps, name for him some of the sub-clans of Habar Yonis.” “ii soo yeeriya,” he said. The men consented.

“Isihaaq?”

“No.”

“Muuse Carre?”

“No.”

“Abdalla Ismail?”

“No.”

“Reer Caynaanshe?”

The young man jumped from his chair and screamed, “Barobiyo!” (The actual word ‘proprio’ is Italian and means ‘definitely.’)

The young man, after that true incident, was dubbed “Barobiyo.”

Being given an unwanted nickname can be frustrating.

The first time I heard the word “Faqash” was in May 1991 in Djibouti. I was there to collect my mother and cousin, who were arriving from Mogadishu. I stayed in Hotel De Djibouti, which was owned and operated by an Isaaq man named Saeed. Because many people were fleeing Somalia, the hotel was fully booked. I roomed with an elderly Isaaq man, Jama, who had been wounded in the leg. He had a good business in Mogadishu and owned big tractors. In the mayhem of the civil war, Jama was shot by an unidentified bandit. He grilled me about who I was and where I had come from, and I took no offense to his line of questioning. Once he realized that I was visiting from the US and that I originally hailed from Afgooye, he became more relaxed.

At noon, Djibouti, a hot and humid city, would come to a standstill. Most of the residents stayed home in the comfort of air conditioners. That was also the time of day when the consumption of khat, a mild stimulant plant, reached its zenith. Being a non-khat consumer, I used to leave the hotel room and hang with my friend, Mohamoud Haji Abdillahi Diriye, an Isaaq merchant from Hargeisa. Jama and his friends stayed in the hotel chewing khat and ruminating on all kinds of topics. No subject was sacred. By the time I came back to the room in the evening, Jama would tease me, “waaryaa Faqash, maxaa cusub?” (Hey you Faqash, what’s up?) I did not ask Jama and his friends what the word “Faqash” meant. Frankly, I thought it was a nickname or a purely nonsensical word. To me, the word sounded more or less like “fuunto,” a word southerners use to refer to a spoiled egg. The men laughed at the utterance of the word Faqash and I laughed at them for engaging in khat-induced silly chatter.

When I returned to California, some of my friends from the north asked me about my brief trip to Djibouti. I told them that I had actually stayed in a hotel owned by a Qaldaan, (northerner) and had another Qaldaan, as a roommate. Then I cursorily added, “But they kept calling me “Faqash.” My friends burst out laughing and, since that day, they have called me “Hassan Faqash.” They did, however, tell me the origin of the word “Faqash.” During the civil war in the north, the soldiers of the Somali government were called “Faqash.” The word means “the noise boots/shoes make or the way they rattle.” The fleeing soldiers, who had committed a litany of horrible acts in the north, hence, were dubbed “Faqash.”

Then, as years passed, the word started to take on a life of its own.

Some people refer to anyone who worked for the Siad Barre regime or supported his government as Faqash. Oddly, the Isaaq government officials who remained in Barre’s regime until his fall fit into that category too.

Some people have started using it exclusively to refer to the Darod.

Then in 2011, I had an encounter with an Isaaq teen that was born and raised in California. This young man is Sacad Muuse, but his mother is Harti. For the first time in his life, he ventured out of the US and visited Hargeisa. He was excited to be among his kith and kin and began mastering Somali, of course with a distinct northern accent.

When he came back to the US, the first question he asked me was “Adeer, qolamaa tahay?” (Uncle, what is your clan?”)

I have known this young man since his infancy, and he has known me merely as a Somali man and a friend of his parents. However, this time, he wanted to get to know me even better and I felt honored.

Then, he dropped a bombshell.

“Uncle, I will never marry an Isaaq woman.”

“Why not?”

“My aunts in Hargeisa were always badmouthing my mother.”

“How?”

“Well, they would say, ‘Islaantaa Faqashta ah” (that Faqash woman).

I told the young man about my story in Djibouti and appealed to him not to reach foregone conclusions.

