Mogadishu: Maiming, Migration, Mutiny, and Malfeasance

For the last several weeks, Mogadishu has experienced a string of bombings by Al-Shabaab, a mutiny in certain divisions of the Somali National Army (SNA), a brawl in the Federal Parliament, and two diplomatic meltdowns in foreign affairs.

The spike of violence in Mogadishu in March alone was unprecedented, consisting of a barrage of bombings and political assassinations. “The situation in the city has gone from bad to worse,” said a former government official in the Ministry of Security. “People in the capital are very worried, including those in the government.”

The government’s response was akin to imposing a national emergency: it closed roads, undertook security sweeps in some neighborhoods, blamed Al-Shabaab and the opposition groups for fomenting and undertaking a terror campaign, and made a cosmetic leadership changes in the SNA, police, and intelligence services. Some politicians in the city voted with their feet by fleeing in droves to Nairobi for safety. The security situation in Mogadishu, a city of two million residents, was further mitigated by the closing of roads, thereby creating undue hardships on the daily lives of citizens. Likewise, the SNA and police were unable to safeguard the country due to issues of salary payments, desertion, mutiny, and the leadership crisis.

Mutiny in the Army

In March, 2019, Somalia experienced a mutiny by some soldiers in both the Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle regions. Some of these forces deserted their military bases because they hadn’t been paid for months and their food rations were cut off. The soldiers’ meagre salary of $100 per month added more anxiety by the delay in their salary payments. To add insult to injury, Prime Minister Hassan Kheyre was incandescent with anger. Kheyre denied the soldiers from getting their salaries and said that those who did not get their salaries are the ones who were not registered. Kheyre’s statement was contradictory because it acknowledged the existence of soldiers who have not yet been registered but were still working.  

Within a week of Kheyre’s  strong denials came another shocker. President Mohamed Farmajo gave a speech  to a group of military officers at the Defense Ministry and admitted in language that was clear, direct, and unequivocal that salaries have not been paid for four months. Instead of taking full responsibility for the government’s failure to pay its soldiers, he fulminated against the armed forces for not keeping their end of their bargain by wiping out Al-Shabaab in two years.

The soldiers’ mutinous acts raised questions about the inability of the federal government to defeat Al-Shabaab, which has been flexing its muscles by capturing more territories and intensifying its violent terror campaign in the capital. The situation was aptly captured by a short skit by Abwaan Dhiirane, a Somali comedian, titled, “A Neglected Soldier Cannot Defend a Nation.”

All These Military Promotions

Farmajo, critics say, weakened the army by promoting young, uneducated, and inexperienced officers. The president appointed Odowaa Yusuf Raage, a 31-year-old, as a Brigadier-General and army commandant. Raage lacks military officer training and experience. According to Mohamed H. Ingiriis, a doctoral candidate at the University Oxford who has also written academically about the Somali military, and is a fierce critic of Farmajo and his government, “Raage was first trained in Uganda as a VIP bodyguard for the presidential palace during the government of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, then be became a Major during the regime of President Hassan Sheikh. President Farmajo made him Lt. Colonel in 2018 and in that same year, he was promoted to Brigadier-General without ever becoming a full colonel.”

Brigadier-General Zakia Hussein Ahmed also serves as the deputy chief of national police. She is a young woman with only four years of experience with the force. According to Ingiriis, “Somalia is basically for mafia networks and their clan or marriage relations.” It is one thing to give leadership to the young but it is crude policy to set the young up for failure when they are thrust into leadership positions that they cannot handle. A current government advisor concurs with Ingiriis on the issue of military promotions.

Dr. Abirahman Baadiyow, an advisor to Prime Minister Kheyre, a former presidential candidate, and a former military officer in the government of Siad Barre, described an incident regarding the scarcity of qualified military officers in the country. Baadiyow once walked into the office of the president, who was flooded with a stack of case folders. “They are all folders of military officers waiting to be approved for promotions,” the president told him.

The government’s policy of promotions is: a) an attempt not to appreciate education and experience in favor of youth and inexperience; b) a gross undermining of military training, education, and hierarchy; and c) valuing loyalty over competency.

Robbing a Runner

Maryan Nuux Muuse, a young Somali runner, participated in a co-ed sports tournament on April 6, 2019. She was leading the race when suddenly she saw two other female runners in a military vehicle. Initially she thought they were injured, but several minutes later, Maryan was in for a big surprise:  she was informed that the two young ladies she saw in the military vehicle were declared the winners of the race. Shocked and dejected by what she saw as a blatant fraudulent act, Maryam went to the media and reported what she had witnessed.

Khadija Mohamed Diriye, Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs, issued a statement and promised an urgent investigation. After a few days, Maryan was officially declared as the winner of the race. She was elated and begrudgingly thanked the government. Maryam’s case seemed at best a minor incident in a city that was gripped by fear of terrorism, but it was  symptomatic of the larger issue: the extent to which the tentacles of corruption have permeated many facets of Mogadishu’s life.

Freelancing in Foreign Policy

Recently, Somalia has made headway in being elected to chair the meetings of the Arab League and the country improved relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea. Mogadishu has deftly handled Kenya’s recent periodic bullying tactics regarding the maritime dispute case between the two countries before the International Court, and surprisingly has shown diplomatic restraint regarding the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s penchant for repeatedly calling Somalia a “failed state.”

However, two diplomatic incidents rocked Somalia when Fadumo Mohamud, the country’s Ambassador to Switzerland, abstained from a United Nations resolution condemning Israel for annexing the Golan Heights in Syria, In response, Abdullahi Dool, then the Director of the Office of the Foreign Minister, tweeted: “I support the diplomatic ties between Israel and Somalia. It is long overdue. Establishing diplomatic relations does not harm anyone but promote peace and cooperation.” Dool was not yet finished. In another tweet, he condemned the “Palestinians” for being “worst enemies” to themselves and said that they should be “condemned each time they attack civilians. It is in our interest to welcome Israel.”

