It was a bad year for Al-Shabaab. In fact, it was the worst
year for the jihadi group since its formation a decade ago. The group lost key leaders, a large swath of territory
and substantial revenues.
Al-Shabaab also lost many of its
territories. Last year, the Somali government forces and those of the African
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) named more than a dozen villages and small towns
which were conveniently—and for public relations consumption—dubbed as
“strategic towns” liberated from the militant group. In reality, what hurt
Al-Shabaab the most was the loss of the strategic coastal city of Baraawe, Bulo
Burte, and the entire region of Bakool. Baraawe was the headquarters of the
group, its main training base, a main source of revenue, and very close to the
capital, Mogadishu (180 km).
If 2013 was a bloody year for
Al-Shabaab because some of the group’s top leaders were either killed or
banished by then-emir Ahmed Abdi Godane, 2014 can be simply categorized as the
year of living dangerously. Key Al-Shabaab leaders were killed by an American air
strike, some were captured, some defected, and some were added to American and
UN sanctions list for wanted terrorists—or, oddly, removed from that infamous
list. A former Al-Shabaab leader from
Puntland, Said Atom, was removed from the UN sanctions list because he had
repudiated his violent past. However, the United States Government put a $3M
bounty on Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir “Ikramah”
(the man who coordinated the attack on the Westgate Mall), Yasin Kilwe (the
group’s emir in Puntland) and Jaafar (Kilwe’s deputy).
Two key Al-Shabaab leaders were
killed by the American drones: Ahmed Abdulkadir Camo “Iskudhuuq,” a commander, and Abdishakur Mohamed Ahmed aka “Tahlil” or “Shakir,” chief of intelligence. Surprisingly, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed
Hirsi, a former head of intelligence of the group and a man on whom the U.S.
put a $3M bounty in 2012, defected to the Somali government. Zakariya, however,
deserted the group 19 months ago in disagreement with Godane. Zakariye will
provide a trove of intelligence about the group to the Somali, Kenyan,
Ethiopian, and American governments.
The major blow for Al-Shabaab
undoubtedly was the killing of Godane himself in an American air strike. The
emir was unique. He was a good organizer: secretive, mysterious, articulate, an
excellent motivator, and an amateur poet. He ruled the radical group with an iron
fist and succeeded in June 2013 to consolidate his power. His loss was perhaps
one that the group is unlikely to recover from in the foreseeable future.
The man who replaced Godane,
Ahmed Diriye “Abu Ubaidah” has yet to
address his fighters and the Somali public. His unusual silence has led to
speculation as to whether he is even in charge. There are some accounts that
say that Mahad Karate, the deputy emir, is the one who is calling the shots.
What we know so far is that Diriye, immediately after his selection, has shown
some interest in reaching out to the renegade Al-Shabaab fighters who have been
in hiding for fear of Godane.
The most prominent of these
disgruntled jihadists is Mukhtar Robow Ali (“Abu Mansur”) who was one of the co-founders of Al-Shabaab, once a
former deputy emir and spokesman. Robow became estranged from Godane and fled
to the Bay and Bakool region. The new emir attempted to open a dialogue with
Robow, but it did not go well. Robow demanded drastic changes in the way
Al-Shabaab is managed and also asked for a full account of the killings of
prominent Al-Shabaab leaders in 2013 by Godane such as Ibrahim Mee’aad “Ibrahim al-Afghani” Abdulhamid Olhaye “Moalim Burhan,” and Omar Hammami, the
American jihadist. Moreover, Robow asked that a new leadership be formed that is
broad-based, inclusive, and legitimate. He also said he had no problem even if
the current emir was selected again. It was apparent that the leadership was
not willing to open the files of past violations, killings, and harassment of
foreign and local jihadists who had crossed Godane. Furthermore, some of the
Al-Shabaab leaders simply saw Robow as a renegade who wanted to wrest power
from the new and inexperienced emir. The current leadership rejected Robow’s
demands, and the talks between the parties have since stalled.
The leadership also reneged on a
promise to release some Al-Shabaab fighters who have been detained in secret
locations during Godane’s reign. Some of the parents of these fighters were
told to come to Barawe during the last Eid festival to be reunited with their
children.
Al-Shabaab succeeded in attacking
Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, three times last year—a proof that the
Somali government even considering the weakened state of the radical group—has serious
security breaches and flaws. The group was responsible for assassinating
lawmakers such as Jama Mohamud Xayd and Sado Ali Warsame.
The year 2015 will be worse for
Al-Shabaab because the group has become an easy target for American drones. It
is astounding that key leaders of the group were successfully pinpointed for
target killing. This indicates, among other factors, that the group’s
leadership has been penetrated by foreign intelligence services—or, that some
of the Al-Shabaab leaders are deeply involved in purging their rivals and
therefore are discreetly leaking information about their whereabouts. The
territories the group controls is shrinking, which means jihadists will further
regroup in rural areas and increase bombing attacks on Mogadishu. If Al-Shabaab
disintegrates in 2015—a distant possibility—it will remerge in a different outfit.
The seeds of jihadism are still present in Somalia. Not long ago, the leaders
of Al-Shabaab were once active members of now defunct Islamic organization
called Al-Ittihad Al-Islami.
