The French were right.
As their adage goes, “Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme
change,” (The more things change, the more they stay the same).
Three weeks ago, the United
Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea released an exhaustive report
that was reviled by some and lionized by others. The main theme of the report is simple: Not
much has changed in the way Somalia is governed.
The arms flow to Somalia
continues as usual and is facilitated by almost everybody, from rogue states to
countries in good standing with the UN.
The other major salient points of the report include: Corruption is rampant and piracy is a lesser
threat but former pirates have made a career change, radicalism is still a
threat to the country but the menace is not exclusively from ideology, charcoal
is a black gold that is illegally exported despite an international ban, and,
of course, “spoilers” always erect obstacles to the pursuit of peace and stability.
President Hassan S. Mohamoud came
to power last fall promising change, stability, and accountability. Many
Somalis and the international community were relieved that finally Somalia had
a new leadership that would, skillfully and honestly, tackle the plethora of
problems the country faced. Maintaining security, eradicating the Al-Shabaab
terrorist group, stopping piracy, and reconstructing the country after 22 years
of civil war and anarchy were the main issues for the new administration.
President Mohamoud’s government gained international recognition and many
countries promised to help in his efforts. Persistently, the president talked
about the need for foreign donors to fund his government directly instead of having
the United Nations administer aid.
Corruption
The UN Monitoring Group report
begins with a stark indictment of the new Somali government. “Despite the
change in leadership in Mogadishu,” says the report, “the misappropriation of
public resources continues in line with past practices.” Some of the
manifestations of this corruption are the following:
a) On
average, about 80 percent of the withdrawals from the country’s Central Bank (CB)
are made—not to run the government—but for private purposes. The CB has become, in a way, an ATM for
certain public officials, or as the report calls it a “slush fund” A case in
point, of $16.9 million transferred to the CB for government use, $12 million
cannot be accounted for.
b) The
monthly revenue from the port of Mogadishu is about $3.8 million; however, from
August 2012 to March 2013, only $2.7 million was deposited in the bank. The
report further explains that “at present, at least 33 percent of the monthly
port revenues cannot be accounted for.”
c)
The immigration services charge a lot of money to
issue passports and visas, but rarely are all the proceeds deposited in the
bank. There is a great deal of fraud and embezzlement. Needless to say, an
individual may never know if his traveling documents are authentic or
fraudulent.
The UN report blames the
country’s leaders for the widespread corruption, but it singles out Abdusalam
Omer, the Somali-American governor of the Central Bank, for being “the key” to the
bank’s irregularities. Omer, oddly, runs the bank without the benefit of a
board. The report even adds a zinger when it brings up Omer’s checkered past. Once
upon a time, Omer was the chief of staff of the mayor’s office in Washington,
D.C. The report claims that Omer was
forced out from this high profile position.
The Central Bank has issued a preliminary response to these allegations.
Piracy
Somalia, once a bastion for piracy,
has experienced a decline in ship hijackings. You might wonder what happened to
most of the pirate leaders. The UN
report has the answer: “To date, neither Mogadishu nor Puntland has seriously
prosecuted and jailed any senior pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators, or
facilitators.” Some former pirates have become security guards for the
unlicensed foreign ships illegally fishing on Somali waters. Pirates have always
blamed these foreign ships for their own criminal acts of piracy. Now, the
pirates have undergone a career change and are joining their arch enemies. Security
protection in the high seas has become a booming business in Puntland
validating the notion, “if you can’t beat them, join them.”
Al-Shabaab
“At present,” the report states,
“Al-Shabaab remains the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia.” The
Al-Qaeda affiliate has not abated its suicide attacks in Mogadishu. The group
has been weakened by internal discord among its leaders, but is still a force
to reckon with. Why? It is because the terror group has not engaged in a direct
battle with the forces of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and, hence,
has retained its core fighters. This enables the group to easily recapture the
towns that Ethiopian forces had withdrawn from or abandoned. “These takeovers,”
the report argues, “illustrates not only the inability of the Federal
Government of Somalia and its associated militias to control any ground without
international support, but also the capacity of Al-Shabaab to readily recover
lost territory.” Moreover, the terror group has infiltrated the government and
especially the intelligence services. Warlords and politicians enable the
militant group to wreak havoc in Mogadishu.