Since the 1960s, Somalia has always condemned Israel for occupying Arab territories; hence, the UN abstention seemed to be an anomaly. Somalia declared that the UN vote was a mistake and recalled Ambassador Mohamud from Geneva and fired Dool.  

Ambassador Mohamud was remorseful for her diplomatic snafu, according to some media reports, and was replaced with Ebyan Ladane Salah, the country’s ambassador to India. Regardless, Dool was defiant and unapologetic. He told The Times of Israel, “I am owed an apology.”

A Brawl in Parliament

Somalia’s federal parliament has lost its relevancy. Last year, President Farmajo orchestrated the removal of speaker Mohamed Jawari and Mohamed Mursal as his replacement. Whereas Jawari was defiant about the government’s attempts to make the legislature kowtow to the executive branch, Mursal is doing the regime’s bidding. Last month, parliament had to recess in one session because many politicians fled to Nairobi and hence there was no quorum. The biggest surprise was the brawl that took place several weeks ago when one legislator called another as “being an Al-Shabaab.” The accuser is a parliamentarian who is also a member of the cabinet. His dual roles are not strange because almost 65 legislators (out of 275) serve in the cabinet. The incident was a testament to the level of acrimony between government supporters in the parliament and opposition groups.

Within that week, another incident raised eyebrows in the legislature. Hussein Arab Isse, a legislator from what is now called Somaliland (a breakaway region), threatened that he and his colleagues from the north would leave parliament if the federal government does not include them in the talks between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Left unsaid was the fact that Isse and his colleagues from the north cannot set foot in the very region they hail from because of their membership in the federal parliament. Moreover, the federal government has neither a strategy to deal with the secessionist region nor future plans for talks, and it remains  unclear why Isse would bring up the issue of Somaliland in the first place.

The dysfunction of the federal parliament is disheartening, as this body is unlikely to do its job of checks and balances. A government official said that more than 100 legislators receive a monthly stipend from the executive branch, ranging from $2,000 to several thousand—depending on one’s rank or importance. It is unfathomable that the current parliament will be an agent of change in the foreseeable future. Apart from a few opposition voices, it has become an extension of the executive committee.

In a nutshell, the situation in Mogadishu is disquieting. Last year, Farmajo described the opposition leaders as being “angry politicians.” However, now, there are soldiers, police officers, citizenry, Bajaaj operators, members of the international community, and some neighboring countries that are all angry. In short, the current state is an amalgam of security failure, inept leadership, poor planning, and—like a horror film—the worry about what will happen next. The situation in Mogadishu is so dire that the liberal interpretation of “Nabad” (Peace) and “Nolol” (Life) loses meaning.

Abdi Hosh: A Tribute

Abdurahman Hosh Jibril, a lawyer and Somalia’s Minister of Constitutional Affairs, a longtime community activist,  a former member of the Federal Parliament, and a mighty figure in  initiating, writing, and adopting the provincial constitution, passed away in Dubai on March 8, 2019, from kidney ailment. He was 63.

Born in Jowhar, 90 KM north of Mogadishu, in 1956, Hosh had the rare opportunity of attending the American-run school founded and managed by the Mennonite Mission in his hometown. He was an exemplary student, always the first in his class, who flourished as a child in Jowhar, a diverse city on the Shabelle river. Hosh’s parents hailed from Goldogob (Puntland), but, for all practical purposes, he was a child of HirShabeelle, from marrow to the bone. His early exposure to diversity in Jowhar was further enhanced by his early schooling at the American school, which was attended by children of the country’s elite.

In that school, Hosh was exposed to Western liberalism and gleaned elements of socialism. In the 1980s, he went to Canada to pursue higher education, studied sociology at the University of Toronto, and then read law at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University.

As a lawyer in Canada, Hosh helped immigrants, refugees, and the indigent on immigration, labor, insurance matters., and human rights issues. However, in the late 1990s, Hosh’s legal career stalled in Canada and he decided to move to California, where he  settled in San Diego. He would help his community with whatever assistance it needed. At that time, I occasionally met Hosh in Anaheim, a city close to Los Angeles and 70 miles north of San Diego, where the main office of the Immigration and Naturalization Services in Southern California was located.

During that period, many Somalis were coming from all over the world to California to apply for asylum. A group of us, including Hosh, helped these asylum seekers in preparing their statements and interpreting for them. I must admit it is when I first became aware of Hosh, not merely as a lawyer, but as a gifted writer. In the statements he prepared for clients, he wrote beautifully—not the typical bland, dry language lawyers are often known for. I have always believed that Hosh had deprived many Somalis from his mellifluous, poetic style of writing because he rarely penned articles. Even when I disagreed with him in his rarely published political articles, I was awed and captivated by the way he wrote. His command of English was impeccable and his use of sarcasm was hilarious and irresistible. One article he wrote, “The Asmara Project: An Abysmal Failure,” still rings in my mind—it was hilarious and biting.

When I started writing regularly 10 years ago, Hosh was one of my biggest fans. He regularly read my articles and took the time to send me emails with effusive praise.

Hosh was an interesting man with a daunting intellect who disdained mediocrity and possessed a strong commitment to progressive agendas, such as equality, justice, women’s rights, protection of minority groups, and fair representation. He always made sure that women were part of the political process and appointed more women in senior positions in his government ministry.

Hosh read a lot and kept up-to-date of what was going on in the world. His eclectic reading tastes were expansive, from novels to biographies.

