Two Myths about Al-Shabaab You Probably Didn't Know

During the last few months, al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Somali group, has shattered some of the misconceptions many have about the critical underpinnings of the group’s activities.  Indeed, some writers, including myself, have made assumptions about the militant group that are simply wrong. Two myths stand out.

1. Al-Shabaab is divided into two factions: Global jihadists and local nationalists

The recent discord among al-Shabaab leadership, especially evident in the bloody incident in Barawe in June 2013, resulted in two founders of the group being killed, Ibrahim al-Afghani and Moalim Burhan, while Hassan Dahir Aweys fell into the hands of the Somali government.

Al-Afghani, was an internationalist jihadi. Other leaders like Aweys, Mukhtar Robow, and Moalim Burhan, were considered to be more local leaders than global jihadists. In addition, two foreign jihadists — Osama al-Britani, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, and the American-born Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki — were killed in September 2013  by loyalists of Ahmed Godane, the supreme leader of al-Shabaab.

The two foreigners, al-Britani and al-Amriki, had impeccable credentials as global warriors. The nagging question is: Why would Godane, a man who is known for his commitment to global jihad, eliminate a group of fighters comprising global and national jihadists?

The answer is simple: The conflict among al-Shabaab leaders is not about whether to wage global jihad. It is mostly about personal rule — namely Godane’s unbridled pursuit of total hegemony over the radical group.  In the end, the larger question about al-Shabaab boils down to not only about global jihad or ideology, but rather is a simple issue of command and control.

2. Al-Shabaab is more lethal and effective now more than ever

We are told that al-Shabaab is ever cohesive and united, as demonstrated by the terror group’s recent bombings in Mogadishu, and the attack on the Westgate mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi.

Yes, al-Shabaab was effective and daring in these bombings, but one has to ask what enabled all these operations to take place in the first place?

In Somalia, the radical group has gotten a rare opportunity in the government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose security apparatus is weak and corrupt.

A year ago, Mogadishu was a lot safer than it is today. According to a recent UN Monitoring Group report, al-Shabaab has infiltrated Mohamud’s administration especially the security and intelligence sectors.

A good illustration is the escape of al-Shabaab member Abdirahman Ali Abukar on September 10 from Mogadishu’s central prison. The fugitive was arrested last year for plotting to kill the country’s deputy head of the national army.  The Somali government has since arrested the prison warden and four correction officers for possibly being bribed by the militant.

This means that as long as the Somali government is corrupt and ineffective, there will be room for al-Shabaab to operate at will. This also means that al-Shabaab is not becoming more cohesive; rather it is a reflection of the government’s inadequacy. Any security lapse in the government is a boon for al-Shabaab.

The attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi was unique because of the preponderance of foreign jihadists in the operation.

If some of the reports are right, the language of communication among the attackers was English, which means that Godane has finally employed a division of labor tactic for his fighters: using foreigners and foreign-born jihadists for operations outside Somalia, and Somali-born fighters for operations within the country.

This division of labor appeases foreign jihadists who have been clamoring for some action for a while.

In short, al-Shabaab’s recent attacks can best be described as opportunities in security lapses and a strong commitment to remain relevant.

These bombings are cries from the militant group to be noticed once again, to distract its fighters from the horrific killings of some of its own leaders and foreign jihadists, and take the limelight away from Somali President Mohamud’s recent diplomatic successes.

By Hassan M. Abukar. The article is reprinted with permission from Sahan Journal.