The ongoing Kenyan
government security sweep against Somalis has generated reactions both serious
and comical. In May, the visiting Chinese Prime Minister, Le Keqiang, vowed to
help Kenya in its efforts to repatriate illegal Somalis back to their country. Beijing’s
offer was an attempt to curry favor with the Kenyan government, with which it
then signed a trade agreement worth several billion dollars. The premier
reiterated what his hosts wanted to hear: illegal Somalis and those suspected
of having ties with Al-Shabaab must be deported from Kenya.
Even more absurd was
the statement by Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Buri Hamza, in
its dangling of the khat card (a mild stimulant plant known in Kenya as miraa).
In an interview with the Standard on
June 1st, Hamza alluded to the possibility of a trade war between Mogadishu and
Nairobi. “If we stop importing miraa,” the minister stated, “so much the
better.” Many in Somalia are addicted to khat, and it would be a herculean
task—not to mention political suicide for the Mogadishu regime—to ban its
importation from Kenya.
On a more serious
note, the security sweep exposed fissures in Kenyan society and added
controversy to the ongoing debate about the role and position of Kenyan Somalis
in the country. The Somali factor in Kenyan politics is paradoxical. On the one
hand, Somali Kenyans have been gaining increasing power in politics and
business, but they have also become victims of periodic profiling and mistrust.
In the 1960s, Kenya’s
first president, Jomo Kenyatta, became increasingly frustrated with the
persistence of the Shifta fighters in the predominantly Somali-inhabited region
of the Northern Frontier District—now the North Eastern Province—who were
agitating to secede from Kenya and join their brethren in Somalia. Kenyatta saw
no difference between the Shifta and ordinary Kenyan Somalis – he was known to
repeat the aphorism: “mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka” (a child of a snake is still a
snake). Kenyatta came up with his own solution to the problem when he told them
plainly: “Pack up and go, but leave us the land.” The Somalis
understandably shunned this directive and stayed.
Five decades later,
Kenyatta’s son, President Uhuru Kenyatta, has cast a dragnet aimed at Somalis
which directly and indirectly affects not only the country’s large contingency
of refugees and immigrants but also Kenyan Somalis.
Kenyan Somalis
inhabit a vast north eastern territory which is one of the poorest and
least-developed regions in Kenya and are also concentrated in the Eastleigh
district of Nairobi. The Somali Kenyan population has grown from several
hundred thousand in the 1960s to approximately 2.3 million now, but still
represents a minority among the country’s 43 million people.
In 1989, two years
before the onslaught of Somali refugees in Kenya, the Kenyan government singled
out Somali Kenyans to carry a pink ID card in addition to the identity document
issued to all Kenyan citizens. This pink card, which highlighted the
government’s discriminatory stance toward Somalis, was declared
unconstitutional in 2003, but, even so, Somalis still remain the target of
harassment and extortion. In Eastleigh, police officers, whether assigned there
or not, routinely make money by stopping and harassing Somalis, legal or
illegal. Somalis in Nairobi call themselves “Human ATMs.”
The label gained
credibility when a large number of Somalis, briefly detained in the security
sweep, secured their release by bribing police officers. Oddly, some elected
Somali officials in the Kenyan parliament were themselves stopped and briefly
detained, even though they had shown the police their Kenyan and parliamentary
IDs. Ali Abdi Bule, a Tana River senator, was stopped and detained for half an
hour because police officers said his papers were false. The police then
released him. In another incident, Senator Billow Kerrow’s house was searched
in clear contravention of his parliamentary immunity.
On the flip-side,
Somali Kenyans are experiencing a golden age in terms of their high
representation in the corridors of political power. They have solid representation
in Uhuru’s Jubilee Coalition Government, with three cabinet portfolios—foreign
affairs, industrialization, sports/culture and arts—which are headed by
Somalis. A Somali is serving as the chairman of the Independent Electoral
and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and two are sitting judges in the country’s
highest courts: One in the Supreme Court and the other in the Appeals Court.
President Uhuru’s legal advisor is also Somali.
In the past, ethnic
Somalis have held important positions, including Minister of Defense, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces, National Chief of Police and Head of the Election
Commission. The number of Somali parliamentarians on the legislative branch has
increased from 13 a year ago to 32 today. Aden Bare Duale, a politician known
for his bombastic rhetoric, holds the post of the National Assembly majority
leader. He told a Somali audience in Eastleigh in April that elected
Somali officials were, for all practical purposes, in control of the
government. “We know how to unlock this government,” he boasted.
In business,
Eastleigh has become a residential haven and a booming business hub for
Somalis. The district is the umbilical cord and the economic center of the
Somali community and Duale asserts that Somalis manage most of the real estate
developments in the country and 80 percent of the fuel trade; they own 80% of
all of Kenya’s imported goods, and one of every five cars. Many Somalis from
the diaspora have also invested heavily in Kenya, particularly in real estate.
Is the increasing
prominence of Somalis in politics and business the reason law enforcement is
profiling and targeting them? Somali politicians and opposition figures
have argued that the security campaign is an attempt to disenfranchise Somalis
as a group. The Secretary General of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
opposition party, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, suggested that the security crackdown
was a case of ethnic profiling with the goal of winning back the trust of
the West and flushing successful Somali businesses out of the country.
Somali Senator Billow
Kerrow also questioned the real motive behind the government’s campaign.
Somalis, stated Kerrow, are known globally for their business acumen, and the
current security dragnet is “an economic war and not a fight against terror.”
After almost three months of the campaign, the government has yet to arrest any
suspected terrorist or dismantle a cell. In addition, Uhuru’s government has
been dragging its feet to appoint an independent commission to investigate the
Westgate Mall terrorist bombing.
While human rights
organizations have condemned the campaign, the dragnet has also shown the
political divide among Somali leaders in Kenya and their ambivalent approach to
security issues bedeviling the country. While all these leaders condemn
terrorists, some have issued statements that further aggravated the situation
and made some Kenyans question how committed Somali leaders are in the fight
against terrorism.
In a televised
speech, Duale told an audience in Eastleigh that those responsible for the
bombings in that district should bomb elsewhere. Then, he oddly mentioned
Machakos, a town and major urban center 64 kilometers southeast of Nairobi, as
an alternative target. “Had the bombers targeted Machakos,” Duale added,
“Eastleigh would not have been harassed.” Duale later denied making the
statement.
The former deputy
speaker of the Kenyan Parliament, Farah Moalim, has alleged in the media that
the government, not Al-Shabaab, is behind the bombings in Kenya. Moalim
subscribes to the conspiracy theory that the United States Government actually
finances Al-Shabaab.
But not all Somali
politicians in Kenya have spoken against the security sweep. For instance, the
Somali cabinet ministers in the government and the former Minister of Defense,
Senator Yusuf Haji, have yet to issue a statement about the crackdown.
Somali Kenyans exist
in a precarious position. As a group they are prominently represented in
politics and business, but they have also become a football, frequently kicked
by the country’s president, his deputy, and the security establishment. Some
Kenyans still view Somalis as aliens who are business rivals and a security
liability. The dragnet is creating a climate of fear in the Somali community
but we do not know yet whether this is a long-term trend or a consequence of
the enduring success of Al Shabaab in Somalia and increasingly Kenya.
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