Hosh was a social butterfly and always eschewed tribalism. The gaggle of friends he had was mindboggling. He knew who was who in Somalia: intellectuals, politicians, chieftains, artists, youth activists, and members of the civil society.

Last March, an influential member of the federal parliament in Mogadishu, invited me to lunch. He told me that Hosh, once his rival in North America, was his guest in the house we were dining in for several months. I was shocked because the level of acrimony between these two former activists was so intense that I never imagined they could coexist under one roof. I was wrong. The two were more mature and forgiving than their rivalry suggested. An anonymous American comedian once said, “The tyrannosaurus has a six-inch deep skin and no apparent interest in politics. What a waste!” Hosh had thick skin and politics was his vocation, a subject in which we had our major differences.  

Hosh was humble and transparent, as well as a  people’s person. When someone on social media once took him to task and accused him of talking about the plight of the poor while collecting a $10,000 monthly salary, he calmly refuted the man’s claim. Then, he mentioned his monthly salary—a figure not even close to $10k—and itemized his expenses. Oddly, it included Hosh paying the salaries of some of his staff from his pocket, as government salaries are notoriously low and at times many months late. At the end, Hosh said that he was actually broke most of the time.

Before his passing, Hosh was in Dubai to attend the wedding of his daughter, Sagal, who was marrying a gentleman from Somaliland. The would-be father of the bride did not have the opportunity to see his daughter wed, but knowing Hosh, he would have boasted about this  young couple from two neighboring but rivalrous regions (Puntland and Somaliland) uniting in matrimony. “My daughter is a unifier,” Hosh would have said, laughing. “I am proud of her.” Unfortunately, the well-planned wedding to have been overseen by Hosh, a proud father, was put on hold because God’s plan often outpaces our own.

Tearful Trio Condemned For Crying Out Loud

Isn’t crying a normal expression of human emotion?

For many Somalis, crying publicly is taboo, and for men, it is especially frowned upon. But recently, three separate incidents in Somalia raised eyebrows and lent credibility to the idea that the rigid knots of this cultural taboo are loosening. A Somali cleric, a female parliamentarian, and a groom at his wedding all cried publicly — and this spontaneous expression of emotion had such a profound effect on those who saw it that it went viral on social media. The tearful trio, each of whom is totally different from the other, and whose motivations for crying are also quite different, generated criticism from Somalis, unearthing the deeply entrenched views many of them hold about the appropriate way people should display emotions. Videos of the trio also led to the exposure of long-held perceptions of femininity and masculinity, and whether emotions should be expressed or suppressed.

Kenyawi’s Crying

The popular Somali-Kenyan cleric, Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Kenyawi, recently visited Mogadishu, where he gave a series of sermons calling for forgiveness among Somalis. During his tour, he met Prime Minister Hassan Kheyre. It was an innocuous meeting, although some critics said it was a cleverly planned PR stunt by both men, a suggestion on which the opposition groups capitalized. Kenyawi was portrayed by these critics as a pathetic object of scorn without a smidgen of dignity, hobnobbing with  federal government leaders instead of staying neutral on political matters.

The cleric was blindsided by the virulent criticism and responded by issuing a video on social media in which he emphasized his lack of interest in politics. Then, something strange happened: The cleric broke down and wept. Occasionally, the cleric would cry during sermons, but his public display of emotion on something not spiritual was odd to many. Supporters of the government lauded him for his “courage” and “sincerity,” whereas his critics lampooned him for acting in an unmanly fashion.  

Muna Kay’s Plea

In January 2019, the Somali Federal Parliament voted on a controversial proposed amendment of the constitution to allow a non-Somali to head the Central Bank. That is what the country’s national leaders wanted, and parliament acquiesced. About 157 members voted in favor of the bill and 17, like Muna Khalif “Muna Kay,” opposed it. During voting, an altercation broke out between Muna and MP Luul Abdi Adan. When the two left the chamber, Muna Kay’s sister attacked MP Luul in the parking lot, injuring her face. Muna Kay’s sister was arrested and booked for assault and battery. Muna Kay bailed her sister out of jail, and then the next day the two went to Mogadishu Airport to board a flight to Baidoa in an attempt, according to police, to be smuggled out of Mogadishu. Muna Kay was stopped and released because she has parliamentary immunity, but her sister was arrested and jailed for absconding bail. Muna Kay was furious and taped a video on Snapchat crying and accusing the Somali police and PM Kheyre for keeping her sister in detention.

Muna Kay, a former model, fashion designer, and businesswoman, made history for being the first Somali parliamentarian to air grievances on social media, crying and pleading for her life. “If I die today, you know why,” she said, alluding to a perceived government plot—real or imagined—to silence her and even liquidate her.

Muna Kay, a longtime supporter of President Mohamed Farmajo and his administration, was fearful of her own government. Her tearful plea and language—mostly peppered in American English—alternated between tragic and profound. Her video went viral; some dismissed her concerns; some defended her as bold and courageous; and others simply wanted to burst her bubble—her name, aura, stature, and media savviness. A small number of people called Muna a self-entitled social brat impelled by an oversized ego. There were other critics who viciously attacked Muna Kay for blaming PM Kheyre for her sister’s criminal conduct. What was odd was the sizable number of women who went after Muna for shedding what they termed “crocodile tears.” In other words, she was portrayed as fake. In a way, these critics were saying to Muna Kay, “How dare you come on Snapchat, after aiding and abetting your sister’s attempt to flee justice, and then you cry foul and plead for help?”

A Groom in Tears

Enough talk about politics. Let’s give another example of someone caught up in the controversial crying game.

