Last year was another bloody year in Somalia, during which Al-Shabaab
increased the number of attacks it had launched in the country over the
previous three years. The range and scale of these attacks and killings,
particularly in Mogadishu, were astounding. They included bombings in the presidential
palace and office (Villa Somalia), major hotels, obscure restaurants, military
bases, forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), its garrisons
and convoys, UN convoys and staff, government
buildings, journalists, foreign diplomats, members of the parliament, and
dozens of towns and villages. In one attack on AMISOM, Al-Shabaab fighters
killed 70 Burundian soldiers.
A War of words
The annals of the group’s violent campaign was best described
by the Minister of Information, Mohamed Abdi Hayir, who said Al-Shabaab’s
attacks were being launched “about once a month.” To counter Al-Shabaab’s
terror campaign, Somali government officials have waged a propaganda war
against the organization, which has raised eyebrows. The head of the National Intelligence
and Security Agency (NISA), Abdirahman M. Tuuryare, ordered the media not to
call the radical group by its name “Al-Shabaab” (which means “youth” in Arabic)
but instead to call the group “UGUS”, a Somali acronym for “the group that massacres
the Somali people”. The head of the security agency explained that the new
government name will demonize the militant group by calling it what it is: a
bunch of murderers. Ironically, Al-Shabaab responded by changing the name attributed
to the government to “the group that subjects the Somali people to humiliation”.
Another government strategy, since March 2015, has been to refer to Al-Shabaab as
an “Al-Qaeda/ISIL” outfit, even though the Somali group is not affiliated with
ISIL. In December 2015, the security chief admitted for the first time that
Al-Shabaab has not been responsible for most of the political assassinations in
Mogadishu, even though the militant group proudly takes credit for these acts.
To Join or not to join
ISIL
The tantalizing speculations that Al-Shabaab was considered
leaving Al-Qaeda to join ISIL have proved to be exaggerated. Recently, though, a
group numbering three to four dozen Al-Shabaab fighters declared their
allegiance to ISIL. Al-Shabaab’s reaction was swift and brutal. It fought the
group, imprisoned some, and ran them out of the south. The splinter group has settled
in the Galgala Mountains in Puntland, several hundred miles away from Mogadishu.
The new group is led by Abdulkhadir Mumin, a cleric and former resident of the
United Kingdom, best known in Al-Shabaab for his fiery speeches. The group lacks
strong leadership, as no heavyweight Al-Shabaab leader has joined it, and the
group has yet to attract Al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters. It is not clear if this
split in Al-Shabaab—though marginal now—might evolve into a clan warfare
because Mumin and his supporters are members of the Darod clan.
He is more likely to appeal to his tribesmen in Puntland, and hence the
prospect of his recruitment of fighters in the south is very dim.
Inroads in Kenya
Al-Shabaab has clearly shown it has the ability to operate in
parts of Kenya at whim. The fact that the majority of Al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters
hail from Kenya has given the radical group significant opportunities to kill,
maim, and kidnap civilians and police officers. The group’s periodical
bombings, while lethal, are overshadowed by another fact: Al-Shabaab’s rapid
growth in Kenya’s northeast region is adding muster to the general mayhem it is
causing through its campaign of bombings and assassinations. A significant
number of fighters are holed up in the dense and scarcely populated Boni Forest
bordering Somalia next to the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab is heavily recruiting
youths in the northeast, manning roadblocks in certain areas and collecting
taxes. Isiolo county governor Godana Doyo lamented last April that more than 10
roadblocks manned by foreign armed men were encountered by travelers on the
road linking Isiolo and Wajir. Motorists were being charged Sh3, 000 (an
equivalent of $29 USD) per car per trip. One county official said that the
individuals who had erected the roadblocks were not bandits. “We fear that the
money they take is going to fund terrorism,” he added. Apparently, Al-Shabaab
has obtained fertile ground in the northeast, a region inhabited mostly by ethnic
Somalis, who have been marginalized and neglected by the Kenyan Government in is
economic development programs.
The carnage
continues
The year 2016 is unlikely to bring change in the nature of
Al-Shabaab activities. The periodic and deadly bombings will continue, but they
might experience a spike this summer when the process of selecting the
country’s national leaders will be finalized in August. There might be some respite
after the election, but the attacks will likely resume when the next government
is installed in the fall. Al-Shabaab’s possible affiliation to ISIL is unlikely
to happen. Reasons for this could be the bloody way in which the pro-ISIL group
has been handled, ISIL’s diminishing appeal among Somali jihadists, the African
outfit’s opposition to ISIL’s monopoly of an Islamic “caliphate”, and the
group’s open recruitment, in contrast to Al-Shabaab’s secretive and plodding
process of recruiting fighters. Al-Shabaab knows its standing in global jihad
has waned. The group’s loss of territory, its bloody leadership squabble in June
2013, in which two of its founders were killed, the marginalization of foreign
fighters and the killings of some of them, such as the American-born Omar
Hammami, and the rise of ISIL as a major jihadi phenomenon that has eclipsed
Al-Qaeda central have damaged Al-Shabaab’s appeal among global jihadists.
One possible change is the consolidation of power by Ahmed
Diriye “Abu Ubaidah”, the emir, who was widely believed to have been a
transitional figure. He is benefiting from the growing number of Al-Shabaab
leaders who have been killed by American drones or are surrendering to the
Somali Government. The late charismatic emir of the group, Ahmed Godane,
endorsed Abu Ubaidah as his successor, clearly a huge advantage for Abu Ubaidah.
This year, it is likely Al-Shabaab will continue to pursue
the splinter group and attempt to liquidate its members, as it did to Godane’s
rivals two years ago. The number of Al-Shabaab ranks inside the
country will incrementally decrease, but not to the point of crippling the
radical group. But more Kenyans are likely to join the movement, which will
translate into more Al-Shabaab activities in that country.
After losing big cities, Al-Shabaab’s coffers are dwindling
because not much revenue is being generated from its control of the provinces. Furthermore,
the general population is getting tired of the brand name of “Al-Shabaab”. That
notwithstanding, Al-Shabaab will continue to be a force inside Somalia. One
reason is the weak Somali Federal Government, which is unable to control most
of the country. Another reason is the presence of foreign troops in the country,
some of whom benefit from the existence of the radical group, which justifies
their presence in Somalia for either securing funding from the UN or preventing
the emergence of a strong Somali Government (which is a threat to its neighbors).
Other factors aiding Al-Shabaab’s continuing presence are the marginalization
and alienation of youth, and the prevalence of corruption. As Al-Shabaab
confronts the New Year, it is highly likely its strategy of employing hit and
run, blocking access to certain government-controlled areas, and harassing
AMISOM forces will continue unabated.
