Somali Phoenix: A Book Review

         

Jama Mohamed Ghalib “Jama Yare” is a Somali politician and writer. He held important posts in Somalia’s civilian government in the 1960s, and later in Siad Barre’s regime. He was the head of the national police under Barre and served, among other important posts, as interior, labor, local government and transport minister. After 1991, he served as a special adviser to General Mohamed Farah Aideed and later became an active participant in various Somali peace conferences held in Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt and Djibouti. Jama published his first book, The Cost of Dictatorship, in 1995. The book under review, Somali Phoenix, is his latest.

This book is a continuation of unfinished business that the author did not address in his first book. It begins with the significance of the Arta Conference which was held in Djibouti in 2000. That important gathering, just 10 years after the beginning of the Somali civil war, was historic—it was the first time a Somali peace conference run by Somalis produced the first transitional government in the country. A Somali government came to existence that was internationally recognized, with a national charter and a clearly defined structure of power: executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. Unfortunately, Arta’s success was not capitalized upon because powerful and sinister forces made sure that it did not succeed. First and foremost, Ethiopia—Somalia’s longtime neighbor and rival— was inimical to the Somali-owned peace conference from the very beginning. Addis Ababa, sensing a rare opportunity to precipitate Somalia’s decline into anarchy, set out to derail the accomplishments of the Arta conference and the transitional national government that it bore. While Ethiopia was the major obstacle, according to Ghalib, other international entities such as the United Nations and the United States, turned a blind eye on Addis Ababa’s negative meddling in Somali affairs. This Ethiopian intervention manifested in several forms, from actual military invasion and periodic incursions in the country to blatant interference —mostly by proxy— in all Somali peace conferences. In one instance during the early 1990s, Somalia’s factions, which were 16, were invited to a gathering in Addis Ababa. Soon, that number had multiplied into 25 separate groups. Some of the Somali personalities who had been invited were mere figures without actual groups. Ethiopia, according to Ghalib, has always had an expansionist policy toward Somalia, a policy that is several hundred years old and is also deeply rooted in fear of Islam.

Ghalib devotes more than 98 pages (one-third) of the book to the destabilizing role of Ethiopia in the past and present of Somalia. What follows is an interesting discussion of other countries’ policies toward Somalia. For instance, Ghalib has a positive view of countries and entities like Kenya, Djibouti, Italy, Egypt, OAU, and the Arab League. The book also covers some general features of Somali culture, Somaliland, and certain key personalities in Somalia.

The discussion on Somaliland and how its secessionist government was founded is perhaps one of the most interesting parts of the book. Ghalib, an avowed nationalist and unionist, minces no words and provides detailed historical and legal refutations of claims made by Somaliland politicians as to why they opted for secession from Somalia.

Perhaps, the discussion of some Somali political leaders, as seen by Ghalib, will create uproar. Ghalib talks about personalities such as Dr. Ismail Jumale Ossoble, Hashi Weheliye Maalin, Ali Mahdi, Aideed, Abdulkadir Zoppo, Abdullahi Yusuf, Mohamed Abshir, Abdirahman Tuur, and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. The author’s view of Aideed is generally positive. Ghalib, for instance, spends less than a paragraph discussing the clan cleansing that took place in southern Somalia. Ghalib’s four-sentence recap of that tragedy in Mogadishu in which thousands of innocent civilians were killed, uprooted, and targeted simply because of their clan affiliation, is as follows:

“Aideed led an uprising against a formidable and strongly established order. The victory over the latter, unfortunately, degenerated into a tragic civil war and inter-clan strafes to which Aideed’s militia was also a party. People therefore died on all sides throughout these conflicts, whether combatants or innocents. Many personalities including Aideed could not therefore escape responsibility for the upheavals per se, but he was never personally accused, let alone proved, of any particular willful murder of non-combatant civilians.”