A Somali man in Galkacayo did the unthinkable: He cried during his wedding. Once again, the video of his emotional public expression generated a chorus of voices, both critical and laudable. What was a natural emotional expression of joy during a marriage ceremony suddenly became controversial among Somalis.

In the video, you can hear voices of some of the guests in a state of shock. “My God,” one of them said, giggling, “perhaps he is crying out of joy.” Others cheered or jeered. The video shows the young bride comforting her man in a natural expression of care and affection. However, within Somali society, such affection is deemed an act of defiance against Somali cultural norms, which teach young girls early in life never to display their affection in public. The incident of the groom crying was ostensibly the first time in the country a man cried publicly in an expression of joy. At least, I have never heard of a groom in tears at a wedding. I have seen some grooms grumbling about the high cost of their weddings, but crying?

This brings us to the question of why many Somali men refrain from crying in public. Somali boys are taught early in life to act like men and conceal any public display of their emotions, such as crying. When boys show emotions, some parents scold them, “Why do you cry like a woman?” The message is clear: A boy should never appear “weak,” “vulnerable,” or “feminine.”

In popular culture, on rare occasions, you may hear such classic melodies as “Hakaba,” in which a male lover laments the falsity of the notion that a man never cries. Not true, it says, because this lover’s “tears pour so profusely that they mix with running water.” Somali men are no different than other men in the world when it comes to preserving what they may perceive as their masculinity.

For Somali women,  displaying their emotions is a no-no. During the British colonial occupation of Somalia, the famous Canadian author, Margaret Laurence, then a young woman living in the north with her English husband in the 1950s, noticed the stoic nature of Somali women when it came to showing emotions in public. In her memoir, New Wind in a Dry Land: An Account of a Sojourn among the Nomads of Somaliland (1964), Laurence chronicled an absorbing account of Somali nomads fleeing from drought. Among them was a woman who had lost several children due to famine, but she was neither crying nor wailing for her loss. When asked why she appeared stone-faced, exhibiting no emotions, she said it was because God, who had given her the children, had taken them  away.

Abdullahi M. Adan “Cawsey” is a young, perceptive Somali  graduate student studying mental health at the University of Toronto. He has made an interesting observation on social media about the difference between Somalis’ traditional approach to the public expression of emotion in contrast to, for example, the Arab approach, which has no taboos with regard to the expression of emotions such as crying in public.  “When a terrorist bombing strikes,” Cawsey said, “unlike others, Somalis are  never seen crying and wailing.” He added that when a Somali cries, which is rare, it is usually for something that happened in the past. In a way, even the expression of emotion by Somalis might not be linked to their present suffering of pain or stress.

Perhaps, Somalis have a surplus of internalized emotions.

Senator Adlai Stevenson, the former Democratic presidential candidate against Dwight Eisenhower, once recounted an interesting anecdote during his concession speech several decades ago. Stevenson narrated the story of an Illinois farmer who had asked Abraham Lincoln how it felt losing an election. Lincoln is said to have responded, “It felt like a little boy who had stubbed his toe in the dark. That he was too old to cry, but it hurt too much to laugh.”

I guess the social media phenomenon is slowly transforming some aspects of Somali culture, such as the public display of emotions. It is the youth who are more likely to transform the way public expression of emotions is displayed. After all, emotional expression is another form of communication—whether it is joy, anger, stress, or helplessness. Repressed emotions must be released and negative emotions transformed into positive emotions. Otherwise, don’t cry for Somalia.

Sharifa Abukar: An Obituary

Sheryl “Sharifa” Steinberg Abukar, an educator, daughter, sister, an aunt, and mother of four adult children passed away in Dubai on January 28, 2019 from cancer.

Sharifa was born and raised in Detroit, Michigan, to an upper middle-class family. Her father was a sales manager for Canada Dry and her mother was a public school principal.

Sharifa left home to attend Michigan State University in East Lansing, when she was 17.  But after two years, she got homesick and returned to Detroit. She subsequently enrolled at Wayne State University where she earned her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Psychology.

In Detroit, home to the largest Arab population in the U.S., Sharifa developed an interest in the Arabic language and a fascination for Muslim culture. The passion would lead her to embrace and convert to Islam, a decision that ruffled feathers within her devout Protestant family. It was a period of shock, confusion, distrust, and alienation, but her family ties and the loving bond they shared overcame their differences. Indeed, family was a guiding force for Sharifa, as she was close to  her parents and siblings. Her mother passed away in 1998.

Sharifa’s dream was to master Arabic and to live in the Middle East. She finally realized her dream came to fruition three years ago when she was offered a job as principal of the Next Generation School in Dubai. Excited about the opportunity, Sharifa worked diligently to ensure her students flourished academically and culturally. But then her illness struck.

For the last 18 months of her life, Sharifa waged a courageous battle against cancer. While undergoing treatment, she still kept up her full-time duties as principal. Her staff wasn’t even aware of her illness because she did not want to disrupt the school’s work and office morale. Initially, her cancer responded to treatment, but recently, her illness relapsed and took its toll on her.

I met Sharifa during a conference in Michigan in 1981. At the time, she was living in West Lafayette, Indiana, where Purdue University is located. She was modest but confident, brilliant but not conceited, intellectually curious and never afraid to ask questions. In a few months, we were married.

We were in our twenties and she was already writing her master’s thesis. She was a patient and thoughtful young woman adjusting to a young man from Somalia.

I was 21 when we got married, and the following year, aged at 22, I became a father. Sharifa was the rock and backbone of our nascent family, then living in Ohio. I focused on my university studies and on financially supporting the family, while she opted to stay home to take care of our first newborn daughter, and eventually, three more children. Educating our children and providing them a safe and healthy environment became her mission.

