Recently, two separate letters written
in Arabic by Al Qaeda leaders in Mali and Somalia have surfaced. The writings paint
a grim picture of the jihadist experience in both countries. The first was
found in Mali, and the second is an open letter from a Somali jihadist leader
to Al Qaeda supreme leader, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
The first was discovered when reporters
from the Associated Press stumbled across a collection of documents that
included a letter written by Abdelmailk Droukdel, the emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), after that radical group was defeated in Timbuktu, Mali, by
French forces. Droukdel (also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) was appointed by
the late Usama Bin Laden to oversee Al Qaeda’s operations in North Africa.
The second letter is presumed to have
been written by Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad (Al-Afghani), who until two years ago
was the deputy emir of Somalia’s Al Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabab. The letter has appeared
on several websites sympathetic to Al-Shabab and carries Al-Afghani’s nom de
guerre, “Shaikh Abu Bakr Al-Zaylici.” It is an indictment of the emir of
Al-Shabab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his brutal, secretive, “un-Islamic” and
ruinous style of leadership which has had tragic repercussions on the course of
jihad in Somalia.
Droukdel’s letter is a frank
assessment of Al Qaeda’s brief and brutal capture of the northern part of Mali
and the draconian rule that the jihadist group imposed on the people. The
militants applied what they called sharia (Islamic law) by stoning adulterers, amputating
the hands of thieves, whipping petty criminals, curtailing women’s activities,
banning entertainment, berating and intimidating people, and destroying tombs
and certain archeological sites.
In his letter, Droukdel
admonished his fighters, saying that sharia was, for all practical purposes, applied
too fast and in haste: “Our previous experience
showed that applying sharia this way, without taking the environment into
consideration, will lead to people rejecting the religion, and engender hatred
toward the mujahedeen, and will consequently lead to the failure of our
experiment.” He went on to lash out at his cohorts for preventing women from
going out, whipping women for not covering up, preventing children from
playing, and searching people’s houses. “Your [local Al Qaeda] officials,”
Droukdel commanded his followers, “need to control themselves.”
Droukdel was aware of other failed
Al Qaeda experiences in Somalia and Algeria and the lessons learned from those attempts
of unilaterally imposing sharia. He implored his fighters to act cautiously and
gently, more like a parent guiding a child too weak to stand on its own, and to
be always mindful of the need for patience. “We should be sure to win allies,”
he recommended, “be flexible in dealing with the realities, and compromise on
some rights to achieve greater interest.”
Droukdel presciently predicted the
foreign military intervention that stymied the jihadi tide in Mali in mid-2012 long
before it actually occurred in January 2013. He warned his fighters that they
lived on the margins of society and hence needed to form alliances with local
jihadi and nationalist groups. His prescription, however, was to engage in an
elaborate scheme of deception to conceal the grand design of Al Qaeda and its global
jihad. Without mincing words, Droukdel asked his fighters to lower their
profile. “Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a ‘domestic’ movement
that has its own causes and concerns,” he stated. “There is no reason for you
to show that we have an expansionary jihadi, Al Qaeda, or any other sort of
project.”
A Somali leader of Al Shabab, Ibrahim
Al-Afghani, in his open letter to Al Qaeda leader Al-Zawahiri, was more
concerned with leadership issues in Somalia than the precise application of
sharia. He wrote against the backdrop that Al Shabab had retreated and become
the hunted. Al-Afghani, a man upon whose head the U.S. has placed a $5 million
bounty, more or less engaged in the blame game. The logical question then is: What
happened to Al Shabab which, not long ago, controlled large swaths of land in
southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, the capital? For Al-Afghani, the
deterioration of Al Shabab as a power to contend with was attributed to the personal
conduct and dictatorial leadership of his longtime friend and colleague, Godane,
the emir of Al Shabab.
Speaking on behalf of what he
called “the silent majority” of Al Shabab members, Al-Afghani accused Godane of
expecting blind obedience, failing to consult with other leaders of the radical
group, and placing personal desires above the requisites of sharia; neglecting
Islamic teachings of fairness, kindness and gentleness; issuing arbitrary
decisions; sowing conflict among the leaders by lavishing his supporters with
largesse, and depriving his critics of the basics of survival and starving them;
mistreating foreign jihadists; marginalizing Al Shabab scholars; inciting young
jihadists against scholars and leaders by issuing threats of liquidation; preventing certain scholars from publishing,
teaching, or even giving sermons; not lending a hand in the jihadi campaigns in
Ethiopia and Kenya; and operating secret jails not subject to the jurisdiction
of the Al Shabab leadership. These detention centers are reserved, Al-Afghani contended,
for jihadists who are not formally accused of any transgression or convicted of
any crime.
