Mired in Major Losses: Al-Shabaab in 2014

It was a bad year for Al-Shabaab. In fact, it was the worst year for the jihadi group since its formation a decade ago.  The group lost key leaders, a large swath of territory and substantial revenues.

Al-Shabaab also lost many of its territories. Last year, the Somali government forces and those of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) named more than a dozen villages and small towns which were conveniently—and for public relations consumption—dubbed as “strategic towns” liberated from the militant group. In reality, what hurt Al-Shabaab the most was the loss of the strategic coastal city of Baraawe, Bulo Burte, and the entire region of Bakool. Baraawe was the headquarters of the group, its main training base, a main source of revenue, and very close to the capital, Mogadishu (180 km). 

If 2013 was a bloody year for Al-Shabaab because some of the group’s top leaders were either killed or banished by then-emir Ahmed Abdi Godane, 2014 can be simply categorized as the year of living dangerously. Key Al-Shabaab leaders were killed by an American air strike, some were captured, some defected, and some were added to American and UN sanctions list for wanted terrorists—or, oddly, removed from that infamous list.  A former Al-Shabaab leader from Puntland, Said Atom, was removed from the UN sanctions list because he had repudiated his violent past. However, the United States Government put a $3M bounty on Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir “Ikramah” (the man who coordinated the attack on the Westgate Mall), Yasin Kilwe (the group’s emir in Puntland) and Jaafar (Kilwe’s deputy).

Two key Al-Shabaab leaders were killed by the American drones: Ahmed Abdulkadir Camo “Iskudhuuq,” a commander, and Abdishakur Mohamed Ahmed aka “Tahlil” or “Shakir,” chief of intelligence. Surprisingly, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hirsi, a former head of intelligence of the group and a man on whom the U.S. put a $3M bounty in 2012, defected to the Somali government. Zakariya, however, deserted the group 19 months ago in disagreement with Godane. Zakariye will provide a trove of intelligence about the group to the Somali, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and American governments.

The major blow for Al-Shabaab undoubtedly was the killing of Godane himself in an American air strike. The emir was unique. He was a good organizer: secretive, mysterious, articulate, an excellent motivator, and an amateur poet. He ruled the radical group with an iron fist and succeeded in June 2013 to consolidate his power. His loss was perhaps one that the group is unlikely to recover from in the foreseeable future. 

The man who replaced Godane, Ahmed Diriye “Abu Ubaidah” has yet to address his fighters and the Somali public. His unusual silence has led to speculation as to whether he is even in charge. There are some accounts that say that Mahad Karate, the deputy emir, is the one who is calling the shots. What we know so far is that Diriye, immediately after his selection, has shown some interest in reaching out to the renegade Al-Shabaab fighters who have been in hiding for fear of Godane. 

The most prominent of these disgruntled jihadists is Mukhtar Robow Ali (“Abu Mansur”) who was one of the co-founders of Al-Shabaab, once a former deputy emir and spokesman. Robow became estranged from Godane and fled to the Bay and Bakool region. The new emir attempted to open a dialogue with Robow, but it did not go well. Robow demanded drastic changes in the way Al-Shabaab is managed and also asked for a full account of the killings of prominent Al-Shabaab leaders in 2013 by Godane such as Ibrahim Mee’aad “Ibrahim al-Afghani” Abdulhamid Olhaye “Moalim Burhan,” and Omar Hammami, the American jihadist. Moreover, Robow asked that a new leadership be formed that is broad-based, inclusive, and legitimate. He also said he had no problem even if the current emir was selected again. It was apparent that the leadership was not willing to open the files of past violations, killings, and harassment of foreign and local jihadists who had crossed Godane. Furthermore, some of the Al-Shabaab leaders simply saw Robow as a renegade who wanted to wrest power from the new and inexperienced emir. The current leadership rejected Robow’s demands, and the talks between the parties have since stalled.

The leadership also reneged on a promise to release some Al-Shabaab fighters who have been detained in secret locations during Godane’s reign. Some of the parents of these fighters were told to come to Barawe during the last Eid festival to be reunited with their children.

Al-Shabaab succeeded in attacking Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, three times last year—a proof that the Somali government even considering the weakened state of the radical group—has serious security breaches and flaws. The group was responsible for assassinating lawmakers such as Jama Mohamud Xayd and Sado Ali Warsame.

The year 2015 will be worse for Al-Shabaab because the group has become an easy target for American drones. It is astounding that key leaders of the group were successfully pinpointed for target killing. This indicates, among other factors, that the group’s leadership has been penetrated by foreign intelligence services—or, that some of the Al-Shabaab leaders are deeply involved in purging their rivals and therefore are discreetly leaking information about their whereabouts. The territories the group controls is shrinking, which means jihadists will further regroup in rural areas and increase bombing attacks on Mogadishu. If Al-Shabaab disintegrates in 2015—a distant possibility—it will remerge in a different outfit. The seeds of jihadism are still present in Somalia. Not long ago, the leaders of Al-Shabaab were once active members of now defunct Islamic organization called Al-Ittihad Al-Islami.