After several years as a homemaker, Sharifa went back to graduate school. She had a passion for Linguistics, particularly for the field of language acquisition. She obtained a certificate in ESL (English as a Second Language) and briefly enrolled in the doctoral program in Linguistics at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). For a while, we were parallel graduate students at UCSD; one in Linguistics and the other in Political Science. It was during that period when I became enamored with the subject of language acquisition. I would read some of the textbooks Sharifa used and engage with her about the latest research in the field.

During her studies, however, Sharifa became restless; she gravitated more to empirical analysis than to theory, her department’s focus. Consequently, she switched to education. First, she obtained a teaching certificate, then became a full time teacher with the San Diego Unified School District. Afterwards, Sharifa became a principal at the Islamic School of San Diego (ISSD), a job that would lead her back to school, this time earning a  Ph.D. in Educational Leadership at the University of San Diego. 

Aside from her educational and professional accomplishments, Sharifa will best be remembered as a smart, caring, loving woman with boundless energy and a commitment to excel in all her endeavors. She never tried to be anything but herself. She was pious without being dogmatic, quiet yet outspoken. In her spare time, she volunteered to participate in community activities such as lecturing in schools and universities, and at public gatherings. She was instrumental in helping the establishment of Iftin School, the first Somali charter school in San Diego.

Once, a few days before our wedding, she invited me and a mutual friend, an Iraqi graduate student majoring in Nutrition at Purdue University, to dinner. The meal was okay: the chicken was tasty, but the rice was burned. My friend whispered to me jokingly, “Man, you are in for a big surprise.” We complimented Sharifa for a delicious meal and kept mum about the rice. But that dinner turned out to be the impetus for Sharifa to perfect her culinary skills. As the years went by, she became an excellent cook, her specialty being  American, Middle Eastern, and Somali dishes. I have had many authentic meals with my friends from Jordan, Palestine, and Syria in my time, but I have never had better maqluuba, a popular dish in that region, than the one Sharifa used to make. That didn’t surprise me: Sharifa was always striving to perfect her talents and abilities.  

During the first year of our marriage, I said to her that Somalis were unique. When she asked why, I replied jokingly, “Because they are the best people.” My youthful hubris didn’t escape her. A decade later in the early 1990s, as thousands of Somali refugees poured into San Diego fleeing the civil war, she took a light-hearted jab at me:  “So, how come the best people in the world manage to be so self-destructive?” I had no answer.

In 2003, after 22 years of marriage, our union ended. For a while, she was the caretaker of our two youngest sons, 13 and 11. Then, she kindly allowed me to care for the boys until they became adults. Sharifa was a good mother whose first thought was always the well-being of our children.

Sharifa will be missed dearly by all whose lives she touched. Her patience and perseverance in the face of adversity, her unbridled optimism, cheerful outlook and empathy, and unwavering faith in God have been remarkable. May God have mercy on her and guide us in appreciating how she enriched our lives with her shining example.

Sharifa is survived by her father, four children, three siblings, a niece and three nephews.

Robow's Arrest: Turmoil in the South West State

Mukhtar Robow, the former number-two man in Al-Shabaab and a presidential candidate in Somalia’s South West (SW) region, was arrested on December 13, 2018, in Baidoa and transferred to the capital, Mogadishu. The Ethiopian forces in Baidoa facilitated the arrest.

Robow’s arrest sent ripple effects among the people of the SW, who took to the streets in protest. At least 10 people died during the riots, including a SW parliamentarian. What are the ramifications of Robow’s arrest?

Robow’s arrest is the manifestation of a federal government in disarray, a glaring flaw in counterterrorism policies, a cry for re-examining the Ethiopian army’s presence in Baidoa, and the promise of a bleak future for a country that has been expected to move forward after two decades of civil war but instead is gradually regressing.

A Federal Government in Quandary

Mukhtar Robow became estranged from the Al-Shabaab terror group in 2013, but waited until 2017 to surrender to the federal government. He was reluctant to turn himself in during the regime of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud (HSM) and Sharif Hassan, then-president of the SW. Robow was afraid he would be handed over to foreign countries if he surrendered. He believed the new President Mohamed Farmajo was a nationalist who would treat him better. Robow surrendered last year and was under the protection of the Somali government forces in Mogadishu. Then, this October, he was given the green light to go to Baidoa and run for the presidency of the SW.

A few days after Robow’s announced candidacy, the federal government issued an unsigned letter banning Robow from running for office. The letter propelled Robow’s popularity to new heights; suddenly, the once-scorned rebel leader became the savior of the SW. Some people in the SW supported Robow simply out of spite for the federal government and its heavy-handedness in interfering in the affairs of the region.

It seems that the federal government miscalculated when it allowed Robow to come to Baidoa The government had one purpose: depose Sharif Hassan, then president of the SW and a thorn in the side of the federal government. Once the people of the SW rose against their then-president and banished him, Robow became expedient. The federal government then needed a new, reliable SW president who could help President Farmajo in the 2020 elections. Robow was too independent and too mercurial to help Mogadishu.

The miscalculation by the federal government to let Robow run for office was compounded by its subsequent bungling such as pressuring the SW Electoral Commission to delay the region’s presidential elections three times, bribing more than 100 SW legislators, who were brought to Mogadishu and each given $5000, and the outright bribing of local SW officials in Baidoa.

Now that Robow is in custody in Mogadishu, there are reports that he is being pressured to withdraw from the election. There was a press conference on Sunday, December 16, at the headquarters of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISA) in which Robow did not appear. There is fear among some SW residents that he might be liquidated while in custody and the crime be blamed on Al-Shabaab. Only two years ago, General Abdullahi Gafow, then director of NISA, fired 1,500 intelligence agents for incompetence and fear of possible Al-Shabaab infiltration of the agency.