Al-Afghani lamented the fact that
Al Shabab had lost the sympathies and support of the local population because
of the militant leadership’s haughtiness and draconian methods. He singled out
the unjustified operations that the group regularly conducts which lead to the loss
of limbs and lives. He warned that Somalia’s jihadi experience and its “fruits”
were in danger of being lost just as in Algeria in the 1990s. Al-Afghani issued
a plea to the Al Qaeda International leaders to intervene and take corrective action
against the emir of the Somali branch. He reminded Al-Zawahiri that the Somali
emir failed to heed his instructions to apply shura (consultation) to the local leaders. The Somali emir, Al-Afghani
said, deliberately sabotaged the decisions of a special court specifically set
up to address the conflict and discord among the Al Shabab leaders. Instead of
going forward, Al-Afghani declared, Al Shabab was going backward. Furthermore, he
mentioned the poor treatment of a foreign jihadist from neighboring Kenya, Shaikh Abboud Rogo, who
returned to his hometown of Mombasa only to be killed there.
It is not clear whether
Al-Afghani has a personal vendetta against Godane. Unconfirmed reports that the
Al-Shabab leaders had once decided to replace Godane with Al-Afghani have
circulated. However, that decision was conveniently torpedoed by none other than
Godane. Moreover, Al-Afghani’s grievances represent the views of the Al Shabab leaders
who favor the globalization of jihad by the Somali branch. Over the last few
years, debate has simmered among Al Shabab leaders about the best way to ensure
that the group survives Somalia’s ever shifting and volatile political
landscape. One group favors building alliances with local groups and perhaps
making temporary political accommodations that will guarantee the group’s relevance
and lift its isolation. This wing sees the gradual expulsion of foreign
jihadists as an absolute must in order to take these necessary and existential
steps.
The second group sees Al Shabab as
an integral part of an Al Qaeda that is more committed to global jihad and less
to the country’s local issues and concerns. No one group ironically has been
able to fully exert its will on the entire movement. Bin Laden’s instruction to
Al Shabab, when the latter applied to join Al Qaeda, was one of caution. According
to documents found in the terrorist’s compound in Pakistan when Bin Laden was
killed by American forces, he advised the emir of Al Shabab to conceal the
Somali group’s ties to Al Qaeda so as not to draw unfavorable attention from
the West. Bin Laden’s successor, Al-Zawahiri, however, has taken just the
opposite position and does not object to the African group’s flaunting its
international affiliations. The fact that Al-Afghani is taking an active stand
in advocating the cause and the plight of foreign jihadists in Somalia, a
segment that has been increasingly marginalized, is an indication that he sees
Somalia as a staging ground for global jihad. Al-Afghani’s views also mirror those
of the American jihadist in Somalia, Omar Hammami, who has gone public by
issuing videos that accuse his Al Shabab colleagues of attempting to personally
liquidate him and emphasize what he terms the “local focus” instead of supporting
a global jihad. Al Shabab’s Twitter response to the Alabama-born fighter was
terse. It reprimanded Hammami for engaging in a “narcissistic pursuit of fame.”
These two letters are precise manifestations
of the view that the jihadi experience in Mali and Somalia has been a failure
because of poor and harsh policies implemented by the Al Qaeda militants that just
alienated local populations. The militants have adhered to a convoluted
understanding of basic Islamic teachings of moderation and natural evolution,
possessing unrealistic expectations and exhibiting poor planning and leadership
with but a limited vision. The fact is that Al Qaeda remains a pariah in a modern
world that is well aware of its dangerous ideology and destructive operations.
Mali and Somalia share a commonality as they are certified failed states and, hence, there remains a power vacuum. They are also distressingly poor countries. Al Qaeda can conveniently find fertile ground in countries like Somalia, Mali, Yemen, and Afghanistan. It is not surprising then that Al Qaeda radicals in Mali and Somalia have shot themselves in the foot as they failed to capitalize on their brief control of many parts of these two countries. Here is the salient fact about the jihadi groups: It is a lot easier to grab power than to establish a viable government.