These enablers are not necessarily religious figures but instead are
either persons tribally tied to Al-Shabaab leaders or pure mercenaries.
A good example is what happened
in Mogadishu last week when Al-Shabaab suicide bombers attacked the Turkish embassy
annex. The Turkish ambassador to Somalia said that the attack was “outsourced”
to Al-Shabaab. “The Al-Shabaab organization may have been used as
‘subcontractor’ in this attack,” he told the Turkish news agency Anadolu. Mogadishu
Mayor, Mohamed Ahmed Nur “Tarzan” also railed about “some politicians” for aiding
and abetting the radical group in the commission of its heinous crimes. At
times, in Somalia, it is difficult to tell where religious radicalism begins
and clan loyalty ends.
The Al-Shabaab the terror group
is not the only entity responsible for most of the political assassinations in
Mogadishu. The UN report said that some warlords and even a senior government official
like General Gaafow—head of the immigration services—run hit squads. The going
rate is $200 per head and $25 for conducting surveillance. This explains why
these crimes are never prosecuted. At least, Al-Shabaab takes full
responsibility for its killings. But then, how does one know if the job was
“outsourced” to the terror group or not?
Charcoal
The UN Security Council had banned
the exportation of charcoal from Somalia primarily because Al-Shabaab was then in
control of Kismayo, Somalia’s third largest port city, and was profiting from its
sale. No one cared about the devastating impact the related deforestation was
having on the country. In 2012, Kenyan forces captured Kismayo, along with a
Somali militia group. However, the transport of charcoal not only continued but
increased 147 percent. Al-Shabaab, which controls the port city of Barawe, is
also exporting the black gold. “About 1 million sacks of charcoal are exported
from Kismayo each month,” the report says. If the current rate continues, warns
the report, “charcoal exports in 2012-2013 will consume some 10.5 million trees
and the area of deforestation will cover 1,750 square kilometers, which is
larger than the city of Houston, Texas, in the United States.”
For the record, the Somali
government has denounced the UN Monitoring Group report as being based on
rumors and innuendos. “It is clear that the report is increasingly dependent
upon gossip, guilty-by-association, and hearsay,” declared the government
spokesman.
The most biting critique of the
report, so far, has come from the maligned Governor of the Central Bank,
Abdusalam Omer, who called the allegations, “completely unfounded,
unsubstantiated, defamatory, and reckless.”
Omer questioned the methodology on which the report was based and the
expertise of some members of its panel. Despite the fact that Omer’s name was
mentioned 27 times in the report, no one, he claimed, interviewed him or asked
him to see the books. In addition, Omer argued that the two designated as “financial
experts” on the panel held degrees in anything but finance or economics. One
was a police officer in Minneapolis and the other a foreign affairs journalist
with Reuters. In essence, none of them has “any relevant training or experience
in forensic accounting.”
Criticism of the Report
Criticism of the Report
In a nutshell, the UN Monitoring group
makes numerous allegations. It might be a gargantuan task to collect reliable
data from Somalia and especially Mogadishu because the city has its share of
double-dealing and back-stabbing, not to mention, a vortex of gossip. For
instance, several years ago, the UN Monitoring Group made a harebrained allegation
that Al-Shabaab, a Sunni jihadist group, had sent 720 fighters to Hezbollah, a
Shiite jihadi group in Lebanon, to fight Israel. However the current report does have some
merit, rampant corruption in the country has been well-documented. For
instance, a World Bank report in May 2012 found $131 million unaccounted for in
then the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) revenues in 2009-2010. If
history is a reliable guide, this is a case of attitudinal and cultural
perversions. “Somalis did not consider looting national assets in customary law
terms as stealing,” the report says and, hence, among many officials, the
“pursuit of power and profit became indistinguishable.”
Mogadishu is unique because power interfaces with corruption, religion with clan, jihadism with opportunism, warlordism with legitimacy, and public service with personal enrichment. It is, indeed, a wild and dizzying world.
Mogadishu is unique because power interfaces with corruption, religion with clan, jihadism with opportunism, warlordism with legitimacy, and public service with personal enrichment. It is, indeed, a wild and dizzying world.
Hassan M. Abukar is a writer and political analyst.
(Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, August 7, 2013)
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