Al-Shabaab as a Winner

One group that is benefiting from Robow’s arrest is Al-Shabaab. It is rare for the federal government and Al-Shabaab to have a convergence of interests. Robow, a target of the terror group for his betrayal, has become persona non grata for the very government where he sought refuge. The former Al-Shabaab leader has become a classic textbook case for wannabe Al-Shabaab defectors.

Somewhere in Jilib, the stronghold of Al-Shabaab, the militant leaders are laughing at the fate of Robow and the humiliations he has suffered at the hands of the federal government. It is even more ironic for many of the foot soldiers of the radical group, who belong to the Rahanweyn clan, as does Robow. What once the federal government hoped for—mass defections of the radical group after Robow’s surrender—is  today becoming a pipe dream. In fact, there is concern that many SW youth in Baidoa might be radicalized and join the terror group.

What’s to be done

1.      Robow must be released. It is true that I opposed his candidacy, but now that the people of the SW want him as their leader, they should be heard. It is not the federal government’s job to pick leaders for the region. The will of the people should be respected, even if they want a leader with a checkered past.

2.      The Ethiopian troops in Baidoa should be withdrawn because they have proven to be a party to internal Somali politics. This force, the supposedly Sector 3 of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is in Baidoa not to keep peace, but to further the interests of Ethiopia. The AMISOM envoy to Somalia issued a statement in which he declared that the African Union forces in Baidoa had nothing to do with the arrest of Robow in Baidoa and his transfer to Mogadishu.

3.      The extra-judicial arrest of Robow shows Somalia’s need for a judiciary as he was neither indicted nor expected to be brought before a court of law.

It is mindboggling that a presidential candidate can be arrested and prevented from running for office without any charges. Somali political leaders have focused more on elections and their mechanism than on creating basic institutions—such as an independent judiciary—that the country badly needs.

4.      The federal government needs to regain the trust and the confidence of the people in the SW by: stopping its interference in the regional elections by installing puppets; consulting with SW elders, women, youth and intellectuals; being mindful of what can cause or aggravate radicalism among youth. The SW region has become a fertile ground for Al-Shabaab’s recruitment. The current turmoil in Baidoa and the unrest after Robow’s arrest are likely to galvanize an already messy situation.

The SW conundrum is getting murkier and sham elections are underway, to be held on December 19. So far, five presidential candidates have made their presentations before the SW parliament. Robow’s empty chair, the sixth candidate, is unlikely to be occupied. The federal government is going to attain its ultimate goal of holding the elections without Robow’s presence on December 19, ensuring  that international observers will not attend due to the proximity of Christmas. The International Partners of Somalia, a group of 11 countries plus AMISOM and the United Nations, has issued a statement calling all parties to stop the use of violence and engage in an open dialogue to resolve the SW conflict. “There should be unified support for the agreed framework governing the election,” the statement read, “and that all parties [must] respect the integrity of the electoral process.” The Somali federal government is not expected to heed the advice of its International Partners.

Uncertainty in the South West State Elections

The resignation of Sharif Hassan Aden, former president of Somalia’s South West (SW) regional state, was supposed to ease tensions during the presidential elections. However, as Somalis aptly say, “Ayax teg, eelna reeb” (The locust flew away, but it left hardship). There has been turmoil in the region as the elections, which were supposed to take place on November 17, 2018, have been postponed, for the second time,  to December 5. There is a growing fear that the new scheduled date may yet be put off due to fear of procedural roadblocks and heavy-handedness on the part of the federal government.

The federal government and local SW politicians agreed on one thing: the removal of then-president, Aden. Unfortunately, afterward, discord emerged as to who should be selected for president. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu has clear goals: It wants to install its own man as SW president, make plans to influence the 2020 federal elections, and weaken the regional states—a thorn in the side of the federal government.

To accomplish its goals, the FGS has been trying to influence SW’s Electoral Commission (EC) to introduce procedural hurdles that will make it difficult  for one major presidential candidate to legally stand for the  elections. The FGS has its man in Abdiaziz Hassan, better known as “Lafta Gareen.” He is a federal parliamentarian, an ally of Somalia’s president, Mohamed Farmajo, and a man some critics accuse of lacking independent streak. On the other hand, the federal government has been trying to prevent Mukhtar Robow, a former leader of Al-Shabaab, to run for elections.

A year ago, Robow defected from the Al-Shabaab terrorist group and has cooperated with the federal government and its Western allies. He was in Mogadishu under the protection of federal security services until last month, when, with the support and the blessing of the federal government, he flew via private plane and landed in Baidoa, the current seat of the SW regional government. In Baidoa, he announced his candidacy  for the presidency of the SW.

A few days later came the bombshell: an official, unsigned federal letter was issued banning Robow’s candidacy. Robow and many SW residents were blindsided by the letter and, instead of derailing his candidacy, the letter made his popularity skyrocket. Robow was welcomed with open arms by Baidoa residents and many of its elites. There were reports that the United States representatives in Somalia reprimanded the FGS, demanding they ease the pressure on Robow. Washington saw Robow’s candidacy as a better option for the troubled SW region where Al-Shabaab controls a large swath of territory. In short, Robow is seen by some as a political leader untainted by corruption and someone who can bring stability to the region because he is well-versed with the tactics and inner workings of the militant Al-Shabaab group. A group of elders, women, intellectuals, and politicians like former speaker Mohamed Jawari has endorsed Robow as the best candidate who can bring change to the region.

What made the FGS change directions regarding Robow?  