Ghalib’s narrative of the late former prime minister of Somalia, Egal, is the most intriguing. The discussion is exhaustive and multi-faceted. It covers Egal’s family history, his failure to finish college in England, his political career which was replete with brilliance and backstabbing, public service and corruption, relations with the CIA—real or imagined—and years of imprisonment in Barre’s jails, serving as lackey to Barre after his release and betraying his people in the north, and finally changing colors and expediently becoming a secessionist leader and president of Somaliland. What piques the interest of the reader is what Egal did to Ghalib while the former was in power in Somaliland. Egal sent assassins to Ghalib’s house in Hargeisa, who in turn showered the author and his family with a fusillade of bullets. Fortunately, no one was hurt.  Ghalib has reproduced in his book a hand-written letter allegedly written by Egal ordering the political assassination.  

Ghalib’s book is a valuable addition to Somali studies. He is an excellent writer and is well-versed in Somali history, politics and culture. His assessment of political events, though at times clouded by his inherent biases, is powerful. I liked Ghalib’s first book, The Cost of Dictatorship, and feel the same with his new book. Ghalib is a Somali icon whose integrity and love of Somalia cannot be disputed. He stands tall in a world where many Somali politicians have sold their country to the highest bidder. Some consider Ghalib as a politician who, despite having served under Barre for 14 years as head of the police and interior minister, has not taken any responsibility for the crimes of that repressive regime. This is a subject Ghalib has yet to address because he has skillfully eschewed it in his prolific writings about Somalia. 

Because this book is self-published, Ghalib, unlike his first book, lacked the services of a professional editor. Hence, the book is poorly edited. It is inundated with numerous references—some good and some unimportant—that should have been neatly organized in footnotes. Despite that shortcoming, I would highly recommend this book to serious readers who are interested in Somali history and politics and who want to know why Somalia is in the state that it is in today.

A Winter of Discontent for Somalia's Beleaguered President

Mark Twain one said, “Get your facts first, and then you can distort them as you please.” When news of his demise spread like wildfire, Twain astutely remarked, “The reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.”

Last week, Somali President Hassan S. Mohamoud had his Mark Twain moment. When Turkey sent a special plane to take Mohamoud to Istanbul, the Somali Government spokesman told the mass media the president was having a medical check-up. Several Somali websites reported that the president was suffering from a stress-related condition and he had been placed in intensive care; others even floated the bizarre idea that he had actually died. 

 

After several days of silence, President Mohamoud gave a five-minute interview to Radio Mogadishu. He was furious he had been reported dead or was in intensive care. He contradicted his spokesman and stated he had come to Turkey to visit his wife and children. And yes, he’d had a medical check-up and the results were great.  The president said he was healthy and did not need to take an aspirin.

A simple question about his health that required a simple answer morphed into a tirade against his rivals that lasted several minutes. “These rumors and innuendos are the work of the enemies of the Somali people,” he warned. “In fact, these gossip-mongers are supporters of Al-Shabaab.” To emphasize his fitness, the president asserted, “I am 100% healthy,” six times in five minutes. The repetition of the word “healthy” was accompanied by a dire threat to his enemies. “I ordered the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security to investigate the people behind these false reports,” he added.

For the president, this has been a winter of discontent.

First, the West has abandoned his government. Last year, his government was heralded as the best option for ending Somalia’s two decades of chaos and anarchy. Western donors met in Brussels and pledged $2.5 billion to help the country rebuild itself from the ashes of ruin. British Prime Minister David Cameron convened an international conference in London to help Mohamoud and his government. Mohamoud also got a warm welcome in Washington, Rome, Tokyo, and other capitals.

Last July, the Somali government suffered a setback when the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea accused it of systemic corruption. The report concluded that 80% of aid given to the regime was missing, and the Somali Central Bank had become a “slush fund,” for the country’s officials. The bank’s governor was forced out and replaced by Yusur Abrar, a former Citigroup vice president. Then, the shocker came when Abrar herself resigned from her post after only seven weeks in office. She accused top government officials of graft and of pressuring her to open an account in Dubai so that funds from the Gulf States could be funneled through it instead of being deposited in the central bank. It was embarrassing for the government that Abrar had submitted her resignation in the UAE where she felt safer after assassination threats against her in Mogadishu. Her resignation was so damaging to Mohamoud’s reputation that Western donors withheld all aid to Somalia. Mogadishu has yet to receive a penny from the $2.5 billion pledged by these Western donors.

