Jama Mohamed Ghalib “Jama Yare”
is a Somali politician and writer. He held important posts in Somalia’s
civilian government in the 1960s, and later in Siad Barre’s regime. He was the
head of the national police under Barre and served, among other important posts,
as interior, labor, local government and transport minister. After 1991, he
served as a special adviser to General Mohamed Farah Aideed and later became an
active participant in various Somali peace conferences held in Kenya, Ethiopia,
Egypt and Djibouti. Jama published his first book, The Cost of Dictatorship, in 1995. The book under review, Somali Phoenix, is his latest.
This book is a continuation of unfinished
business that the author did not address in his first book. It begins with the
significance of the Arta Conference which was held in Djibouti in 2000. That
important gathering, just 10 years after the beginning of the Somali civil war,
was historic—it was the first time a Somali peace conference run by Somalis
produced the first transitional government in the country. A Somali government
came to existence that was internationally recognized, with a national charter
and a clearly defined structure of power: executive, legislative, and judiciary
branches. Unfortunately, Arta’s success was not capitalized upon because
powerful and sinister forces made sure that it did not succeed. First and
foremost, Ethiopia—Somalia’s longtime neighbor and rival— was inimical to the
Somali-owned peace conference from the very beginning. Addis Ababa, sensing a
rare opportunity to precipitate Somalia’s decline into anarchy, set out to
derail the accomplishments of the Arta conference and the transitional national
government that it bore. While Ethiopia was the major obstacle, according to
Ghalib, other international entities such as the United Nations and the United
States, turned a blind eye on Addis Ababa’s negative meddling in Somali
affairs. This Ethiopian intervention manifested in several forms, from actual
military invasion and periodic incursions in the country to blatant
interference —mostly by proxy— in all Somali peace conferences. In one instance
during the early 1990s, Somalia’s factions, which were 16, were invited to a gathering
in Addis Ababa. Soon, that number had multiplied into 25 separate groups. Some
of the Somali personalities who had been invited were mere figures without
actual groups. Ethiopia, according to Ghalib, has always had an expansionist
policy toward Somalia, a policy that is several hundred years old and is also deeply
rooted in fear of Islam.
Ghalib devotes more than 98 pages
(one-third) of the book to the destabilizing role of Ethiopia in the past and
present of Somalia. What follows is an interesting discussion of other
countries’ policies toward Somalia. For instance, Ghalib has a positive view of
countries and entities like Kenya, Djibouti, Italy, Egypt, OAU, and the Arab
League. The book also covers some general features of Somali culture,
Somaliland, and certain key personalities in Somalia.
The discussion on Somaliland and
how its secessionist government was founded is perhaps one of the most
interesting parts of the book. Ghalib, an avowed nationalist and unionist,
minces no words and provides detailed historical and legal refutations of claims
made by Somaliland politicians as to why they opted for secession from Somalia.
Perhaps, the discussion of some
Somali political leaders, as seen by Ghalib, will create uproar. Ghalib talks
about personalities such as Dr. Ismail Jumale Ossoble, Hashi Weheliye Maalin,
Ali Mahdi, Aideed, Abdulkadir Zoppo, Abdullahi Yusuf, Mohamed Abshir,
Abdirahman Tuur, and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. The author’s view of Aideed is
generally positive. Ghalib, for instance, spends less than a paragraph
discussing the clan cleansing that took place in southern Somalia. Ghalib’s
four-sentence recap of that tragedy in Mogadishu in which thousands of innocent
civilians were killed, uprooted, and targeted simply because of their clan affiliation,
is as follows:
“Aideed led an uprising against a formidable and strongly
established order. The victory over the latter, unfortunately, degenerated into
a tragic civil war and inter-clan strafes to which Aideed’s militia was also a
party. People therefore died on all sides throughout these conflicts, whether
combatants or innocents. Many personalities including Aideed could not
therefore escape responsibility for the upheavals per se, but he was never
personally accused, let alone proved, of any particular willful murder of non-combatant
civilians.”
Ghalib’s narrative of the late
former prime minister of Somalia, Egal, is the most intriguing. The discussion
is exhaustive and multi-faceted. It covers Egal’s family history, his failure to
finish college in England, his political career which was replete with
brilliance and backstabbing, public service and corruption, relations with the
CIA—real or imagined—and years of imprisonment in Barre’s jails, serving as
lackey to Barre after his release and betraying his people in the north, and
finally changing colors and expediently becoming a secessionist leader and
president of Somaliland. What piques the interest of the reader is what Egal did
to Ghalib while the former was in power in Somaliland. Egal sent assassins to
Ghalib’s house in Hargeisa, who in turn showered the author and his family with
a fusillade of bullets. Fortunately, no one was hurt. Ghalib has reproduced in his book a
hand-written letter allegedly written by Egal ordering the political
assassination.
Ghalib’s book is a valuable addition
to Somali studies. He is an excellent writer and is well-versed in Somali
history, politics and culture. His assessment of political events, though at
times clouded by his inherent biases, is powerful. I liked Ghalib’s first book,
The Cost of Dictatorship, and feel
the same with his new book. Ghalib is a Somali icon whose integrity and love of
Somalia cannot be disputed. He stands tall in a world where many Somali
politicians have sold their country to the highest bidder. Some consider Ghalib
as a politician who, despite having served under Barre for 14 years as head of
the police and interior minister, has not taken any responsibility for the
crimes of that repressive regime. This is a subject Ghalib has yet to address
because he has skillfully eschewed it in his prolific writings about
Somalia.
Because this book is
self-published, Ghalib, unlike his first book, lacked the services of a
professional editor. Hence, the book is poorly edited. It is inundated with numerous
references—some good and some unimportant—that should have been neatly organized
in footnotes. Despite that shortcoming, I would highly recommend this book to
serious readers who are interested in Somali history and politics and who want
to know why Somalia is in the state that it is in today.
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