Perhaps, the 2020 federal presidential elections is the reason. President Farmajo has been in office for the past two years, but he is already gearing up for re-election. Against the backdrop of the 2020 federal elections, President Farmajo calculated that he needed a reliable, malleable, and loyal man who can deliver the SW votes, someone who can arm-twist, coax, and cajole the 70 federal parliamentarians from the SW when the elections take place in 2020. Robow, in essence, is his own man and will be interested more in consolidating his power base than becoming a proxy for President Farmajo.

Last month, the federal government brought more than 100 SW legislators to Mogadishu and handed each $5,000. The move angered a dozen members of the SW’s Electoral Commission, who resigned in protest. These resignations were a golden opportunity for the federal government to manipulate the electoral process in favor of its man, Lafta-Gareen.

The new members of the EC have been struggling to institute procedures for the presidential elections as they have been pressured by both the FGS and the Acting President of the SW, Abdulkadir Sharif Sheikhuna, to find ways to ban Robow from running for office. There is fear among federal officials that Robow will defeat Lafta Gareen, but the EC has so far weathered mounting pressure to bar Robow from the elections and gave him a certificate allowing him to run for the elections.  Robow has been pardoned by President Farmajo, and he is no longer on the sanctions list of the US and United Nations. Moreover, the $5 million bounty on his head placed by Washington has been rescinded.

There is fear that the SW elections might lead to violence and instability. The resignation of Aden, the former president of the SW, was not the end of his political influence in the state. He has his supporters and cronies still entrenched in the bureaucracy. Moreover, the new Acting President, an ally of Aden, also wants to carve his own niche with the federal government. Reliable sources have told me that the Acting President has been promised he will replace his father in the federal parliament once the latter resigns. There are credible reports that the Acting President met with members of the EC on November 19 in violation of the rules and regulations of the electoral  process. 

The federal interference in the SW elections is a manifestation that Mogadishu does not care much about the real issues affecting the region’s residents—lack of security, disconnect from the capital, Mogadishu, youth unemployment, bad governance, and corruption. It is more interested in spending millions on bribing legislators, shipping in a bullet-proof car for Lafta Gareen, and sowing discord and divisions among clans. Mogadishu’s attention span is limited to regional and federal elections, and it will be soon heard from, once again, in the 2020 federal elections. In the meantime, for many SW residents, it will be business as usual—fear of Al-Shabaab, a regional government without a capacity, and a state president doing all the bidding for Mogadishu.

Robow: From Wanted Terrorist to Political Candidate

Mukhtar Robow, former leader of the Al-Shabaab terror group, recently announced his candidacy for the President of the South West (SW) regional state in Somalia. Last year, he surrendered to the Somali government and renounced violence.

Robow went to Baidoa ten days ago where he was well received. However, a few days after his announcement, the Somali federal government denounced his candidacy and castigated him as unfit to run for office, stating that the requirements for lifting his past international sanction have not yet been met.

The issue of Robow’s candidacy is as complex as Somalia’s political landscape. It highlights the Somali government’s incompetence in formulating and implementing policies, its failure to speak in one credible voice, and in the dubious role played by competing interests, both foreign and domestic.

Who’s in charge?

It’s not clear how Robow — who has been under the protection and watchful eye of the Somali federal government security forces — left  Mogadishu in a plane and landed in Baidoa, the seat of the SW regional government, without the full knowledge of top leaders in the federal government.

It was the Ministry of Security, not the Council of Ministers, that issued the statement banning Robow from running for public office. The document bears no name and no signature.

“It appears to be authentic, but poorly presented,” an anonymous former official of the Ministry of Security told me.

Through all this, Villa Somalia, the seat of the presidency, has remained silent. This chaotic bureaucratic bungling is common for the current administration, and it begs the question: Who is actually in charge of the government? We all remember the handing over of Colonel Abdikarim Qalbi-dhagax, a Somali citizen, to Ethiopia last year and the ensuing chaos of who was to blame for the debacle.

For the past few days, the government has been in damage control mode. Prime Minister Hassan Kheyre has vowed to investigate the Robow matter. Why Prime Minister Kheyre did not initially object to Robow’s candidacy is puzzling. It could be due to domestic pressure from certain groups, an issue we will address later. Being reactive rather than proactive has been the norm for the current Somali government.

Competing interests
Competing foreign and domestic interests are at odds in Robow’s case.

The U.S. continues to play a major role in Somalia’s war against Al-Shabaab. The country had placed a $5 million bounty on the head of Robow and his former colleagues in the terror group. Last year, American officials were intimately involved in Robow’s surrender to the Somali government and the terms of his protection and safety in Mogadishu.

The Americans must have been in the loop regarding the decision to let Robow run for office.  American officials have been meeting regularly with elders from the SW region to learn about the possibility of the former rebel leader running for office. According to reliable sources in the SW, the elders have supported Robow’s candidacy, believing he would be an agent of change, especially in ameliorating security conditions in their region. They came out of these meetings, believing Robow had the blessing of the U.S.

It is not inconceivable for the U.S. to endorse former militant leaders to become part of the political process. It happened in Afghanistan, with such leaders as Hikmatyar, Rabbani, and Haqqani, as well as in Iraq, with the likes of Muqtada al-Sadr. It also happened in Somalia, when Sheikh Sharif, the former leader of the Union of the Islamic Courts, was captured and released, and later became President of Somalia. And then there is the case of Ahmed Madobe, the former rebel leader, who once was the number two man in Al-Shabaab, and has been the President of Jubbaland State for the past six years.

Perhaps the U.S. views Robow as someone who can bring stability to the volatile SW region, where al-Shabaab is mostly in control. He might be a better alternative than Sharif Hassan, the current leader of the region. Robow may know how to deal with Al-Shabaab because he is well-versed in their tactics and inner workings. He also has one advantage: most of the foot soldiers of Al-Shabaab belong to his Rahanweyn clan.