Second, Turkey, the only government that had been transparently providing cash aid ($4.5 million a month) directly to the Somali Government cut its aid in late December, 2013.  When a Turkish official was asked if aid would be resumed, he said, “We have no such plans at this stage. It is not our agenda.” Fortunately for Mohamoud, his government is still getting millions of dollars from Qatar and other Gulf States, monies whose size and frequency have never been revealed. 

Third, Al-Shabaab has intensified its bombings in Mogadishu, especially of the presidential compound. These terror acts are unprecedented in their ferocity and frequency. The lack of safety in the capital is a manifestation of the regime’s inability to reign in the terror group. Recently, James Clapper, the American Director of National Intelligence, accused Mohamoud of being weak and for heading a regime marred by chronic political infighting. To add insult to injury, a confidential report by the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea, that was leaked to Reuters this month, accused the Somali government of diversion of arms to Al-Shabaab. “A key adviser to the president, from his Abgaal sub-clan, has been involved in planning weapons deliveries to Al-Shabaab leader Yusuf Isse Kabatukade who is also Abgaal,” the report stated. These were weapons the government purchased as part of the partial lifting of the UN arms embargo last year. This is not the first time Mohamoud has been accused of having ties with Al-Shabaab. Last August, in an interview with a Somali channel, former prime minister and current parliamentarian Ali Khalif Galeyr accused Mohamoud of being in cahoots with Al-Shabaab. According to Galeyr, PM David Cameron of Britain had withdrawn an invitation to Mohamoud to attend the G-8 summit when the ties between Somali officials and Al-Shabaab leaders were uncovered. 

The reports of Mohamoud’s ill health are indeed exaggerated. However, what is not in doubt is his growing isolation from the international community, especially Western donors and Turkey, a country that has been a stalwart supporter of Mogadishu. Mohamoud might claim to be as fit as a fiddle, but his government today is ailing with endemic problems of corruption, lack of financial resources, serious security matters, and poor leadership.  

(Reprinted with permission from African Arguments, February 18, 2014).

Waran-Cadde's Wallaweyn Problem

I have a confession to make: I am a southerner and a card-carrying “Wallaweyn” man. Incidentally, Wallaweyn is a small town in southern Somalia. I was born in Afgooye (not far from Wallaweyn) and, since immediately after my birth and until age 18, I grew up in Mogadishu. Despite my strong credentials as Wallaweyn, I also have connections in the north, mostly through blood ties. In the 1960s, one of my sisters married a northerner (Ciise Muuse), a union that produced two children. A cousin also married another northerner (Sacad Muuse-Jibril Abokor), and that couple had several children. Most of my teachers in school were northerners. If you kindly think my English is good, all the credit is due to my northerner teachers. My grandparents hail from the north: my grandmother from Sool and my great grandparents from the Sanaag (Maakhir) region. This dizzying web of lineage for a Wallaweyn man like me is not unique; many Somalis are, after all, inter-related.

You may ask, Okay, what is the point? What are you trying to say?

Relax, I am doing what Somalilanders call “gogol-xaadh” (introduction) because this piece will infuriate some and delight others. It will annoy some because I will be called a “Somaliland hater” or a “Wallaweyn whiner.”  Others may approve of this piece because, as unionists, they will be delighted by the thrashing of Somaliland secessionists. Others might see it as a humorous attempt to toy with that dreadful and suffocating thing called “political correctness.” Are we clear now? No hard feelings.

 

The theme of this article can be summarized in one sentence: I like Somaliland politics. I never get bored with it because it is intriguing and lively. The north and the south share these common features: a) a dominant tribe is in power in both regions, b) there is a certain level of corruption in each, with the south being the greater den of thieves, and c) each regime marginalizes its opponents. However, the north enjoys relative peace and safety. Unlike the south, politicians in the north are not assassinated if they oppose the policies of the government. In Mogadishu, one member of the parliament was recently killed in a mysterious car bombing immediately after leaving the presidential compound. That happens only in Mogadishu.