He was somewhat pleased to hear my explanation of the word ‘Faqash’ because the term was not yet pejorative.

After the young man left, I kept questioning whether my assessment was actually right.

My Isaaq friends call me Faqash from time to time, even though I am not Darod nor have I ever worked for the government of Siad Barre, yet I am never offended by it.

Do some people use the word to discriminate against others or deride an entire tribe?

There is a great deal of sensitivity among some people regarding the word. The fact that the word is loosely used against all kinds of people today does not in itself make it pejorative.

Perhaps, the word is in the midst of a natural evolution.

Yesterday, it was Siad Barre’s soldiers!

Today, it is refereed to all southerners and whoever is being teased.

Tomorrow, it might be used against someone else.

However, the fact is, it is not specific to one group.



Friday, August 10, 2012

An Ominous Return: Murder In Kaaraan

Asli Ali did not hear from her son, Ahmed, for several days.


Ahmed, after many years abroad, had returned to Mogadishu in March, 2012.

Asli became fidgety with each passing hour and concerned in her comfortable home in Toronto, Canada.

Something was amiss.

Ahmed would call her every day from Kaaraan district in Mogadishu, where the family’s sprawling villa was located. She knew how dangerous Mogadishu could be.

On June 17, 2012 the family finally received the call that turned their world upside-down.

Ahmed, 48, had been found dead in one of the bedrooms in the villa. His uncle, Axmadey Hassan Ali Jimaale, discovered the corpse.

Jimaale and his family had been living in the villa since 1991. Asli had asked him to protect the property until her family returned to Somalia. Jimaale worked for the Somali government in the field of intelligence.

What devastated Asli and her family even more was the manner in which her son had died.

Ahmed, who was found bound, gagged, and stabbed multiple times, was said to have had killed himself.

“Suicide?” screamed his mother.

She was incredulous at the notion that a man could tie himself up, and then stab himself so many times.

“There are other, and perhaps, easier ways one can end his life,” Asli muttered.

A female relative told Asli, over the phone, immediately after the body was found that Ahmed had actually been murdered.

The Kaaraan district police officers, who came to the house and investigated the scene, had difficulty believing it was a case of suicide. The story flew in the face of all the evidence. To the police, It was a staged crime scene. The uncle, it seemed to the authorities, knew more than he was letting on.

“How could you not have heard any noises last night? You were sleeping next room?” one police officer asked the uncle.

The police took Ahmed’s uncle and, later, his aunt into custody on suspicion of murder.

An autopsy by an independent medical examiner proved the police they were right when he ruled the case a homicide. Ahmed had been stabbed in his kidneys, liver, heart, back, under the shoulder-blades, and in his throat. The stab wound to the heart, according to the autopsy report, was the fatal blow. A knife left in his throat was determined to have been placed five hours after Ahmed’s death, in an effort to make the killing look self-inflicted.

Hussein Abdirahman, Ahmed’s younger brother, was appalled by the way his brother had met his demise.

“It is the savagery of the crime that is very disturbing,” he stated.

Hussein, a criminal justice major, had his own theory of who might have done it, but the evidence was merely circumstantial.

“Most likely, it is someone holding on to hatred, or grudge, or perhaps, has a financial stake in the commission of this heinous crime,” Hussein stated.

Ahmed Abdulkhadir Abdirahman was born in Mogadishu in 1964 to Somali-Arab parents. His nickname was “Ahmed Bare” because he had a red birthmark the size of an eraser on his forehead. His father, Abdulkhadir, was one of the first Somali school principals in the country. Ahmed’s father was a product of a Somali-Arab father and a mother who hailed from a dominant clan in Mogadishu. The father passed away in 2004.

“My late husband had held some important government posts,” noted Asli.

The family was doing well financially when the Somali Civil War broke out in 1991. They owned six commercial stores, all of which adjacent to their home.

Ahmed had nine siblings, and was the third oldest. He was also the father of two daughters, ages 14 and 11.

“My brother was pleasant, kind, gentle, gregarious and loving,” remembered Hussein. “He had an ebullient personality.”