The U.S. has security interests in the SW; it uses the Ballidoogle airfield to combat Al-Shabaab. Recently, a North Carolina company was awarded a $12 million-dollar to upgrade and expand the airfield, which in the future might serve as an alternative to the American base in Djibouti.

Is the U.S. against Robow’s candidacy? It doesn’t seem so because the issue of his candidacy, as outlined above, has been discussed with Somali federal leaders and SW elders for a long time.

Where do neighboring countries (Ethiopia and Kenya) stand on Robow?

It is difficult to gauge where Ethiopia stands. The current regime in Addis Ababa, under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, may be neutral on Robow’s candidacy because it has more pressing internal issues, such as ethnic violence and regional unrest. The previous regime before Ahmed, however, was more attuned to supporting and bolstering President Sharif Hassan. It may be that the nation’s foreign policy will not change direction drastically and that Addis Ababa might be apprehensive about having Robow lead an important, strategic, and neighboring Somali regional state, such as the South West.

On the other hand, Ethiopia may not see Robow or his former Al-Shabaab group, as a major threat. Ethiopia and Al-Shabaab continue to coexist peacefully. Al-Shabaab does not target Ethiopia nor does it engage in terrorist acts inside Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian forces deliberately avoid engaging in battles with Al-Shabaab. In a way, there is an unwritten agreement between the two entities. Sometimes, Ethiopian troops inside Somalia peacefully withdraw from certain towns, and Al-Shabaab fighters move in, thereby resulting in no clashes between their forces.

Kenya differs from Ethiopia because it has serious problems with Al-Shabaab. There are constant Al-Shabaab bombings inside its territory. Moreover, Kenya has thousands of troops inside Somalia. However, the idea that Kenya has enough power to pressure the Somali federal government regarding Robow’s candidacy is tenuous.

Business and tribal interests

The role of business conglomerates or tribal groups in Somali politics cannot be underestimated. Sometimes these two groups overlap. This is especially obvious in the Lower Shebelle region, where various clan militias have been fighting and vying for power. Some of these clans are intricately aligned with President Sharif Hassan, who has given them the authority to operate checkpoints on the roads that connect Marka and Afgooye to Mogadishu.

These checkpoints are lucrative, generating millions of dollars, and they are controlled by rogue members of the Somali national army, business/tribal groups, or Al-Shabaab. The business and tribal groups want to maintain the status quo, and they see Robow’s candidacy as a clear, and present danger to their interests. Robow has vowed to close down all the checkpoints in the SW region, especially those in the Lower Shebelle.

Some say Prime Kheyre is responding to pressure from some of these business and tribal groups that have expressed their displeasure at Robow’s candidacy. Some of the stakeholders of this business/tribal group control the air transportation sector between Baidoa and Mogadishu because the roads are not under the government’s control. The veracity of these reports remains to be seen.

What’s next?

Next month, it will be interesting to see if Robow stays in the race. The head of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISA) was in Baidoa ten days ago negotiating with Robow to force him to withdraw from the race. Robow adamantly rejected this suggestion, saying that he had met with President Farmajo to discuss the matter. Moreover, he said his candidacy is for the people of the SW region to decide.

The federal government is in a bind. Robow has become a celebrity due to Mogadishu’s decision to bar him from running for office. The NISA delegation that met him were confronted by armed people willing to defend the former rebel group. Robow has told some of the SW elders he is confounded by a leadership that can not speak with one voice. It is the same federal government that has given him a diplomatic passport to travel to Saudi Arabia for a pilgrimage and gave him an official Interpol Clearance letter.

The current president of the SW, Sharif Hassan, is reveling in the political quagmire surrounding Robow’s candidacy because he does not want elections to take place in November. Any delay in the elections is a sure extension of his term. There are also other reports he may not be a candidate.

There are ten members of the Federal Parliament in Mogadishu from the SW region who are candidates for the President of the SW. Former president Hassan Sheikh and his opposition group have their candidate in Farkeeto, the former Finance Minister. Some in the federal government have an alternative candidate other than Robow: Abdiaziz Hassan “Lafta Gareen,” a parliamentarian. The head of NISA, who has resigned, is also a possible candidate. The current president of the SW, Sharif Hassan, is reveling with the political quagmire surrounding Robow’s candidacy because he does not want elections taking place in November. Any delay of the elections is a sure extension of his term.

Robow has been a quick hand in politics. His candidacy has mobilized a segment in the SW that is disenchanted with the way the region is governed. He has called for women to be included in the Election Commission. His speeches have tapped into the sentiments of those who want security in their region and see any federal interference in their affairs as an affront.

“It makes no sense that Ali Dheere (an Al-Shabaab spokesman) wants to chase me in the bushes and PM Kheyre doesn’t want me in Baidoa,” Robow said. Both men he mentioned belong to the same clan.

Regardless of what happens, Robow’s candidacy is a nightmare for the SW region, which has many highly qualified politicians with no history of blood on their hands. It was a coup for the Somali people to see one of the top leaders of Al-Shabaab defect and denounce his old colleagues, but to reward him with political leadership is a travesty. One only has to look at the example of Ahmed Madobe, also a former rebel leader, who hasn’t been able to drive Al-Shabaab from Jubbaland.  Besides, don’t these former terrorists ever ask for forgiveness from the Somali people and the families of the people they had killed?

The ideal situation is to require former terrorist leaders like Robow to take part in rehabilitation programs before they can assume office. It would be wise to introduce a requirement that all Somali leaders with a violent past be banned from running for or holding office until they prove they have been rehabilitated. Until that happens, Somalia will be populated with dubious characters in its political landscape—men like Robow, Madobe, and some former warlords in parliament with a similar violent past.