 

A Pinocchio Interior Minister

Politicians lie, but some shamelessly offend our intelligence.

Recently, a brave and competent Somali journalist from the Somali Channel in the U.K interviewed the interior minister of Somaliland, Mohamed Ali “Waran-Cadde” (The White-speared). The interview was a classic example of how to dodge, lie, misinform, and mock. The minister said that Somaliland was a British protectorate and had a special relationship with Britain based on respect and cooperation.  While the British ruled Somaliland indirectly and were not as brutal as the Italians in the south, the territory was still administered by the Colonial Office in London. The protectorate, after all, was established to supply meat to the British garrison in Aden. Britain did not help the territory develop or build infrastructure.

 

Waran-Cadde was asked about the rumors of his government hiring white mercenaries to protect potential oil fields. He curtly denied them and made it clear that his government will hire neither white mercenaries nor black ones. Then, in reference to the African Union forces in the south, Waran-Cadde called them “sanweyne” (big nose). This denigration of fellow African Union forces that are helping the country get rid of terrorists reveals ignorance and arrogance.

 

Waran-Cadde, in a boldface lie, denied that his government had any shortcomings. He said that the government did not deny the head of the UCID opposition party permission to hold a public demonstration in the town of Gabiley. In fact, the government insisted on the event taking place in the office of UCID rather than outside. Furthermore, Waran-Cadde discounted that a major clan in Somaliland dominates—by design— key positions, including  the presidency, interior, foreign affairs, and finance ministries, chairmanship of opposition parties, and the airport and port administrations.

Recently, Waran- Cadde’s security forces arrested three Somali federal government officials at Hargeisa airport. These officials had attended the Turkish-sponsored bilateral talks between Somaliland and Somalia that were held in Istanbul. “Here in Somaliland, [we] enacted anti-federal government legislation and they knew our response; henceforth, we would bring those people to justice,” declared Waran-Cadde. “They traveled by plane from Mogadishu to Hargeisa and they weren’t transit passengers,” he added. It was only last November when Waran-Cadde, in a press conference, named the Somali government enemy number one of Somaliland.

 

Waran-Cadde has also denied that Somaliland receives foreign aid. This is a strange statement from a government official since his entire security forces get their salaries from the UNDP. Somaliland has also received $3 million from UK Aid in the last year. This assistance, which was earmarked for the pacification of the Sool and Buuhoodle regions, was misspent as is most of the aid given to any part of Somalia. Faisal Ali Waraabe, chairman of UCID, has called the ruling clique in Somaliland a bunch of looters and demagogues who muzzle the independent media like Universal TV and fleece national resources. He compared the current regime in Somaliland to the Siad Barre government. “Somaliland is for sale,” he lamented.

 

Waran-Cadde is a flamboyant politician who has changed political parties as often as one changes clothes. He has, in his home, what defies logic: seven wild lions. Several years ago, one of them got loose in Hargeisa and killed a girl. He has failed to justify why he keeps dangerous wild animals in the city or whether keeping such animals in an urban setting is legal.

 

A War of Words

Recently, a spat erupted between Fadumo Siciid of the UCID party and Amina Mohamoud Diriye, a deputy minister. Ms. Siciid held a press conference in which she lashed out at Ms. Diriye. Ms. Siciid was barred from entering Gabiley by the current administration. This war of words might seem trivial to many, but in reality it is an indication of relative freedom of speech in Somaliland. The role of northerner women in politics is more vibrant than that of their sisters in the south.

  

The current Somaliland administration has a history of marginalizing the opposition parties and deliberately creating discord in their ranks. Funds allocated for the opposition are given to them at one time and denied at another. Opposition figures are also deprived of access to the national mass media. Waran-Cadde, of course, reassured the Somali Channel viewers that he would look into the matter.

Let us hope for that.