Asli recalled how her son, as a student, had displayed high intellect and a seriousness of purpose.

“He was the first in his class,” she said with pride. “He decided to return to Mogadishu after he had studied civil engineering in Saudi Arabia, in order to help his people.”

Ahmed was one of thousands of Somalis who had returned to war-torn Mogadishu after two decades of absence due to the civil war. The city has been enjoying relative peace and stability, and business has started to boom. Many of the returnees naturally attempted to reclaim their properties, which they had abandoned in the early 1990s. Tensions arose between those who were reclaiming their properties and the others who had illegally occupied them. There have been instances when the returnees were asked to pay extortion money, or even ended up being killed for simply asking for what was rightfully theirs.

Ahmed’s family did not have to worry because their property was in good hands. The uncle moved into the villa to make sure it did not fall into the wrong hands. He never paid rent, nor did he share the revenues from the six stores with Ahmed’s family.

According to Asli, Ahmed’s return was his own choice, and, hence, never coordinated with the family. His arrival in Mogadishu, according to the family, was not an attempt to reclaim the family property. Ahmed was given a room in the family’s five-bedroom villa but was uncomfortable with the way his uncle treated him.

“My son was scared and even forewarned me about an imminent danger,” said Asli, choking on her tears.

Hussein also said that he had been getting daily text messages from his brother in the two weeks prior to his death.

“Ahmed would complain about his uncle and aunt, and say that the two had a secret agenda to take over the ownership of the villa,” Hussein added.

In one instance, according to the mother, while Ahmed was drinking tea in the house, his uncle grabbed the cup from him and said, “What are you doing here? Don’t you know that there are people out there who are coming to kill you?”

Ahmed, according to the family, calmly told his uncle that he would defend himself.

Asli said that Ahmed called her afterwards and was growing increasingly agitated and fearful for his life. That is when he decided to move out of the family house and rent a place in the Hamarweyne District.

One week later, he was dead.

Prior to Ahmed’s killing, a man had contacted Asli and told her he was serious about buying the villa. She called Ahmed and asked him to show the villa to the potential buyer. Ahmed told her that he did not want to get involved for fear of alienating his uncle. It was the uncle who had previously dissuaded the family from selling the property.

Ahmed’s uncle and aunt were eventually released on bail, but the investigation continued. The family is concerned that the two might be flight-risk.

A day after the incident, Hussein called one of his cousins only to find his call transferred to the jail where his aunt was being held.

“What did you do?” asked Hussein.

“Ahmed was my son. Why would I kill my own son,” responded the aunt.

According to the uncle, Ahmed had gone to bed at 11 on the night before, and said that he was afraid. The uncle told him to go to his room, and assured that no one would bother him. Ahmed did not appear for breakfast. It was 3 o’clock in the afternoon when the uncle became concerned and broke down Ahmed’s locked door.

Ahmed’s motionless body was found.

Hussein talked to his uncle afterwards and became suspicious. A statement made by the uncle caught him off-guard.

“They [perpetrators] had stabbed Ahmed viciously,” the uncle said.

The word “they,” was revealing, according to Hussein, and indicated the uncle knew that more than one person had been involved in the killing.

It was also odd that the uncle was implying that Ahmed, after all, did not kill himself.

The family is perplexed at the glacial pace of the investigation.

There is skepticism that the case will be solved soon. The prosecutors are backlogged with thousands of cases. Mogadishu’s 2 million residents have only nine full time prosecutors.

Moreover, the family’s minority status, according to Hussein, is hampering any progress in the case. The family is feeling injustice and the government’s lack of genuine interest in solving the murder.

It was only after members of the Somali-Arab community in Mogadishu got involved in the case was Ahmed’s autopsy administered.

Speaking in cautious but hopeful tones, Hussein said that the family is facing a daunting task, but that they would never give up until all of the perpetrators are put behind bars.

“It is the duty of the government,” he further emphasized, “to bring justice to the table, and treat all citizens equally before the law.”